Delhi High Court Upholds POCSO Acquittal After Finding Contradictory Dates and Reporting Timings in Beauty Parlour Molestation Case

Complaint Said Incident Occurred on 22 March but Victim Testified It Happened on 23 March; Delhi High Court Refuses to Reverse POCSO Acquittal

Facts

• The prosecution alleged that, at approximately 12:30 PM on 22 March 2013, Joginder Kumar alias Jindi sexually assaulted a minor girl at a beauty parlour situated in the DDA Flats, Bindapur, New Delhi.
• The minor occasionally visited the beauty parlour operated by PW3 to learn the work.
• According to the prosecution, the beauty parlour was closed and PW3 asked the minor to collect certain materials from the shop.
• The minor alleged that when she entered the shop, the accused followed her, offered her ₹50,000 to leave PW3 and accompany him, and touched her breast.
• She claimed that she pushed him and raised an alarm, following which he fled on his motorcycle.
• A written complaint was recorded on 23 March 2013, leading to registration of FIR No. 137 of 2013 at Bindapur Police Station.
• The charge sheet referred to offences under Section 354A IPC and Section 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.
• The Trial Court ultimately framed a charge under Section 8 of the POCSO Act for sexual assault as defined under Section 7.
• The prosecution examined eight witnesses, including:
  • The minor;
  • The beauty-parlour owner;
  • The minor’s father;
  • The police officials who received and investigated the complaint; and
  • A schoolteacher who proved the minor’s date of birth.
• The accused denied the allegations. He claimed that he was falsely implicated at the instance of persons involved in a property dispute who wanted him to sell his property at a low price.
• The defence examined two witnesses in support of the alleged false-implication theory.
• On 28 February 2015, the Additional Sessions Judge-01, Dwarka Courts, acquitted the accused of the offence under Section 8 of the POCSO Act.
• The State challenged the acquittal before the Delhi High Court under Section 378 CrPC.

Issues

1. Whether the minor’s account remained substantially consistent in her written complaint, Section 164 CrPC statement and trial testimony.
2. Whether contradictions regarding the date of the alleged incident were minor discrepancies or material defects affecting the prosecution’s case.
3. Whether the conflicting accounts concerning the time and manner in which the complaint was lodged created reasonable doubt.
4. Whether the evidence of the minor was sufficiently corroborated by her father, the beauty-parlour owner and the police witnesses.
5. Whether the Trial Court’s appreciation of the evidence was perverse or wholly unreasonable.
6. Whether the High Court should interfere with an acquittal where the Trial Court’s view remained reasonable and plausible.
7. Whether the Trial Court’s failure to conduct a separate hearing under Section 232 CrPC caused prejudice to the accused.

Appellant’s Arguments

• The State argued that the prosecution witnesses remained substantially consistent on the material facts.
• The minor consistently alleged that:
  • The accused entered the beauty parlour;
  • Offered her ₹50,000;
  • Asked her to accompany him; and
  • Touched her breast.
• Her allegation was supported by:
  • Her written complaint;
  • Her statement under Section 164 CrPC;
  • Her deposition before the Trial Court;
  • The evidence of her father; and
  • The testimony of the beauty-parlour owner.
• The Trial Court placed undue emphasis on trivial inconsistencies which did not affect the core allegation of sexual assault.
• According to the State, the minor consistently stated that the incident occurred on 23 March 2013.
• The Investigating Officer had received the information on the same date at approximately 7:20 PM.
• The Trial Court was therefore wrong in treating the case as involving an unexplained delay of one day in registering the FIR.
• The State sought reversal of the acquittal and conviction of the accused under Section 8 of the POCSO Act.

Respondent’s Arguments

• The respondent submitted that the Trial Court’s judgment disclosed no error requiring appellate interference.
• The contradictions were not confined to insignificant details but related to:
  • The date of the alleged incident;
  • Whether the complaint was filed on the same day or the following day;
  • The time at which the complaint was submitted;
  • Who accompanied the minor to the police station; and
  • When the police first visited the alleged place of occurrence.
• The accused maintained that he had been falsely implicated because of a pending property dispute.
• Since the Trial Court’s interpretation of the evidence was reasonable and plausible, the presumption of innocence stood reinforced by the acquittal.

Analysis of the Law

Sexual assault under Sections 7 and 8 of the POCSO Act

• Section 7 defines sexual assault to include touching a child’s breast with sexual intent where the act involves physical contact without penetration.
• Section 8 prescribes punishment for such sexual assault.
• The prosecution therefore had to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused touched the minor’s breast with sexual intent.

Appellate review of an acquittal

• The High Court possesses wide powers to reappreciate the evidence in an appeal against acquittal.
• However, those powers are exercised subject to important safeguards:
  • The accused carries the presumption of innocence;
  • Acquittal reinforces that presumption;
  • The Trial Judge had the advantage of directly observing the witnesses;
  • The accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt; and
  • A plausible Trial Court view should not be replaced merely because another view is possible.
• Interference is justified where the acquittal is perverse, manifestly illegal or wholly unreasonable.
• If the grounds supporting acquittal are reasonable and cannot be effectively displaced, the appellate court should not reverse it.

Delay in sexual-offence cases

• Delay in reporting a sexual offence is not by itself fatal to the prosecution.
• Courts must recognise that a victim may delay disclosure because of:
  • Trauma;
  • Fear;
  • Social stigma;
  • Shame; or
  • Natural hesitation.
• However, the present case was not merely about a delay in reporting.
• The problem was the existence of irreconcilable versions concerning the date of the alleged occurrence and the point at which the criminal law was set in motion.

Section 232 CrPC

• After examination of an accused under Section 313 CrPC, the Sessions Court must consider whether there is evidence that the accused committed the offence.
• The Trial Court did not conduct a separate hearing in the manner contemplated by Section 232.
• However, non-compliance does not automatically invalidate the trial.
• The accused must show that the omission caused serious or substantial prejudice.
• Since no prejudice was alleged or established, the procedural omission did not affect the proceedings.

Precedent Analysis

1. Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 248
   1. The Supreme Court held that a High Court’s power to reassess evidence in an acquittal appeal is as extensive as its power in an appeal against conviction.
   1. Nevertheless, the appellate court must give proper weight to:
      1. The Trial Court’s assessment of witness credibility;
      1. The presumption of innocence;
      1. The accused’s right to the benefit of doubt; and
      1. The Trial Judge’s advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses.
   1. Where the grounds supporting acquittal are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the decision.
   1. Applying this principle, the Delhi High Court found the Trial Court’s assessment to be a reasonably possible view of the evidence.
2. Moidu K. v. State of Kerala, 2009 (3) KHC 89: 2009 SCC OnLine Ker 2888
   1. The decision holds that failure to comply with Section 232 CrPC does not automatically vitiate the trial.
   1. Interference is warranted only where the omission causes serious and substantial prejudice to the accused.
   1. Since Joginder Kumar did not claim or demonstrate any prejudice, the procedural omission did not invalidate the trial or acquittal.

Court’s Reasoning

Contradiction regarding the incident date

• The written complaint was recorded on 23 March 2013 and stated that the incident had occurred “yesterday around 12:30 PM”. This placed the incident on 22 March 2013.
• The minor’s Section 164 statement expressly stated that the incident occurred on 22 March 2013.
• During her trial testimony, however, she stated that the incident occurred on 23 March 2013.
• The prosecution did not clarify this contradiction while the minor was in the witness box.
• The contradiction concerned the very date on which the offence allegedly occurred and could not be dismissed as a minor discrepancy.

Contradictions regarding the complaint

• The minor testified that:
  • Her father returned at approximately 6:30–7:00 PM;
  • She narrated the incident to him; and
  • She, her father and PW3 immediately went to the police station.
• The father broadly supported this version and stated that he took his daughter to the police station on the same evening.
• PW3, however, stated that:
  • The father returned only at approximately 9:00 PM; and
  • They went to the police station the following day.
• PW6, the police constable, gave a completely different account. He stated that:
  • The minor came to the police station at approximately 12:30 PM on 23 March;
  • She was accompanied by another girl;
  • She submitted the written complaint at that time; and
  • The police immediately visited the alleged place of occurrence.
• The Investigating Officer, PW8, stated that the complaint was marked to him only at approximately 7:00 PM on 23 March.
• If PW6’s evidence was accepted, the Investigating Officer’s version was incorrect. If the Investigating Officer’s version was accepted, PW6’s account of receiving the complaint and visiting the scene at 12:30 PM became improbable.

Additional uncertainty

• The minor’s complaint suggested that she visited the beauty parlour during school holidays.
• In cross-examination, she admitted that 23 March 2013 was not a school holiday, that her school hours were from 7:00 AM to 1:30 PM and that she had not attended school that day.
• Her absence from school was not mentioned in the written complaint or her Section 164 statement.

Effect of the contradictions

• The inconsistencies were not about peripheral or insignificant details.
• They concerned:
  • The date of the alleged offence;
  • The timing of disclosure;
  • Whether the complaint was filed the same day or the next day;
  • The time when the complaint reached the police; and
  • When the investigation commenced.
• These contradictions created serious doubt about the genesis and chronological development of the prosecution case.
• The High Court did not hold that delay in reporting a sexual offence was itself fatal.
• It held that the prosecution presented mutually inconsistent accounts of when the incident and complaint occurred.
• On the overall evidence, the Trial Court’s view was neither perverse nor wholly unsustainable.
• The conditions required for reversing an acquittal were therefore not satisfied.

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court held that the prosecution evidence contained material and unexplained contradictions regarding both the date of the alleged sexual assault and the time at which the complaint was lodged.

These were not minor discrepancies. They affected the origin and credibility of the prosecution’s case. Since the Trial Court’s decision to acquit was a reasonable and plausible view of the evidence, the High Court refused to substitute another possible interpretation.

The State’s appeal was dismissed, the acquittal of Joginder Kumar alias Jindi under Section 8 of the POCSO Act was affirmed, and all pending applications were closed.

Case Details

Case: State (Government of NCT of Delhi) v. Joginder Kumar alias Jindi
Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 799 of 2016
Trial Case: Sessions Case No. 30/02/2013
Judge: Justice Chandrasekharan Sudha
Reserved on: 20 July 2026
Pronounced on: 22 July 2026
Result: State’s appeal dismissed; acquittal under Section 8 of the POCSO Act affirmed; pending applications closed.

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