Delhi High Court Refuses Late Written Statement in Commercial Suit; Holds Company Cannot Disown Email Used in MCA Filings to Escape Valid Court Service
Written Statement Filed Five Months Beyond 120-Day Limit Rejected: Delhi High Court Refuses Relief to Company
Facts
The dispute arose from a commercial recovery suit for ₹39,37,880.64, together with pendente lite and future interest at 18% per annum, instituted by Raj Kumar Singhal against Pinnacle Innovatory Services Private Limited in 2023.
The Commercial Court initially recorded that Pinnacle had been served through email on 6 December 2023 at bhaviksanghavi20@gmail.com and directed it to file its written statement. The company was subsequently served again through the same email address on 20 March 2024, following which it was expressly directed to file its written statement within the statutory 30-day period.
Despite this, no written statement was filed.
On 6 June 2024, the Commercial Court closed Pinnacle’s right to file its written statement and struck off its defence. Importantly, because the outer limit of 120 days had not yet expired, the Court expressly granted the company liberty to seek condonation and file its written statement within that remaining statutory window.
The company did not avail itself of that opportunity.
It claimed that it first discovered the proceedings only on 21 August 2024 through an unrelated e-Courts search and received certified copies on 28 August 2024. Yet even thereafter, instead of immediately filing its written statement, it moved several procedural applications. The written statement was eventually filed only on 27 December 2024.
The Trial Court rejected the applications. Pinnacle therefore approached the Delhi High Court under Article 227.
Issues
The principal question was whether Pinnacle’s written statement could be accepted despite being filed after expiry of the mandatory 120-day period applicable to commercial suits.
This turned substantially on the company’s contention that the statutory clock had never properly commenced because service at the disputed email address was invalid.
The Court therefore examined whether:
- summons sent to an email address appearing in the company’s own MCA filings constituted valid service;
- the company could subsequently disown that email by claiming it belonged to a former Chartered Accountant;
- alleged non-supply of the plaint and documents rendered service defective;
- delay beyond 120 days could be condoned in a commercial suit; and
- the Trial Court’s refusal to review its earlier order justified supervisory interference.
Petitioner’s Arguments
Pinnacle argued that service at bhaviksanghavi20@gmail.com was invalid because the email allegedly belonged to its erstwhile Chartered Accountant, whose association with the company had ended after 2022–23.
It maintained that its actual business communications were conducted through other official email addresses and alleged that the plaintiff deliberately chose an incorrect address despite knowing those addresses.
Alternatively, Pinnacle argued that even if the summons had reached the disputed email address, the service remained defective because the summons were allegedly not accompanied by complete copies of the plaint and necessary documents.
Respondent’s Arguments
Raj Kumar Singhal countered that the disputed email address was not some unrelated or obsolete address.
It had been used by Pinnacle itself in statutory filings before the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, apart from its use during commercial dealings.
Accordingly, a corporate entity could not represent an email address as its own before regulators and commercial stakeholders and subsequently disown that very address when court process was served upon it.
The respondent further relied upon the mandatory 120-day outer limit under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC as amended for commercial disputes, arguing that once this period expired, the Court had no power to condone further delay.
Analysis of the Law
Company Cannot Disown Email Used in Its Own MCA Filings
This is the strongest proposition emerging from the judgment.
The High Court examined the record and found that bhaviksanghavi20@gmail.com had been used by Pinnacle in its own statutory filings before the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, including Form CHG-1 and Form DPT-3 filed in July 2023.
This directly undermined Pinnacle’s contention that the email belonged to a Chartered Accountant whose association with it had ended earlier.
The Court held:
“the petitioner cannot be permitted to disown an email ID reflected in its own regulatory filings, to evade the service of court process.”
Once the court process was duly dispatched to the email address furnished in the company’s own regulatory filings, service was complete in law.
Service Was Not Merely Through Email
The High Court also rejected the suggestion that the plaintiff had attempted service exclusively through electronic means.
The Trial Court’s record showed that process fee had also been filed for service through registered cover, undermining Pinnacle’s factual contention that service was confined only to email.
Alleged Missing Documents Did Not Invalidate Service
Pinnacle’s alternative argument that the summons were not accompanied by the plaint and necessary documents was also rejected.
The Trial Court had already recorded that complete summons had been served, and the High Court found no reason to disturb that factual finding.
The 120-Day Rule in Commercial Suits
The Court then addressed the decisive procedural consequence.
Even giving Pinnacle the benefit of treating 20 March 2024 as the operative date of service rather than the earlier service of 6 December 2023, the statutory outer limit of 120 days expired in July 2024.
The written statement was filed only on 27 December 2024—approximately five months after even the outer limit had expired.
Relying upon SCG Contracts (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., (2019) 12 SCC 210, the High Court reiterated that the 120-day limit prescribed for filing a written statement in a commercial suit is mandatory and cannot be condoned after its expiry.
This was particularly damaging to Pinnacle because the Trial Court had itself expressly given the company an opportunity on 6 June 2024 to seek condonation while the 120-day window was still open.
The company simply did not avail itself of that opportunity.
Conduct After Alleged Knowledge
The High Court also examined Pinnacle’s conduct even on its own version.
The company claimed to have discovered the suit on 21 August 2024 and obtained certified copies on 28 August.
Yet it still did not immediately file its written statement.
Instead, in September 2024, it pursued applications under Order IX Rule 7 and Order VII Rules 10 and 11 CPC and withheld its substantive defence until December.
The High Court characterised this as a “passive attitude” demonstrating lack of bona fides.
Precedent Analysis
SCG Contracts v. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure
This was the principal authority governing the written-statement issue.
The Supreme Court had established that in commercial disputes the statutory framework creates an absolute outer limit of 120 days for filing the written statement. After expiry, the defendant forfeits the right and the court cannot extend the period.
S. Murali Sundaram v. Jothibai Kannan
On review jurisdiction, the Court relied upon S. Murali Sundaram v. Jothibai Kannan, (2023) 13 SCC 515.
The principle applied was that review jurisdiction cannot operate as an appeal in disguise. A party cannot use review merely to reagitate questions already considered and decided.
An error requiring a lengthy process of reasoning to discover is not ordinarily an “error apparent on the face of the record.”
Court’s Reasoning
The High Court found Pinnacle’s case defective at multiple levels.
First, the company had been served on an email address that its own statutory filings represented as connected with the company.
Second, even adopting the later service date of 20 March 2024 entirely in Pinnacle’s favour, the mandatory 120-day period expired in July.
Third, the Trial Court had expressly alerted Pinnacle to the 120-day window and permitted it to seek condonation within that period.
Fourth, Pinnacle nevertheless filed its written statement only on 27 December 2024.
Once the 120-day period expired, the Commercial Court had no discretion to revive the forfeited right to file the written statement.
The review application equally failed because Pinnacle produced no new material and demonstrated no error apparent on the face of the record. The arguments raised in review had substantially already been considered.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court dismissed Pinnacle Innovatory Services Private Limited’s petition and upheld the Commercial Court’s refusal to take its written statement on record.
The Court held that a company cannot disown an email address appearing in its own regulatory filings merely to evade the legal consequences of court process served upon that address.
More importantly, once valid service is established, the 120-day outer limit for filing a written statement in a commercial suit is mandatory. After expiry of that period, the defendant forfeits its right to file the written statement and the delay cannot subsequently be condoned.
The High Court found no patent illegality or jurisdictional error warranting interference under Article 227.
Case Details
Case: Pinnacle Innovatory Services Private Limited v. Raj Kumar Singhal
Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Case No.: CM(M) 1514/2026 & CM APPL. 45021/2026
CNR: DLHC010309282026
Judge: Justice Ajay Digpaul
Reserved: 2 September 2026
Decided: 15 September 2026
Key Provisions: Order VIII Rule 1, Order V Rule 1(1), Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC; Commercial Courts Act, 2015; Article 227 of the Constitution
Result: Petition dismissed; forfeiture of defendant’s right to file written statement upheld.
