Court’s Decision
The Delhi High Court, by order dated 9 June 2025, dismissed the bail application filed by the accused in FIR No. 610/2024, registered at Police Station K.N. Katju Marg. The charges included Sections 498A, 406, 34, 376, 328, 354A, 376D of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. Justice Girish Kathpalia held that the nature and severity of the allegations—ranging from sexual abuse, wife-swapping, and gang rape, to intimidation and social media exploitation—rendered it unfit for bail. The Court specifically noted the accused’s past conduct of misusing anticipatory bail by contacting the prosecutrix through a new SIM card registered in his own name. The bail application was accordingly dismissed.
“The allegations in the FIR are not the stereotyped matrimonial dispute allegations… I do not find it fit case to release the accused/applicant on bail.”
Facts
The petitioner sought regular bail in connection with an FIR originally registered under Sections 498A, 406, and 34 IPC. However, following the prosecutrix’s statement under Section 164 CrPC, grave additional charges were invoked, including rape (Section 376 IPC), gang rape (Section 376D IPC), administration of intoxicating substances (Section 328 IPC), sexual harassment (Section 354A IPC), and aggravated penetrative sexual assault under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The FIR and subsequent statements alleged acts of physical, sexual, and psychological abuse.
The petitioner claimed the FIR was retaliatory, following his own complaint against the prosecutrix under Section 494 IPC. He contended that the case stemmed from a matrimonial dispute and that at the time of the alleged POCSO offence, he was 17 years and 6 months old. Nevertheless, he did not press the age-related argument to challenge the applicability of the POCSO Act.
Issues
- Whether the petitioner is entitled to regular bail despite the grave allegations, including those under the POCSO Act and IPC Sections for sexual assault.
- Whether the petitioner’s prior misuse of anticipatory bail warrants denial of regular bail.
- Whether the allegations are primarily matrimonial or extend to serious independent criminal offences.
Petitioner’s Arguments
Counsel for the petitioner contended that the accused had been falsely implicated due to a matrimonial dispute. It was argued that the charges were exaggerated and retaliatory, especially since the prosecutrix was earlier summoned by police on the petitioner’s complaint under Section 494 IPC. He submitted that the original allegations in the FIR had not been reiterated in the charge sheet, and therefore the case lacked credibility. Furthermore, it was claimed that the petitioner was a juvenile (17 years and 6 months) at the time of the alleged sexual offences, though this argument was not pressed in law. The petitioner sought bail on grounds of innocence and characterising the dispute as domestic in nature.
Respondent’s Arguments
The prosecutrix’s counsel strongly opposed the bail application, asserting that the allegations were serious and far beyond the realm of a typical matrimonial dispute. The learned APP further submitted that the accused had earlier been granted anticipatory bail by the Sessions Court, but he misused the liberty by threatening the prosecutrix over the phone. The investigation had uncovered text messages sent by the accused under a fictitious identity using a new SIM card, which was later found to be registered in his name. The accused had admitted before the Sessions Court to having contacted the prosecutrix, leading to cancellation of the anticipatory bail.
Analysis of the Law
The Court considered the statutory framework of the IPC and the POCSO Act, especially in the context of bail jurisprudence. While bail is the rule and jail the exception, serious offences involving sexual assault, particularly against women and children, attract a stricter standard for judicial scrutiny. The Court noted that in cases involving allegations of rape and aggravated sexual offences, the presumption of innocence does not, at the stage of bail, outweigh the necessity of protecting the victim and ensuring the integrity of the trial.
Precedent Analysis
No specific judicial precedents were cited in the order. However, the Court’s reasoning is consistent with the established jurisprudence on denying bail where:
- there is evidence of tampering with the complainant,
- the allegations are serious in nature,
- and the accused has a past record of misusing interim protections.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court held that the allegations contained in the FIR went beyond a matrimonial discord and included:
- sexual harassment by a family member,
- physical abuse using blades,
- coercion to participate in wife-swapping,
- molestation by friends in a hotel,
- creation of a fake Instagram account to solicit sex for money,
- and rape/gang rape as per the prosecutrix’s Section 164 CrPC statement.
The Court took a stern view of the petitioner’s conduct after being granted anticipatory bail—he contacted the prosecutrix using a fictitious identity through a new SIM, which was later traced to him. This act was seen as a clear attempt to intimidate the prosecutrix and subvert the judicial process.
Hence, the Court held that the petitioner’s conduct and the gravity of the allegations made the case unfit for grant of bail.
Conclusion
The Court dismissed the bail application, clarifying that all observations were confined to the question of bail and should not influence the trial on merits.
“It is made clear that the above observations are solely on the issue of bail and not on merits of the case.”
Implications
This judgment reinforces that bail in serious sexual offence cases will not be granted merely on the ground of a past matrimonial relationship. The Court’s emphasis on post-bail conduct, particularly attempts to influence the prosecutrix, serves as a stern warning against misuse of judicial leniency. The order reflects the growing judicial intolerance towards coercion of complainants and digital abuse through social media impersonation.
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