1. Court’s decision
The Supreme Court of India allowed the State’s appeal and set aside the Calcutta High Court’s judgment that had permitted a private company to retain over 211 acres of agricultural land by virtue of a belated review order. The Court held that revenue authorities under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 have no statutory power of review, and any attempt to reopen a concluded vesting determination after decades is void, unconstitutional, and contrary to the doctrine of finality — “review is not an inherent power of quasi-judicial authorities.”
2. Facts
The respondent company, incorporated in 1946, owned substantial agricultural land in West Bengal. Following enforcement of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, proceedings were initiated to determine whether the company was entitled to retain land under Section 6(1)(j), which protects companies exclusively engaged in farming as on 1 January 1952. In 1971, after full adjudication, a Revenue Officer rejected the company’s claim, holding that it failed to prove exclusive engagement in agriculture, and vested most of the land in the State. The company’s challenges failed over decades, attaining finality by 2002.
3. Issues
The principal issues were whether a Revenue Officer could review a concluded vesting order decades later without express statutory authority, whether executive directions could confer such power, and whether the respondent company had ever satisfied the statutory requirement of being exclusively engaged in agricultural farming so as to claim protection under Section 6(1)(j).
4. Appellants’ arguments
The State contended that the 1971 vesting order had attained finality after exhaustive litigation and could not be reopened. It was argued that the WBEA Act does not confer any power of review on revenue authorities, and that Sections 57A and 57B expressly bar reopening of decided matters. The State submitted that executive directions issued in 2008 directing review were ultra vires and unconstitutional, as jurisdiction cannot be created by consent or executive fiat. Reliance was placed on settled Supreme Court jurisprudence that review powers must be expressly conferred by statute.
5. Respondent’s arguments
The respondent company argued that it had always been engaged in agricultural farming and relied on corporate documents, income tax records, and certificates to assert eligibility under Section 6(1)(j). It was submitted that earlier proceedings suffered from procedural defects, that compensation was never paid, and that the State itself had approved an “amicable settlement” in 2008 permitting review. The company further invoked estoppel, contending that after it withdrew pending litigation and surrendered some land, the State could not resile from the review order.
6. Analysis of the law
The Court undertook an extensive analysis of the statutory scheme of the WBEA Act. It reiterated that power of review is not inherent and must be expressly conferred by legislation. Section 57A, which invests certain civil court powers in revenue authorities, was held insufficient to imply review jurisdiction. The Court emphasised that quasi-judicial executive authorities can exercise only limited powers explicitly granted, and that reopening settled rights undermines rule of law and certainty.
7. Precedent analysis
The Court relied on a long line of precedents, including Patel Narshi Thakershi, Kalabharati Advertising, and Kuntesh Gupta, all of which hold that review without statutory sanction is void. It also approved earlier Calcutta High Court decisions holding that successor revenue officers cannot sit in appeal over concluded determinations. The Court placed the issue within broader constitutional jurisprudence on separation of powers and independence of adjudicatory functions, drawing from decisions such as Kesavananda Bharati, L. Chandra Kumar, and Madras Bar Association.
8. Court’s reasoning
Applying these principles, the Court held that the 2008 government order and consequential review by the Revenue Officer were nullities. The executive could not direct reopening of a 1971 vesting order that had attained finality after decades of litigation. The Court rejected the argument of estoppel, holding that there can be no estoppel against statute. On merits, it further held that even otherwise, the respondent company had failed in 1971 to prove exclusive engagement in agriculture despite multiple opportunities, and the vesting determination was legally sound.
9. Conclusion
The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court erred in validating an illegal review process and in permitting retention of vested land. The review order of 2008 was declared void ab initio, and the 1971 vesting order was restored. The appeal filed by the State was allowed, reaffirming the finality of land acquisition proceedings under the WBEA Act.
10. Implications
This judgment is a landmark reaffirmation of finality in land reform adjudication and a strong check on executive overreach. It clarifies that revenue authorities cannot resurrect stale claims through review in the absence of express statutory power. The ruling protects the integrity of land reform laws, reinforces separation of powers, and sends a clear message that long-concluded vesting decisions cannot be undone through administrative accommodation or political settlements.
Case Law References
- Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji – Review is not an inherent power; must be expressly conferred by statute.
- Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Narichania – Review without statutory authority is ultra vires and void.
- L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India – Judicial supervision over tribunals forms part of basic structure.
- Madras Bar Association v. Union of India – Judicial functions cannot be transferred to executive authorities.
- Satyanarayan Banerjee v. Charge Officer (Cal HC) – Revenue authorities have no power to reopen concluded vesting orders.
FAQs
Q1. Can revenue officers review old land vesting orders?
No. Unless expressly authorised by statute, revenue officers have no power to review or reopen concluded vesting determinations.
Q2. Does executive approval or settlement validate an illegal review?
No. Executive directions cannot confer jurisdiction where the statute does not permit it, and there is no estoppel against law.
Q3. What must a company prove to retain land under Section 6(1)(j)?
It must strictly establish that it was exclusively engaged in agricultural farming as on 1 January 1952.
