Court’s Decision
The Patna High Court, through Justice G. Anupama Chakravarthy, reiterated that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be invoked when a statutory alternative remedy is available. The Court dismissed the writ petition filed by a candidate challenging the selection of another person for a Public Distribution System (PDS) dealership, directing him instead to approach the Divisional Commissioner under the Bihar Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016.
The Court further granted liberty to the petitioner to file the complaint or application within two months from the date of receipt of the order and directed that the delay shall be condoned by the concerned authority under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The authority was also instructed to decide the matter within three months, ensuring adherence to the principles of natural justice.
“When an efficacious and adequate alternative remedy is available, the High Court ordinarily should not entertain a writ petition,” the Court observed, reaffirming the long-standing doctrine of judicial restraint.
Facts
The petitioner had applied for a PDS dealership license for Hardeochak Gram Panchayat under the Pirpainti Block of Bhagalpur district. The District Selection Committee, chaired by the District Magistrate, conducted the selection process and issued a resolution dated 27 February 2019 recommending another candidate belonging to the Backward Class category for the EBC-reserved seat.
The petitioner, who had secured 53.69% merit marks, alleged that the selection was arbitrary, illegal, and discriminatory, and that his superior merit had been ignored. He challenged the selection process, seeking cancellation of the resolution, and prayed for a direction to grant him the dealership.
The respondents opposed the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner had an effective statutory remedy available under the Bihar Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016, which provides for appeal and revision mechanisms.
Issues
- Whether the writ petition under Article 226 was maintainable when an alternative statutory remedy existed under the Bihar Targeted PDS (Control) Order, 2016.
- Whether the petitioner could directly invoke writ jurisdiction alleging arbitrariness in selection.
- Whether the delay in filing an appeal or complaint could be condoned under the Limitation Act.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner contended that the selection made by the District Selection Committee was arbitrary and contrary to the selection criteria under the PDS Control Order. He argued that his higher merit position entitled him to selection and that the selection of a candidate from the Backward Class category for an EBC-reserved seat was illegal.
He further submitted that although an appellate remedy was provided under Section 32(iii) of the Bihar Targeted PDS (Control) Order, 2016, the District Magistrate, being the head of the selection committee, could not fairly adjudicate an appeal against his own order. Therefore, the petitioner claimed that approaching the appellate authority would be futile, and the writ petition was maintainable.
However, he alternatively prayed that if the Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction, he be permitted to approach the Divisional Commissioner and that the authority be directed to condone any delay in filing the application, as the statutory limitation period had already lapsed.
Respondent’s Arguments
The State, through its counsel, submitted that the writ petition was not maintainable since the petitioner had an effective alternative remedy. The State relied on Section 32(iii), (v), and (vi) of the Bihar Targeted PDS (Control) Order, 2016, which provides a structured appellate and revisional framework.
It was argued that an appeal lies before the District Officer against an order of the licensing authority and that, if not disposed of within 60 days, the aggrieved person can file a revision before the Divisional Commissioner. Thus, the statute provides a complete mechanism to redress grievances relating to the selection of PDS dealers.
The respondents further contended that judicial intervention at this stage would disrupt the administrative process and undermine the statutory scheme. They also emphasized that the High Court should not act as an appellate authority in service or administrative selections, especially where legislative frameworks provide specific remedies.
Analysis of the Law
The Court carefully examined Section 32 of the Bihar Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016 and found that the provision explicitly provides for appeal and revision:
- Section 32(iii): Any person aggrieved by an order of the licensing authority denying, renewing, or cancelling a license may appeal to the District Officer within 30 days.
- Section 32(v): The appellate authority may stay the operation of the order pending appeal.
- Section 32(vi): If the appeal is not disposed of within 60 days, or if the appellant is dissatisfied, a revision may be filed before the Divisional Commissioner, who must decide it within two months.
The Court observed that this comprehensive statutory scheme aims to provide an effective grievance redressal mechanism and therefore excludes the need for direct writ intervention. It held that judicial interference is unwarranted unless there is a clear violation of fundamental rights, absence of jurisdiction, or breach of natural justice.
The Court further clarified that since the District Magistrate cannot review his own decision as the appellate authority, the appropriate forum for the petitioner is the Divisional Commissioner under Section 32(vi).
Thus, in consonance with the principles of judicial restraint, the Court held that the existence of statutory remedies bars direct invocation of Article 226.
Precedent Analysis
Though the judgment does not expressly cite other decisions, the reasoning aligns with established precedents such as:
- Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 – The Supreme Court held that writ jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly and not when an efficacious alternative remedy is available.
- Union of India v. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882 – It was reiterated that the writ jurisdiction cannot be used as a substitute for statutory appeals.
- State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 – The Court held that judicial review can only be invoked where the process is patently unjust or without jurisdiction.
Applying these principles, the High Court reaffirmed that Article 226 jurisdiction is discretionary, and litigants must first exhaust remedies provided under the law before approaching the writ court.
Court’s Reasoning
Justice G. Anupama Chakravarthy held that the petitioner’s grievance clearly falls within the statutory framework of the PDS Control Order, which provides both appellate and revisional mechanisms. Since the District Magistrate, who headed the selection committee, cannot sit in appeal over his own decision, the petitioner should approach the Divisional Commissioner as the appropriate authority.
Acknowledging the petitioner’s concern regarding the limitation period, the Court invoked the equitable principles of justice and directed the authority to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Moreover, the Court ensured procedural fairness by ordering that the authority must grant the petitioner an opportunity of hearing before deciding the complaint.
Thus, the High Court balanced judicial restraint with fairness, allowing the petitioner a remedy while preserving the integrity of the statutory hierarchy.
Conclusion
The Patna High Court disposed of the writ petition, directing that:
- The petitioner may file a complaint/application before the Divisional Commissioner within two months from the receipt of the judgment.
- The delay in filing shall be condoned by the authority under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
- The Divisional Commissioner shall decide the matter within three months of filing, ensuring a fair hearing.
By doing so, the Court reaffirmed the fundamental rule of administrative jurisprudence: when the law provides a remedy, that route must be followed before invoking constitutional jurisdiction.
“Statutory remedies are not ornamental; they are the intended first line of redress under the law,” the Court remarked, reinforcing judicial propriety and procedural discipline.
Implications
This judgment strengthens the jurisprudence of administrative efficiency by discouraging premature writ petitions. It underscores the judiciary’s consistent approach to uphold hierarchical redressal mechanisms and promote fairness within statutory frameworks.
For government selections and welfare schemes such as PDS dealerships, the ruling establishes that disputes must first be resolved through designated authorities, preserving both efficiency and procedural justice.
FAQs
1. Why did the Patna High Court dismiss the writ petition?
Because the petitioner had a statutory remedy under Section 32 of the Bihar Targeted PDS (Control) Order, 2016, and writ jurisdiction cannot substitute statutory procedures.
2. What direction did the Court give to the petitioner?
The petitioner was directed to approach the Divisional Commissioner within two months, with assurance that any delay will be condoned and the matter decided within three months.
3. What legal principle does the judgment reinforce?
It reinforces the doctrine of alternative remedy, emphasizing that writ petitions should only be entertained when there is no adequate statutory forum or in cases involving violation of fundamental rights.
