Influencer Republishes Defamatory Video Despite Court Injunction; Bombay High Court Orders X to Remove Identified Content but Refuses Blanket Monitoring and Account Suspension Directions
Can Social Media Platforms Be Ordered to Monitor Future Defamatory Posts? Bombay High Court Says Intermediaries Cannot Be Made Censors
Facts
Serum Institute of India Pvt. Ltd. and its CEO, Adar Poonawalla, instituted a suit against Yohan Tegra, Anarchy for Freedom India and others concerning allegedly defamatory online statements and videos. Google LLC and X Corp were impleaded as intermediaries whose platforms were being used for dissemination of the impugned material. SERUM INSTITUTE
The plaintiffs sought injunctions against publication and circulation of the allegedly defamatory material and claimed ₹100 crore as compensation and damages. They also sought directions requiring Google and X to remove the content, prevent its future publication and suspend/delete the relevant accounts. SERUM INSTITUTE
On 5 June 2023, the Bombay High Court had already restrained defendants 1 to 5 from publishing or circulating the specified defamatory videos and material, or material of a like nature, and directed them to delete the content and issue an unconditional apology. The plaintiffs alleged that the order was not complied with. SERUM INSTITUTE
Significantly, defendant No. 1 allegedly uploaded another video on the very night the injunction was passed, stating that he would not comply with the order. Google subsequently removed the objectionable content, while X declined the plaintiffs’ request because the earlier order contained no specific takedown direction against X. SERUM INSTITUTE
The plaintiffs therefore filed the present interim application seeking specific directions against the intermediaries.
Issues
The principal questions before the Court were:
- Whether X Corp could be directed to remove a specifically identified video containing material already found objectionable/defamatory by the Court.
- Whether intermediaries could be directed to proactively prevent defendants from uploading similar defamatory material in the future.
- Whether Google and X could be directed to deactivate, delete or suspend the social-media accounts of defendants 1 to 4.
- Whether an intermediary’s obligation under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act and Rule 3 of the Intermediary Rules arises merely because an earlier order concerning the originator exists, or whether the intermediary requires a specific court direction concerning identifiable material.
- Whether the fresh application was barred because similar relief against X had not been granted in the earlier interim application.
- What consequences should follow from the alleged deliberate disobedience of the injunction dated 5 June 2023.
Plaintiffs’ Arguments
The plaintiffs contended that once defamatory content had already been adjudicated upon and declared unlawful by a competent court, intermediaries could not continue hosting it after receiving notice of the order.
They relied upon the intermediary due-diligence framework and argued that actual knowledge through a judicial order triggers the obligation to remove prohibited material. They relied particularly upon decisions including DBS Bank India Ltd., Akshay Hari Om Bhatia and Himayani Puri. SERUM INSTITUTE
According to the plaintiffs, defendant No. 1 had not merely failed to comply but had openly defied the injunction by uploading another video containing substantially the same objectionable material. Consequently, X should be required to remove that content. SERUM INSTITUTE
X Corp’s Arguments
X argued that it was merely an intermediary/platform and not the originator of the impugned content.
It submitted that if defendant No. 1 had disobeyed the injunction for several years, the plaintiffs’ proper remedy was contempt or enforcement proceedings against him rather than what X characterised as a proxy proceeding against the intermediary. SERUM INSTITUTE
Relying upon Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, X argued that “actual knowledge” requires a court order specifically directing the intermediary to remove identifiable material. An intermediary cannot itself be required to determine which statements are defamatory. SERUM INSTITUTE
X also relied upon Sanu Bhattacharjee for the proposition that a general direction requiring an intermediary to identify and remove objectionable content would effectively make the platform an adjudicator—something inconsistent with Section 79. SERUM INSTITUTE
It further relied upon Google India v. Visaka Industries and Wikimedia Foundation Inc. v. ANI Media, stressing the danger of turning intermediaries into “super censors” and the impermissibility of excessively broad injunctions. SERUM INSTITUTE
Defendant No. 1’s Arguments
Defendant No. 1 questioned the maintainability of the application and argued that the plaintiffs were effectively seeking enforcement of the 2023 injunction after remaining inactive for nearly three years.
He also contended that his pending application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC concerning maintainability and jurisdiction should be decided first. SERUM INSTITUTE
He further attacked the validity of the earlier injunction on allegations concerning bias and non-disclosure. SERUM INSTITUTE
Analysis of the Law
The Court drew an important distinction between:
(a) ordering an intermediary to remove specifically identified content that a court has considered and found objectionable; and
(b) requiring the intermediary itself to continuously identify, judge and suppress future material that might be defamatory.
Under Shreya Singhal, Section 79(3)(b) was read down so that an intermediary’s obligation arises upon actual knowledge through a court order or appropriate governmental notification concerning unlawful material. SERUM INSTITUTE
The Court therefore accepted that judicial directions can be issued to an intermediary to remove prohibited content, while rejecting the proposition that the intermediary can be saddled with the judicial function of deciding what future content is defamatory.
This preserves the distinction between intermediary compliance and judicial adjudication.
Precedent Analysis
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India was central. It establishes that intermediary liability cannot depend simply upon private complaints alleging unlawfulness; “actual knowledge” under Section 79 must operate within the safeguards identified by the Supreme Court. SERUM INSTITUTE
Google India Pvt. Ltd. v. Visaka Industries was relied upon for the concern that an expansive interpretation could effectively transform intermediaries into “super censors.” SERUM INSTITUTE
Wikimedia Foundation Inc. v. ANI Media (P) Ltd. was important because the Supreme Court had interfered with an overly broad injunction requiring removal of content capable of tarnishing the plaintiff’s reputation. SERUM INSTITUTE
The Bombay High Court consequently adopted the principle that a takedown direction must ordinarily concern identifiable material considered by the Court, rather than delegate to the intermediary an open-ended responsibility to determine defamatory content.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court found that the earlier injunction remained operative. The defendants had not complied with it, and defendant No. 1 had subsequently republished objectionable material while expressly indicating that he would not comply with the Court’s direction.
The fresh application was therefore based upon subsequent events and a different cause of action. The earlier failure to grant relief specifically against X did not operate as res judicata because the issues in the suit had not been finally adjudicated and the earlier order itself was interlocutory. SERUM INSTITUTE
The Court nevertheless drew a firm boundary around the relief available against intermediaries.
A specific video could be ordered removed once judicially identified and considered. But a blanket direction requiring platforms to ensure that no similar defamatory content is ever uploaded would effectively require them to determine whether future content is defamatory.
That function belongs to the Court—not the intermediary.
Similarly, suspending or deleting entire social-media accounts was considered too drastic at the interim stage.
Conclusion
The Bombay High Court partly allowed the interim application.
It directed X Corp to take down, remove or delete the specifically identified fresh video uploaded by defendant No. 1.
At the same time, the Court refused the broader prayers requiring intermediaries to police or prevent future defamatory content and declined, at this stage, the drastic relief of deactivating, deleting or suspending the defendants’ social-media accounts.
The Court also treated the alleged violation of its earlier injunction seriously and directed issuance of show-cause notices to defendants 1 to 4 under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC for alleged defiance of the 5 June 2023 order.
The ruling therefore establishes a significant distinction: courts may compel intermediaries to remove specifically identified unlawful material, but cannot outsource to platforms the judicial function of deciding what future speech is defamatory.
Case Details
Case: Serum Institute of India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Yohan Tegra & Ors.
Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Original Side
Case No.: Interim Application No. 5853 of 2025 in Suit No. 558 of 2023
Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC-OS:21322
Judge: Justice Gauri Godse
Reserved On: 29 June 2026
Pronounced On: 29 September 2026
Result: Interim Application partly allowed. X Corp was directed to take down/remove/delete the specifically identified fresh video uploaded by Defendant No. 1. The Court refused blanket directions requiring intermediaries to monitor or prevent future defamatory content and also declined to suspend or delete the defendants’ social-media accounts at the interim stage. Show-cause notices were issued to Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC for alleged disobedience of the injunction dated 5 June 2023.
