Bombay High Court Refuses to Dismiss Homebuyers’ Consumer Complaint on Limitation, Upholds Delay Condonation in Dispute Over ₹45 Lakh Forfeited by Godrej
Bombay High Court Upholds Condonation of Delay in Homebuyer’s Consumer Complaint Against Godrej; Says Liberal Approach Needed Where ₹45.15 Lakh Was Forfeited Without Registered Agreement
Facts
Godrej Projects Development Ltd. filed a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging the order dated 26 May 2025 passed by the Maharashtra State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. The State Commission had dismissed Godrej’s revision petition and upheld the District Commission’s order dated 6 August 2024 condoning delay in filing a consumer complaint by the homebuyers.
The complainants had booked Flat No. 103, C Wing, in the “Godrej Central” project for a total consideration of ₹2,19,55,239/-. They had paid ₹45,15,844/- to the developer, and an allotment letter was issued on 10 August 2015. Godrej alleged that the complainants failed to pay the balance consideration despite reminders and therefore terminated the allotment by letter dated 28 January 2016, while also forfeiting the amount already paid.
The complainants disputed the termination and eventually filed Consumer Complaint No. 18/685 before the State Commission on 13 August 2018, along with an application for condonation of delay. On 16 April 2019, the State Commission returned the complaint for presentation before the proper forum, holding that it lacked pecuniary jurisdiction. The complainants later filed the complaint before the District Commission on 22 July 2022 along with a delay condonation application.
The District Commission condoned the delay. The State Commission affirmed that order. Godrej then approached the Bombay High Court.
Issues
The principal issue before the High Court was whether the District Commission and State Commission were justified in condoning the delay in filing the consumer complaint before the District Commission.
The Court also considered whether the complainants were entitled to exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act for the period during which the complaint was pending before the wrong forum, namely the State Commission.
Another issue was whether the High Court, in supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, should interfere with a discretionary order condoning delay, particularly when the consumer complaint involved forfeiture of a substantial amount paid by homebuyers.
Petitioner’s Arguments
Godrej argued that the delay was wrongly calculated as only 76 days, whereas the actual delay was 1192 days. It submitted that the complainants had failed to explain such an inordinate delay with proper reasons.
The petitioner contended that the cause of action arose on 28 January 2016 when the allotment was terminated. Since the original complaint itself was filed beyond two years from that date, the complaint was time-barred from inception.
Godrej further argued that the complainants were not entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act because, after the State Commission returned the complaint on 16 April 2019 with a direction to present it before the proper forum within one month, the complainants failed to do so. It was also submitted that the complaint later filed before the District Commission was not the same complaint that had been returned by the State Commission and therefore could not be treated as a continuation of the earlier proceeding.
Godrej relied on State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO to argue that delay cannot be condoned unless sufficient reasons are provided, and on Sri Amar Chand Inani v. Union of India to contend that the complaint before the District Commission could not be treated as a continuation of the earlier complaint.
Respondent’s Arguments
The complainants opposed the petition and argued that Godrej had accepted ₹45,15,844/- from them but had failed to execute a registered agreement in their favour as required under the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963. They submitted that they were ready and willing to pay the balance consideration, but were insisting upon execution of a registered agreement.
They contended that the unilateral termination and forfeiture of the amount were illegal and unjust. The complainants also argued that the cause of action did not arise merely on the date of termination, but continued through subsequent correspondence, especially when Godrej finally refused to perform its obligations.
As regards delay after return of the complaint by the State Commission, the complainants submitted that the original papers and court fee were not returned within reasonable time. They had to pursue the matter, including through the Right to Information Act, to obtain the papers and secure clarity regarding refund of court fees. They also relied on the Covid-19 pandemic and the illness of complainant no. 1 as sufficient causes explaining the delay.
Analysis of the Law
The Court examined Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which permits exclusion of time spent in bona fide proceedings before a court or forum lacking jurisdiction. The Court referred to the conditions laid down in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department, namely that the earlier and later proceedings must be civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party, the earlier proceeding must have been pursued with due diligence and good faith, the earlier proceeding must have failed due to defect of jurisdiction or similar cause, both proceedings must relate to the same matter in issue, and both must be before a court/forum.
The Court noted that the complainants had first approached the State Commission, which returned the complaint only because it lacked pecuniary jurisdiction. Therefore, the question was not whether Section 14 could apply in principle, but whether the delay after return of the complaint was sufficiently explained.
The Court also reiterated that “sufficient cause” must generally receive a liberal construction where there is no mala fide, deliberate delay, or dilatory strategy. At the same time, delay cannot be condoned mechanically or as a matter of generosity.
Precedent Analysis
The Court relied on N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, where the Supreme Court held that length of delay is not decisive; the acceptability of the explanation is the real test. The Supreme Court also held that once a court of first instance condones delay by exercising positive discretion, a superior court should ordinarily not interfere unless the order is arbitrary, perverse, or based on wholly untenable grounds.
The Court also considered State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO, which emphasised that “sufficient cause” should be applied pragmatically and not pedantically, and that substantial justice deserves preference over technical objections when delay is not deliberate.
The Court balanced this with Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, which cautions that delay cannot be condoned where the party is negligent, lacks bona fides, or remains inactive without sufficient explanation.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court found that the complainants’ explanation regarding delay was supported by contemporaneous documents. The documents showed that the complainants were pursuing return of the original complaint and refund of court fees after the State Commission returned the complaint. It appeared that the relevant documents were furnished under the RTI Act on 5 April 2022, and communication dated 27 January 2022 showed that the court fee refund could not be granted.
The Court also took judicial note of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Supreme Court’s suo motu extension of limitation from 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022. Further, complainant no. 1 was allegedly infected with Covid-19 on 27 June 2022, and a medical certificate was produced.
The Court rejected Godrej’s contention that no reasons were given for delay. It held that the reasons may not be perfect, but they were sufficient to support the discretion exercised by the consumer fora.
The Court also considered the broader equities of the case. The complainants had paid ₹45,15,844/- in 2015, no registered agreement for sale was executed as required under MOFA, and complainant no. 2, after the death of her husband, was pursuing refund of a substantial amount against an established real estate developer. The Court held that, on balance, the justice of the case lay in favour of allowing the consumer complaint to be heard on merits.
Conclusion
The Bombay High Court dismissed Godrej’s writ petition and refused to interfere with the orders condoning delay. The Court held that the District Commission had exercised positive discretion in condoning delay, and the State Commission had rightly affirmed that order.
The Court held that in supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, interference was not warranted unless the discretion exercised by the lower fora was arbitrary, perverse, or wholly untenable. Since the complainants had shown sufficient cause, had pursued the earlier complaint before the wrong forum, were affected by delay in return of papers and the Covid-19 period, and were seeking refund of a substantial amount forfeited by the developer, the delay deserved to be condoned.
Case Details
Case: Godrej Projects Development Ltd. v. R.K. Ramani & Anr.
Court: Bombay High Court, Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Case Number: Writ Petition No. 9689 of 2025
Judge: Justice N. J. Jamadar
Date: 2 July 2026
Result: Writ petition dismissed with costs; delay condonation in consumer complaint upheld.
