Delhi High Court Converts Murder Conviction to Culpable Homicide; Holds Wooden Danda Assault Lacked Intent to Kill and Death Followed Septicemic Shock
Delhi High Court Sets Aside Life Sentence for Murder; Holds Wooden Danda Assault Without Fatal Intent Amounted to Culpable Homicide
Facts
The appeals were filed by Saddam @ Ataur Rehman and Mohd. Ubesh alias Shahrukh against their conviction under Sections 302/34 IPC and sentence of life imprisonment. The prosecution case was that around 12:42 a.m. on 28 February 2019, Saddam caught hold of 65-year-old Hamidan while Mohd. Ubesh assaulted her with a wooden danda having a pointed edge, and co-accused Salma slapped her. Hamidan remained hospitalized for about seven days and died on 7 March 2019.
The Trial Court convicted both appellants for murder, principally relying upon the testimony of PW-1 Shahzad, the deceased’s grandson, and the medical evidence.
The post-mortem recorded seven injuries. Six were contusions or abrasions and one was a sutured wound on the forehead. The cause of death was recorded as “septicemic shock consequent upon ante-mortem injury to head as result of blunt force impact.”
Crucially, the doctor stated that the sutured injury could not itself be the cause of death and that there was no punctured wound caused by a pointed weapon.
Issues
The principal issue was whether the appellants’ conduct amounted to murder under Section 302 IPC or only culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC.
The Court had to determine:
- Whether there was any intention to cause death;
- Whether the appellants knew that the injury inflicted was likely to cause death;
- Whether the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death;
- Whether the deceased’s age of about 65 years was sufficient to attract Clause Secondly of Section 300 IPC; and
- Whether the subsequent septicemic shock altered the degree of criminal liability.
Petitioner/Appellants’ Arguments
The appellants argued that the offence under Section 302 IPC was not made out and that, at the highest, the case could fall under Section 304 Part II IPC.
They emphasized that the weapon was only a 1.5-foot wooden danda, which could not be regarded as a deadly weapon, and therefore no intention to kill could reasonably be inferred.
They further relied upon the medical evidence showing that six injuries were contusions or abrasions, while the only sutured wound was not opined to be the cause of death.
The appellants also relied upon the fact that the deceased remained conscious after the incident and herself narrated the history of assault at the hospital.
Respondent’s Arguments
The State argued that the deceased was about 65 years old and that the accused intentionally inflicted an injury on her head knowing that such an injury was likely to cause death because of her age.
The prosecution also argued that the attack occurred around midnight and that this indicated deliberate criminal intent.
Accordingly, the State sought to sustain the conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC.
Analysis of the Law
The Delhi High Court examined the distinction between culpable homicide under Section 299 IPC and murder under Section 300 IPC.
The Court reiterated that every murder is culpable homicide, but every culpable homicide is not murder. It adopted the structured three-stage test referred to in Sitaram Kuchhbedia v. Vimal Rana and Ors., requiring the Court to first establish homicide, then culpable homicide under Section 299, and finally determine whether the case falls within any clause of Section 300.
Clause Secondly of Section 300
The Trial Court had relied upon the deceased’s age to hold that the appellants knew the injuries were likely to cause her death.
The High Court rejected this reasoning.
Referring to Dayanand v. State of Haryana, it explained that Clause Secondly ordinarily applies where the accused possesses special knowledge that the victim suffers from a particular disease or physical condition making an otherwise ordinary injury likely to prove fatal.
The Court held that mere old age of about 65 years was insufficient. There was no prosecution case that the deceased suffered from a particular disease or that any such condition was within the appellants’ knowledge.
Intention to Cause Death
The Court then considered whether Clause Firstly of Section 300 was attracted.
Applying the factors explained in Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P., the Court examined the weapon used, nature of injuries, force employed, circumstances of the assault and presence or absence of premeditation.
The evidence showed that only Mohd. Ubesh used a wooden danda of approximately 1.5 feet, Saddam merely held the deceased, and Salma used her hands. Six out of seven injuries were simple contusions or abrasions. The Court held that the danda could not, by itself, be characterized as a deadly weapon.
From these facts, the Court concluded that there was no intention to cause death.
Whether Injury Was Sufficient to Cause Death
The Court then considered Clause Thirdly of Section 300 by applying Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab.
Virsa Singh requires, among other things, proof that the injury intentionally inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
In the present case, no doctor had opined that any individual injury, or all injuries cumulatively, were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The doctor expressly stated that the sutured forehead injury could not be the cause of death.
The High Court therefore described the Trial Court’s contrary finding as perverse.
Precedent Analysis
Sitaram Kuchhbedia v. Vimal Rana and Ors.
The Court used this decision to structure the distinction between murder and culpable homicide: first determine causation, then culpable homicide under Section 299, and finally whether one of the four clauses of Section 300 applies.
Dayanand v. State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 717
This judgment was used to explain Clause Secondly of Section 300. Special knowledge of the victim’s particular vulnerability is required. Mere age does not automatically establish such knowledge.
Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 444
The Court relied upon this authority for the factors relevant to deciding intention, including nature of weapon, part of body targeted, force used, premeditation, prior enmity and number of blows.
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 37
The Court applied the classic four-part test for Clause Thirdly of Section 300. Since the prosecution failed to establish that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, murder under Clause Thirdly was not established.
Ganga Dass v. State of Haryana, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 534
This precedent was particularly important on the facts.
There, the accused had inflicted a single iron-pipe blow on the deceased’s head, but death occurred 18 days later due to septicaemia and complications. The Supreme Court converted the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC.
The Delhi High Court found the circumstances sufficiently similar to support the same approach in the present case.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court found that the prosecution had proved that the appellants participated in the assault, but it had not proved murder.
There was no evidence establishing that the appellants intended to kill Hamidan. The weapon was an ordinary wooden danda, most injuries were simple, and no injury was medically proved to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Further, the deceased did not die immediately. She remained in hospital for seven days and ultimately died of septicemic shock. The Court observed that the septicemia could possibly have resulted from an infection contracted during hospitalization.
Thus, neither an intention to cause death nor an intention to inflict an injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death was established.
The case, therefore, did not fall within Section 300 IPC and could only constitute culpable homicide under Section 304 IPC. Since intention to kill was absent but knowledge of likely consequences could be attributed, the Court placed the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court partly allowed the appeals and converted the appellants’ conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC.
The sentence of life imprisonment was consequently set aside.
For sentencing, the Court considered:
- use of a 1.5-foot wooden danda;
- injuries not proved to be grievous;
- death due to septicemic shock;
- clean antecedents; and
- satisfactory jail conduct.
The Court concluded that the period already undergone — approximately four years by each appellant — was sufficient punishment.
Both appellants were therefore directed to be released forthwith, unless required in any other case.
Case Details
Case: Saddam @ Ataur Rehman v. State NCT of Delhi; Mohd Ubesh alias Shahrukh v. State of NCT of Delhi
Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Case Number: CRL.A. 1635/2025 & CRL.A. 255/2026
Judges: Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Vikas Mahajan
Date: 25 August 2026
Result: Murder conviction under Section 302 IPC converted to culpable homicide under Section 304 Part II IPC; life sentence set aside; sentence reduced to period already undergone and both appellants ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.
