Court’s Decision
The Delhi High Court, in a detailed judgment delivered by Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri, dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of a tanker driver who was tried for offences under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) arising out of a 1999 road accident that led to the death of a cyclist.
The Court reaffirmed that mere occurrence of an accident does not automatically imply negligence or rashness, emphasizing that the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was driving in a rash or negligent manner directly causing the victim’s death.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s precedents, the Court observed:
“Negligence of the driver cannot be presumed merely because an accident has occurred. The principle of res ipsa loquitur applies only where the nature of the accident justifies such an inference.”
Finding inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, lack of corroborative evidence, and deficiencies in the investigation, the Court upheld the acquittal, granting the benefit of double presumption of innocence to the accused.
Facts
The case arose from an accident on 23 October 1999 at Rohtak Road, near A1 Super Bazar, Paschim Vihar, where a cyclist was hit by a tanker-truck (bearing registration number DL-1G-9597) allegedly driven rashly and negligently. The cyclist sustained grievous injuries and was declared dead on arrival at Deen Dayal Upadhyay Hospital.
The accused, who was driving the tanker, was apprehended at the scene by bystanders and handed over to the police. After investigation, a chargesheet was filed under Sections 279 and 304A IPC. The Metropolitan Magistrate acquitted the accused in 2015, holding that the prosecution had failed to prove rash or negligent driving.
The State appealed under Section 378(1) of the CrPC, challenging the acquittal and arguing that the evidence on record was sufficient to establish culpability.
Issues
- Whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was driving in a rash or negligent manner causing the victim’s death.
- Whether the Trial Court erred in disbelieving the testimony of the alleged eyewitness and in granting benefit of doubt to the accused.
- Whether an appellate court can interfere with an acquittal in light of the principle of double presumption of innocence.
Petitioner’s (State’s) Arguments
The Additional Public Prosecutor argued that the Trial Court erred in discarding the testimony of PW-6 (Nand Ram), who had clearly identified the accused as the driver of the tanker and described the act of rash driving that caused the cyclist’s death. It was contended that the accused’s own admission that he was driving the tanker at the time of the accident corroborated the prosecution’s case.
The State further submitted that the finding of the Trial Court regarding the cyclist coming from the wrong direction was speculative and unsupported by any material evidence. The prosecution maintained that PW-5 (Ramesh) and PW-6 (Nand Ram) consistently deposed that the tanker was moving at a high speed and overtook vehicles rashly before colliding with the cyclist.
Thus, the State urged that the acquittal be reversed and the respondent be convicted for the offences under Sections 279 and 304A IPC.
Respondent’s (Accused’s) Stand
The accused admitted that he was driving the tanker at the relevant time but denied any rash or negligent driving. He claimed that there was heavy traffic on the road and that the cyclist’s tyre got entangled with the rear portion of the tanker, leading to the fall.
It was argued that no eyewitness had actually seen the accident occur and that the alleged witnesses were unreliable. The accused pointed out inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies and highlighted the absence of physical evidence — no photographs, no mechanical inspection of the cycle, and no proof of high speed or rashness.
He contended that the Trial Court’s finding was sound and based on well-settled principles of criminal jurisprudence requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Analysis of the Law
The Court began by reiterating the essential ingredients of Section 304A IPC:
- The death of a person must have been caused by the act of the accused;
- The act must have been rash or negligent, though not amounting to culpable homicide; and
- The rashness or negligence must be directly and proximately connected with the death.
Quoting the Supreme Court in Mohd. Aynuddin v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(2000) 7 SCC 72], the Court explained that rashness implies overhasty conduct without due care, while negligence denotes a culpable failure to exercise reasonable caution. It clarified that criminal negligence cannot be presumed merely because an accident occurred — the prosecution must lead specific evidence of the manner of driving and surrounding circumstances.
The Court also cited Naresh Giri v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2008) 1 SCC 791] to emphasize that Section 304A IPC applies only where there is absence of intention or knowledge to cause death, distinguishing it from culpable homicide.
Precedent Analysis
- Mohd. Aynuddin v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(2000) 7 SCC 72] — The Supreme Court held that negligence cannot be presumed solely due to an accident; res ipsa loquitur applies only where the facts themselves indicate negligence.
- Naresh Giri v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2008) 1 SCC 791] — Clarified that criminal rashness involves deliberate risk-taking without due care, and negligence must be attributable to a state of mind reflecting indifference.
- State of Karnataka v. Satish [(1998) 8 SCC 493] — “High speed” alone does not constitute rashness or negligence; the prosecution must prove the manner of driving and other attendant factors.
- Ravi Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2022) 8 SCC 536] and Anwar Ali v. State of Himachal Pradesh [(2020) 10 SCC 166] — Reaffirmed the principle of double presumption of innocence in appeals against acquittal; appellate courts must be cautious in disturbing acquittals unless the trial court’s view is manifestly perverse.
Court’s Reasoning
Justice Ohri meticulously examined the depositions of PW-5 and PW-6, finding both to be unreliable. PW-5 admitted that he did not actually witness the accident and only saw the aftermath. PW-6 gave contradictory statements — at one point claiming he witnessed the accident from inside the bus, and later stating he saw it after alighting. Moreover, his statement under Section 161 CrPC was recorded a day later, contrary to his claim that it was made on the spot.
The Court noted that the mechanical inspection report of the tanker showed no fresh damage, and the prosecution failed to produce the cycle or site photographs. There was no scientific evidence of the tanker’s speed or proof of reckless driving.
Accordingly, the Court held that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving rash or negligent driving. It found that the Trial Court’s acquittal was a possible and reasonable view, not warranting interference.
The Court also emphasized the double presumption of innocence, quoting from Ravi Sharma and Anwar Ali, and observed that once a person is acquitted, the presumption of innocence is strengthened, not weakened.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court held that the findings of the Trial Court were well-reasoned and supported by evidence, and there was no error in granting the benefit of doubt to the accused.
The appeal filed by the State was dismissed with the observation that:
“A finding of rash or negligent driving cannot rest on conjecture or assumption. The prosecution failed to establish the essential ingredients of the offences alleged. The inconsistencies in witness testimonies and the lack of corroborative evidence render the prosecution version unreliable.”
Thus, the acquittal of the accused under Sections 279 and 304A IPC was upheld.
Implications
This judgment reinforces a crucial principle of criminal law — that liability under Section 304A IPC requires proof of rashness or negligence, not mere involvement in an accident. The ruling underscores that courts must rely on concrete evidence rather than assumptions when determining criminal culpability in motor accident cases.
It also reaffirms the doctrine of double presumption of innocence, serving as a reminder that appellate courts must exercise restraint when reviewing acquittals unless the trial court’s findings are palpably erroneous.
FAQs
1. Can a driver be convicted for rash or negligent driving merely because an accident occurred?
No. The Court held that negligence cannot be presumed merely from the occurrence of an accident; specific proof of rash or negligent driving is required.
2. What is the “double presumption of innocence”?
When an accused is acquitted by a trial court, the presumption of innocence is reinforced. Appellate courts must be cautious in reversing such findings unless there is manifest illegality.
3. Does driving at high speed automatically amount to rashness?
No. “High speed” is a relative term and by itself does not establish rash or negligent driving without corroborative evidence of the manner of driving or surrounding circumstances.
