Court’s Decision
The Patna High Court, in a Division Bench comprising Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Justice Sourendra Pandey, set aside the conviction and 20-year sentence of a man convicted under Section 376(3) of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 5(m)/6, 9(m)/10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO Act).
The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the age of the alleged victim beyond reasonable doubt, and found serious inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses and grave lapses in investigation. The Bench observed that “a conviction cannot be sustained merely on moral conviction; it must stand the test of legal proof.”
Accordingly, the Court acquitted the appellant, holding that the prosecution case suffered from “fundamental infirmities in age determination, reliability of evidence, and procedural compliance.”
Facts
The case arose from a complaint lodged on 9 September 2018, alleging that the accused lured a minor girl to his house under the pretext of boiling milk, locked the door, threatened her with a sword, and committed rape. The victim was said to have escaped when a villager, Raju, knocked on the door after hearing her cries.
The FIR was registered under Section 376(2) IPC and relevant sections of the POCSO Act. The trial court convicted the accused based primarily on the victim’s testimony and medical report, sentencing him to twenty years’ rigorous imprisonment. The appeal before the High Court challenged this conviction on grounds of unreliable evidence, procedural irregularities, and failure to establish the victim’s age.
Issues
- Whether the prosecution conclusively proved that the victim was a minor under 18 years of age.
- Whether inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim and witnesses undermined the prosecution case.
- Whether the investigation and trial suffered from procedural irregularities sufficient to vitiate the conviction.
- Whether alteration of charge and retrospective application of amended penal provisions violated the accused’s right to a fair trial.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The appellant’s counsel, assisted by the Amicus Curiae, argued that the entire case was fabricated due to prior enmity between the parties. They pointed out that the FIR was lodged after an unexplained delay of 24 hours, that the alleged companion of the victim, Isha, was never examined, and that the investigating officer failed to record the victim’s statement under Section 161 CrPC.
They argued that the trial court erred in treating the victim’s fardbeyan as her Section 161 statement, which is impermissible under law. Furthermore, the accused was not medically examined under Section 53A CrPC, and the victim’s clothes were never seized for forensic analysis—both mandatory steps in sexual assault investigations.
The defence also emphasized that the school register produced to establish the victim’s age was unreliable, containing interpolations and manual pagination. The medical report suggested an age between 15–16 years; applying the two-year margin of error, the upper limit of her age would be 18, placing her outside the POCSO ambit.
It was also argued that the trial court illegally altered the charge from Section 376(2) to 376(3) IPC after recording the accused’s statement under Section 313 CrPC, without giving him an opportunity to defend himself—a clear violation of Sections 216 and 217 CrPC. Lastly, the sentence was imposed under an amended POCSO provision not in force at the time of the offence, violating Article 20(1) of the Constitution.
Respondent’s Arguments
The Additional Public Prosecutor defended the conviction, arguing that the victim’s testimony was consistent and trustworthy and that she qualified as a “sterling witness.” The prosecution contended that the school register corroborated her age as below 12 years, and the medical report confirmed she was a minor.
The prosecution invoked Section 29 of the POCSO Act, submitting that once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the accused to rebut the presumption of guilt, which he failed to do. They relied on Vijay @ Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 8 SCC 191 and Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 8 SCC 21, asserting that the victim’s unshaken testimony alone was sufficient for conviction.
Analysis of the Law
The Bench examined the alteration of charge under Sections 216 and 217 CrPC, citing R. Rachaiah v. Home Secretary, Bangalore (2016) 12 SCC 172, which held that alteration of charge after trial requires granting the accused a fresh opportunity to defend himself. The Court noted that no such opportunity was provided in this case.
It reiterated that procedural fairness under Article 21 mandates due notice, opportunity for defence, and examination of material witnesses. The alteration of charge after the 313 statement and the absence of cross-examination on the altered charge vitiated the fairness of the trial.
On the issue of age determination, the Court analyzed Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 and the Delhi High Court’s judgment in Court on its Own Motion v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024 SCC OnLine Del 4484), which held that in ossification-based age assessments, the upper age limit must be considered and a two-year margin of error applied.
The Court concluded that, even as per the medical report (15–16 years), the upper limit of the victim’s age could reach 18 years, disqualifying her as a “child” under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act.
Precedent Analysis
- Shri Umed v. Raj Singh (AIR 1975 SC 43) – The Supreme Court held that documents with manual alterations, missing pages, or interpolations cannot be treated as reliable evidence.
Application: The school admission register produced by the prosecution suffered from similar irregularities and was thus deemed unreliable. - R. Rachaiah v. Home Secretary, Bangalore (2016) 12 SCC 172 – Held that alteration of charges post-trial without recalling witnesses or granting defence opportunity vitiates conviction.
Application: The trial court’s alteration from Section 376(2) to 376(3) IPC was held illegal. - Rajak Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2018) 9 SCC 248 – Held that in age estimation by medical means, doubt must favour the accused.
Application: Supported the finding that the victim’s age could not be proved conclusively below 18 years. - Court on its Own Motion v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) – Directed courts to adopt the higher end of ossification test results while determining age.
Application: Reinforced that the victim’s age could fall within the 18-year range.
Court’s Reasoning
The Bench found the prosecution’s evidence inherently unreliable. It noted that the victim’s fardbeyan was recorded before the FIR but was not used as its basis, raising suspicion about the sequence of events. The presence of the alleged witness, Raju, was found “unnatural and contrived,” as he lived two kilometres away and failed to immediately inform anyone about the incident.
The investigating officer admitted that he neither recorded the victim’s statement nor examined neighbours or key witnesses, and failed to seize clothes or document the scene of occurrence.
Medically, there were no signs of sexual violence, and the doctor’s report described the victim as “habitual to sexual intercourse.” The accused was not medically examined, further weakening the case.
The Court concluded that the trial court had erred in treating defective evidence as conclusive and had overlooked glaring procedural violations. It held that the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act cannot override the principle that prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Conclusion
The Patna High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence. It held that the prosecution failed to prove the victim’s age, the occurrence, and the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Bench ordered the appellant’s immediate release, observing:
“A conviction cannot rest on conjectures or sympathy; it must be founded upon credible evidence and lawful procedure. Where doubt persists, the benefit must necessarily go to the accused.”
Implications
This judgment underscores the judiciary’s insistence on strict adherence to procedural safeguards in sexual offence trials, especially under the POCSO Act. It clarifies that:
- The victim’s age must be conclusively proved before invoking special penal provisions.
- Alteration of charge without fair opportunity to the accused violates Articles 20(1) and 21.
- Section 29 POCSO presumption does not absolve the prosecution from proving its case beyond reasonable doubt.
The verdict will likely serve as a precedent for future cases where evidentiary gaps and procedural irregularities intersect with stringent sexual offence laws.
FAQs
1. Can a conviction under POCSO stand if the victim’s age is uncertain?
No. The prosecution must conclusively prove that the victim was below 18 years at the time of the incident. Any reasonable doubt benefits the accused.
2. What happens if charges are altered after trial without notice?
Such alteration violates Sections 216–217 CrPC and the accused’s right to fair trial; convictions based on altered charges are liable to be quashed.
3. Does Section 29 of the POCSO Act remove the need for proof?
No. The presumption under Section 29 is rebuttable and does not override the requirement of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
