Supreme Court Bars Police-Led PCPNDT Investigations; Holds Appropriate Authority Must Investigate, Police Role Is Supplemental and Magistrate Cannot Take Cognizance Solely on Police Chargesheet
Supreme Court Clarifies Illegal Foetal Sex-Determination Prosecutions; Appropriate Authority Must Lead PCPNDT Probe, Police May Assist and Cognizance Requires Statutory Complaint
Facts
The appeal arose from a certificate issued by the Allahabad High Court under Article 134-A read with Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, raising important questions concerning the interpretation of the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act).
Respondent Dr. Brij Pal Singh had approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of a chargesheet filed against him for offences under Sections 315 and 511 IPC and Sections 4, 5(2), 6(a), 23 and 25 of the PCPNDT Act, arising from FIR No. 628 of 2017.
The case originated from secret information received by the District Magistrate, Bulandshahar, who was the Appropriate Authority under the Act, regarding alleged illegal determination of the sex of a foetus. The District Magistrate deputed the Tehsildar, Khurja, as an authorised officer to conduct a decoy operation. Information obtained through the operation led to a raid at the hospital and initiation of criminal proceedings.
While allowing the quashing petition, the Allahabad High Court noticed conflicting decisions of different High Courts on whether police could register FIRs and investigate PCPNDT Act offences and whether a Magistrate could take cognizance upon a police chargesheet.
The High Court therefore certified three questions of law for determination by the Supreme Court: whether an FIR could be registered merely because PCPNDT offences are cognizable; whether police could investigate such offences and, if not, who could; and whether a Magistrate could take cognizance on a police chargesheet.
Issues
The Supreme Court considered three central issues:
- Whether an FIR can be registered by the police for offences exclusively under the PCPNDT Act merely because Section 27 declares those offences cognizable and non-bailable.
- Whether police can independently investigate PCPNDT Act offences, or whether investigation is primarily vested in the Appropriate Authority under Section 17(4).
- Whether a Magistrate can take cognizance of PCPNDT Act offences on a police chargesheet despite Section 28 requiring a statutory complaint.
An important connected issue was how the procedure operates when the same transaction simultaneously discloses PCPNDT Act offences and independent IPC/BNS offences.
Appellants’/State’s Arguments
The State and those supporting police involvement principally contended that Section 27 expressly declares every offence under the PCPNDT Act to be cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable.
Accordingly, once information disclosing a cognizable offence is received, the ordinary machinery under the CrPC should operate, including registration of an FIR and investigation by police.
It was argued that Section 28 regulates only the subsequent stage of judicial cognizance, whereas investigation and cognizance are conceptually and chronologically distinct stages. Thus, according to this view, Section 28 could prevent a Magistrate from taking cognizance directly on a police report without necessarily extinguishing police investigative powers.
The Union of India additionally contended that completely excluding police could create a form of “backdoor immunity” where the same conduct constituted serious general criminal offences. It therefore supported recognition of separate investigative tracks where PCPNDT violations and IPC/BNS offences coexist.
Respondent’s Arguments
The contrary position was that the PCPNDT Act constitutes a complete and specialised statutory enforcement mechanism.
Sections 17 and 17A specifically empower the Appropriate Authority to investigate complaints, summon persons, obtain documents and materials, issue search warrants and initiate legal action.
It was argued that Rule 18A(3)(iv) expressly requires Appropriate Authorities, “as far as possible,” not to involve police in investigating cases under the Act, because PCPNDT proceedings are intended to operate as complaint cases.
Section 27 could therefore not be read in isolation merely because it describes PCPNDT offences as cognizable. Such an interpretation would effectively displace the special investigation machinery deliberately created by Parliament.
Most importantly, Section 28 creates a mandatory jurisdictional restriction: no Court may take cognizance except upon a complaint by the Appropriate Authority, authorised officer or other statutorily specified complainant. Consequently, a police chargesheet cannot substitute the complaint contemplated by Section 28.
Analysis of the Law
1. PCPNDT Act Creates a Special Enforcement Architecture
The Supreme Court read Sections 17, 17A, 27, 28 and 30, together with Rule 18A, as an integrated statutory scheme rather than construing Section 27 independently.
Section 17(4) expressly makes investigation of complaints concerning violations of the Act a function of the Appropriate Authority. It also authorises the Authority to take appropriate legal action and initiate independent investigations.
Section 17A further equips the Appropriate Authority with investigative powers including summoning persons, requiring production of documents or material objects and issuing search warrants.
This demonstrated that Parliament did not contemplate the Appropriate Authority merely as an administrative regulator or formal complainant. It was intended to perform a substantive investigative role.
2. Meaning of “Cognizable” Under Section 27
Section 27 provides that every PCPNDT offence is cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable.
However, the Court declined to treat the word “cognizable” as sufficient to displace the Act’s specialised statutory machinery.
The provision had to be harmoniously construed with Sections 17, 17A, 28 and 30 and Rule 18A. The special enforcement mechanism could not be rendered redundant merely by importing the ordinary police-investigation procedure applicable to conventional cognizable offences.
3. Appropriate Authority Is the Primary Investigator
The Supreme Court’s decisive conclusion was that police cannot be the main investigating authority for PCPNDT Act offences.
Section 17(4) specifically assigns investigation to the Appropriate Authority, while Rule 18A(3)(iv) directs that police involvement be avoided “as far as possible.”
The Court therefore held that the Appropriate Authority must remain the primary and controlling investigative agency.
4. Police Can Have a Supplemental Role
The judgment does not impose an absolute prohibition upon every form of police participation.
Police may provide supplemental assistance when required by the Appropriate Authority and under its supervision.
Thus, the distinction is between:
Police-led investigation — impermissible for PCPNDT offences;
and
Police assistance to an Appropriate Authority-led investigation — permissible where required.
The Court’s final answer expressly states that police may, at best, perform a supplemental role when required by the Appropriate Authority.
5. Magistrate Cannot Take Cognizance on Police Chargesheet
Section 28 was treated as decisive at the cognizance stage.
It provides that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence under the Act except upon a complaint made by one of the statutorily specified persons or authorities.
The Supreme Court characterised this as a complete statutory embargo against cognizance through any route outside Section 28.
Consequently, a Magistrate cannot take cognizance of PCPNDT offences merely upon a police chargesheet.
Precedent Analysis
The judgment undertook an extensive examination of conflicting High Court authorities and earlier Supreme Court decisions.
High Court decisions favouring police investigation
The Court considered decisions such as Dr. Varsha Gautam v. State of U.P., Dr. Rahul Malik v. State of U.P., Manoj Krishan Ahuja v. State of NCT of Delhi, Dr. Anant Ram v. State of Haryana, Dr. Aparna Singhal v. State of Haryana, Dr. Randhawa Ultrasonography Imaging and Research Institute v. State (NCT of Delhi), Uravashi Fakay v. State of NCT of Delhi, Ila Sood v. State of Punjab and Dr. Dhamayanthi Rajkumar v. State. These authorities broadly treated Section 27’s declaration that PCPNDT offences are cognizable as preserving some degree of ordinary police power.
High Court decisions restricting police involvement
On the opposite side were decisions including Dr. Amritlal Rohledar v. State of Chhattisgarh, Ramesh Chandra Naik v. State of Orissa, Sujatha Scan Centre v. State of Telangana, Dr. Sai v. State of Maharashtra, Manvinder Singh Gill v. State of M.P., Dr. Swaroop Charan Sahu v. State of M.P., Suo Motu v. State of Gujarat, Mohammad Imtiyaz v. State of Rajasthan and Dr. Vinod Kumar Bassi v. State of U.P.
These decisions emphasised the special complaint-based machinery created by the PCPNDT Act and, in varying degrees, restricted ordinary police intervention.
Jeewan Kumar Raut v. CBI
The Supreme Court also examined analogous provisions of the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994, particularly Jeewan Kumar Raut v. CBI, (2009) 7 SCC 526.
That legislation similarly restricts cognizance to complaints by specified authorities. The analogy supported the proposition that a special statute may deliberately establish a specialised investigative and prosecutorial route rather than ordinary police-driven prosecution.
The Court ultimately observed that its own precedents had consistently pointed towards the proposition that Sections 27 and 28 do not themselves confer investigative power upon police, although the position had not previously been expressly formulated in the manner required by the present reference.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court considered the statutory structure decisive.
First, Parliament expressly assigned the investigation of PCPNDT complaints to the Appropriate Authority under Section 17(4). Treating police as the primary investigator would substantially dilute that express allocation.
Second, the specialised nature of PCPNDT offences requires technical scrutiny concerning diagnostic procedures, medical records, ultrasound facilities and regulatory compliance. The statutory framework therefore deliberately places enforcement substantially in the hands of specialised authorities.
Third, Rule 18A(3)(iv) expressly instructs Appropriate Authorities not to involve police “as far as possible.” That provision would lose much of its practical meaning if police possessed an unrestricted parallel authority to initiate and conduct PCPNDT investigations.
Fourth, Section 28 creates an unmistakable statutory barrier at the prosecution stage. Regardless of what investigative assistance police might provide, a police chargesheet cannot itself become the jurisdictional foundation for cognizance of a PCPNDT offence.
Separate PCPNDT and IPC/BNS Tracks
Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, while concurring with Justice Sanjay Karol, provided an important practical clarification.
A single transaction may disclose both PCPNDT offences and independent IPC/BNS offences. The existence of common facts does not merge the two statutory procedures.
For the PCPNDT component, the Appropriate Authority investigates, with police assistance only supplementally and when specifically required.
For an independently constituted IPC/BNS offence arising from the same transaction, however, ordinary police jurisdiction continues unaffected.
Thus, two parallel but legally distinct investigative tracks may coexist.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court answered the reference by drawing a clear distinction between the specialised PCPNDT enforcement mechanism and ordinary criminal investigation.
It held that the police cannot be the principal investigating authority for offences under the PCPNDT Act. Investigation is primarily the statutory responsibility of the Appropriate Authority under Section 17(4).
Police participation is not completely excluded but is limited to a supplemental role, when required by and under the supervision of the Appropriate Authority.
Most importantly, Section 28 imposes a complete embargo upon a Magistrate taking cognizance of PCPNDT offences merely on a police chargesheet. Cognizance must follow the complaint mechanism prescribed by the Act.
At the same time, police remain competent to independently investigate separate IPC/BNS offences arising from the same or connected transaction.
After answering the reference, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Allahabad High Court for decision in accordance with these principles and disposed of the appeal.
Case Details
Case: State of Uttar Pradesh & Another v. Brij Pal Singh & Another
Court: Supreme Court of India, Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction
Citation: 2026 INSC 901
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 2938 of 2025
Judges: Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
Date: 20 August 2026
Result: Reference answered: Appropriate Authority is the primary investigator for PCPNDT offences; police role is supplemental; Magistrate cannot take cognizance on police chargesheet; matter remanded to Allahabad High Court.
