Court’s Decision
The Patna High Court set aside the order of the Bihar State Sentence Remission Board rejecting the plea for premature release of a life convict who had served nearly two decades in prison. Justice Sandeep Kumar held that the Board’s order was unsustainable in law as it was passed without proper reasoning, contrary to binding judicial precedents, and in violation of the liberal remission policies applicable at the time of conviction.
The Court emphasized that remission is not a matter of charity but a legal right subject to fair consideration, reiterating that the State must apply existing or more liberal policies in a non-arbitrary manner. The Court quashed the Board’s order dated 12 September 2023 and directed that the petitioner’s case be reconsidered afresh in light of the principles laid down in earlier decisions including Ajit Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar and Pradeep Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar.
Facts
The petitioner was convicted for offences under Sections 364, 302, and 201 of the Indian Penal Code in 2006 by the Sessions Court at Gopalganj, which sentenced him to death. The High Court, however, commuted the death penalty to imprisonment for life.
Having undergone over 17 years of actual incarceration and more than 22 years including remission, the petitioner applied for premature release under the State’s remission policy. His plea was rejected by the State Sentence Remission Board on the ground that under Clause (iv)(ka) and (kha) of Notification No. 3106 dated 10 December 2002, he was ineligible for consideration.
Aggrieved, he filed a writ petition challenging the order, contending that his case was governed by the 1984 Remission Policy, which was in force on the date of conviction, and that the 2002 Notification came into effect only in 2007. He relied on several High Court rulings holding that convicts sentenced prior to the 2002 Notification’s enforcement were entitled to benefit under the earlier, more liberal policy.
Issues
- Whether the petitioner’s eligibility for premature release should be determined by the remission policy prevailing at the time of conviction (1984) or by the later 2002 Notification.
- Whether the Remission Board’s rejection order was arbitrary and contrary to precedent.
- Whether the State is bound to apply a more liberal remission policy if in force at the time of consideration.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner contended that his conviction and sentence occurred in 2006, at which time the 1984 Policy governed premature release. The 2002 Notification, which imposed stricter conditions, came into force only in 2007 and therefore could not be applied retrospectively.
He further argued that the Remission Board had passed a cryptic and non-speaking order, merely quoting provisions of the 2002 Policy without assigning reasons or examining the applicability of precedents. His counsel relied on the judgments in Ajit Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar and Pradeep Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar, where similar rejection orders were quashed.
It was emphasized that the petitioner had already completed 19 years of actual imprisonment and had demonstrated good conduct during incarceration, which should have weighed in his favour for premature release under Article 161 of the Constitution and Section 433-A of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Respondent’s Arguments
The State argued that under the Notification No. 3106 dated 10 December 2002, convicts sentenced for heinous offences such as murder and kidnapping were categorically excluded from premature release. The Remission Board had, therefore, correctly rejected the petitioner’s proposal by applying Clause (iv)(ka) and (kha) of the Notification.
It was contended that remission is not an automatic right but a matter of executive discretion, and the petitioner could not claim premature release as a matter of entitlement. The State maintained that the Board had exercised its powers within the legal framework, and there was no violation of constitutional or statutory provisions.
Analysis of the Law
The Court extensively analyzed the evolution of remission policy in Bihar, tracing it from the 1984 Policy, to the 2002 Notification, and the 2012 Jail Manual. It reaffirmed the principle that grant of remission or commutation is an executive function traceable to Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution, which confer power on the President and Governors to grant pardon or remission.
However, this discretion is not absolute and must be exercised “cautiously and judiciously”, as held in Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra and Maru Ram v. Union of India.
The Court examined Section 433-A CrPC, which restricts premature release of life convicts to those who have served at least 14 years of actual imprisonment, noting that the petitioner had already exceeded this threshold.
Crucially, the Bench reiterated the settled position that the remission policy applicable at the time of conviction governs, but if a more liberal policy exists later, the State must apply the liberal one, ensuring parity and fairness in executive action.
The Court emphasized that mechanical reliance on restrictive clauses without consideration of precedents or liberal amendments amounts to arbitrary exercise of discretion, violative of Article 14.
Precedent Analysis
- Ajit Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar – The Court in this case quashed a similar rejection by the Remission Board, holding that the 2002 Notification was not enforced prior to September 2007, and that convicts sentenced before that date were entitled to the benefit of the 1984 Policy. It clarified that remission decisions must be reasoned and not mechanical.
- Pradeep Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar – The Court ruled that offences under Section 364-A IPC were not explicitly barred under Clause (iv)(ka) of the 2002 Policy. The word “etc.” appearing in the clause had to be read ejusdem generis, applying only to offences of a similar nature like rape, dacoity, or terrorism.
- Surendra Mahto v. State of Bihar (2021 PLJR 393) – Held that the 2002 Notification came into operation only from 25 September 2007, and prior to that, the 1984 Policy governed remission.
- Jagdish v. State of Haryana (2022) – The Supreme Court held that if a more liberal policy exists at the time of consideration, the convict should receive its benefit.
- Rajo @ Rajwa @ Rajendra Mandal v. State of Bihar (2023 INSC 771) – Reaffirmed that the policy prevailing on the date of conviction applies, but if a more liberal policy exists at the time of consideration, it must be extended in favour of the convict.
The High Court relied heavily on these precedents to conclude that the petitioner was entitled to reconsideration under the liberalized regime.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court found that the Remission Board’s rejection order was non-speaking and arbitrary, containing no discussion of the petitioner’s conduct, eligibility, or applicability of the earlier policies.
Justice Sandeep Kumar observed:
“The power of clemency cannot be reduced to an unbridled instrument of refusal. When liberty is at stake, fairness must prevail over form.”
He further held that once the 2002 Notification’s ambiguity had been removed through the 2012 Jail Manual and the 2023 amendment to Rule 481, there remained no justification for denying the petitioner consideration under the liberal provisions.
The Court noted that even the State had, in several cases, released similarly situated convicts under identical offences, demonstrating selective application of policy and violation of Article 14. The Bench clarified that remission is a constitutional and legal right to be fairly considered, and its denial must be reasoned, objective, and consistent with established precedents.
Conclusion
The High Court quashed the order of the Bihar State Sentence Remission Board dated 12 September 2023, granting the petitioner liberty to reapply for remission. The Board was directed to reconsider his application in accordance with law and in light of the judgments in Ajit Kumar Mishra and Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, within three months of filing.
The Court concluded with a sharp reminder:
“The exercise of executive mercy must not degenerate into bureaucratic indifference. Clemency is not a concession — it is the conscience of the State acting within law.”
Implications
This decision strengthens the jurisprudence on remission and premature release, reaffirming that executive discretion under Articles 72 and 161 and Section 433-A CrPC must align with constitutional principles of fairness and equality.
It clarifies that the remission policy applicable at the time of conviction governs eligibility, but if a more liberal policy exists later, the State must adopt it. The ruling also reinforces the requirement that remission decisions must be reasoned and transparent, ensuring accountability of the Remission Board.
FAQs
1. Which remission policy applies to a convict — the one at conviction or the one at consideration?
The policy prevailing at the time of conviction applies; however, if a more liberal policy exists at the time of consideration, the convict should benefit from the liberalized regime.
2. Can the State Remission Board deny premature release without assigning reasons?
No. The Court has held that such orders must be reasoned, considering the convict’s conduct, eligibility, and relevant precedents.
3. What is the significance of the 2012 Jail Manual and the 2023 Amendment?
They liberalized the scope of remission, removing certain restrictions and ensuring that convicts previously excluded—such as those convicted under Section 364 IPC—could be considered for premature release.
