Supreme Court Denies Plot to Housing Society Claimant; Holds Ignored Resignation and Rejected Membership Records Justified High Court’s Interference With Arbitral Findings
Supreme Court Upholds Denial of Housing Society Plot; Finds Claimant Resigned in 1951 and Was Never Re-Admitted as Member
Facts
The dispute concerns the alleged membership of S.N. Sharma in the Burmah Shell Co-operative Housing Society and his consequent entitlement to allotment of a plot. Sharma claimed that he was a member of the Society and had been illegally deprived of a plot. The dispute was referred to arbitration under the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 1972.
An earlier ex parte arbitral award granting him a plot was set aside by the Supreme Court in 2002, with directions to continue the arbitration proceedings. After remand, the Registrar acting as Arbitrator passed an award dated 7 October 2003, holding that Sharma was a member of the Society and had fulfilled his obligations. The Arbitrator consequently directed allotment of a plot to his legal heir, Prakash Narain Sharma, upon payment of the land cost. The Delhi Co-operative Tribunal upheld the award on 18 March 2004.
The Society challenged these orders before the Delhi High Court under Articles 226 and 227. The High Court found that the Arbitrator and Tribunal had failed to consider crucial documentary evidence. It held that Sharma had resigned his membership in 1951, was not subsequently admitted as a member, and therefore had no right to allotment of a plot. It also noted that four members had claims prior to Sharma. The arbitral award and Tribunal’s order were consequently set aside.
The legal heir challenged that judgment before the Supreme Court.
Issues
The principal issues before the Supreme Court were:
- Whether S.N. Sharma had actually been re-admitted as a member of the Society after resigning his membership in 1951.
- Whether his legal heir could consequently claim allotment of a plot from the Society.
- Whether the Delhi High Court, while exercising certiorari jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227, could interfere with the concurrent findings of the Arbitrator and the Co-operative Tribunal.
- Whether failure of the Arbitrator and Tribunal to consider material documentary evidence rendered their findings sufficiently perverse or legally erroneous to justify writ interference.
The Supreme Court expressly identified the core controversy as Sharma’s membership and whether the High Court exceeded its certiorari jurisdiction by interfering with the arbitral and Tribunal orders.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The appellant/legal heir argued that the High Court exceeded the permissible limits of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 by interfering with concurrent factual findings of the Arbitrator and Tribunal.
It was contended that Sharma had been a valid member of the Society, had fulfilled his duties and obligations and continued as a member until his death. His name continued to appear in membership lists. The Arbitrator and Tribunal had considered the relevant documentary material before directing allotment of a plot.
The appellant further argued that land was available for allotment and relied upon earlier civil court proceedings in support of that position. Reliance was placed upon Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil to contend that the High Court had impermissibly interfered with findings reached by the statutory authorities.
Respondent’s Arguments
The Society argued that the Arbitrator and Tribunal had failed to examine crucial documents demonstrating that Sharma’s membership had ceased in 1951.
According to the Society, Sharma thereafter sought fresh membership in 1952, but his request was never accepted. No share certificate was issued to him thereafter. Consequently, the mere appearance of his name in certain records could not establish continuing membership.
The Society further argued that payment or proposed payment of ₹15,000 could not confer a right to a plot when Sharma was not a member, particularly when other members had prior claims to allotment. It therefore maintained that the High Court was justified in correcting findings reached after material documentary evidence had been ignored.
Analysis of the Law
The Supreme Court examined the nature and limits of the High Court’s certiorari jurisdiction.
The Court reiterated that certiorari is fundamentally supervisory rather than appellate. A writ court ordinarily cannot reassess evidence merely because another conclusion is possible.
However, an important distinction exists where a factual finding is unsupported by evidence, is based upon conjecture, or is reached by ignoring decisive material on record. Such a finding can become perverse and constitute an error of law, thereby permitting interference through certiorari.
The Supreme Court therefore held that although the scope of certiorari is limited, an error of law apparent from the record can be corrected. A finding unsupported by evidence or documentary material can legitimately attract writ interference.
This was not treated as an ordinary case where the High Court simply preferred its own interpretation of the evidence. Rather, the statutory authorities had failed to consider documents that went directly to the foundation of Sharma’s claimed membership.
Precedent Analysis
The Court principally considered the following authorities:
General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project v. Giridhari Sahu (2019 INSC 1020): The judgment establishes that certiorari is supervisory and not appellate. Ordinarily, factual findings cannot be reappreciated, but findings unsupported by evidence or overwhelmingly contrary to the evidence may become legally vulnerable as perverse findings.
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque (1954 INSC 122): Referred to for the established principles governing certiorari and correction of errors of law apparent on the face of the record.
Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das (2023 INSC 733): Reiterated that findings based on no evidence, conjecture or perversity may be challenged through certiorari because such defects can constitute errors of law.
Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010 INSC 422): Relied upon by the appellant concerning the limits of supervisory jurisdiction. The Supreme Court distinguished its application, observing that the writ petition before the High Court had been filed under both Articles 226 and 227.
Court’s Reasoning
The Supreme Court found that the Arbitrator and Tribunal had glossed over crucial documentary material.
Most importantly, the record showed:
- Sharma’s resignation was accepted by the Society’s Managing Committee on 5 May 1951;
- his share was transferred to another member on 18 August 1951;
- his subsequent application for membership was rejected by the Managing Committee on 5 November 1952; and
- his later request to deposit money for a plot was rejected on 4 November 1979.
According to the Supreme Court, consideration of these documents could lead to only one conclusion: Sharma was not a member of the Society. The Arbitrator had instead presumed that he remained a member throughout his lifetime, despite the documentary record to the contrary.
The Tribunal compounded the problem by affirming the finding through a brief six-paragraph order. The Supreme Court therefore held that the High Court was fully justified in exercising certiorari jurisdiction because the underlying findings were rendered without proper consideration of decisive evidence.
The Court additionally approved the High Court’s consideration of equities. Four persons had prior claims for allotment of a plot, which provided an additional reason for rejecting Sharma’s claim.
Once the Court concluded that Sharma was never re-admitted as a member, the question whether a vacant plot was actually available became irrelevant. Without membership, there could be no enforceable entitlement to allotment.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court upheld the Delhi High Court’s interference with the orders of the Arbitrator and Co-operative Tribunal.
It held that the High Court had legitimately exercised certiorari jurisdiction because the authorities below ignored material documentary evidence establishing that Sharma had resigned from the Society and was never subsequently re-admitted as a member.
Accordingly, neither Sharma nor his legal heir had a right to demand allotment of a plot from the Society. The Supreme Court dismissed both civil appeals with no order as to costs.
Case Details
Case: Shri Prakash Narain Sharma (Dead Through Legal Representative) v. M/s Burmah Shell Co-operative Housing Society (Regd.) Through Managing Committee Member & Others
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Civil Appeal Nos. 10693–10694 of 2026; 2026 INSC 927
Judge: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Date: 31 August 2026
Result: Civil Appeals dismissed; Delhi High Court judgment upheld; claimant held not entitled to allotment of a Society plot; no order as to costs.
