Court’s Decision
The Bombay High Court quashed a preventive detention order passed under Section 3(1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1981 (MPDA Act), branding the detenue as a “dangerous person.” The Court held that the detention order suffered from multiple infirmities—absence of proximity between the alleged offence and detention order, reliance on stale and extraneous material, lack of evidence showing disturbance of public order, and speculative apprehensions despite the detenue being on bail.
The Court emphasised:
“That the allegations are grave in itself does not convert an incident of law and order into a public order problem. Preventive detention cannot rest on stale material and casual satisfaction.”
Accordingly, the detention order dated 09.06.2025, its approval, and subsequent confirmation were quashed. The detenue was directed to be released forthwith.
Facts
The petitioner was arrested in March 2025 in connection with an FIR alleging caste abuse, assault, and criminal intimidation under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Arms Act, and SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. He was released on bail in April 2025.
Subsequently, the District Magistrate issued a preventive detention order in June 2025 under the MPDA Act, branding him a “dangerous person” whose detention was necessary to prevent acts prejudicial to public order. The grounds cited the recent FIR, two in-camera witness statements, and a table of seven antecedent cases dating back to 2020.
The petitioner challenged the detention order, contending that the alleged offence was an isolated incident affecting only individuals, that the 12-week delay snapped the live link between offence and detention, and that stale antecedents were impermissibly relied upon.
Issues
- Whether the alleged incident amounted to a disturbance of public order or was merely a law-and-order breach.
- Whether the unexplained delay between the incident (March 2025) and detention order (June 2025) vitiated the detention.
- Whether the detenue being on bail without violating conditions undermined the basis of detention.
- Whether reliance on stale antecedents and inconsistent categorisation of the detenue showed non-application of mind.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner’s counsel argued that the alleged March 2025 incident, though serious, was a targeted assault on an individual and did not affect the even tempo of community life. There was no evidence of public disorder such as rioting, traffic paralysis, or shop closures.
It was further submitted that the 12-week gap between the incident and the detention order snapped the proximate link required under preventive detention law. Since his release on bail in April 2025, there was no allegation of breach of bail conditions or post-bail misconduct.
The counsel highlighted that the detention order inconsistently described him as a “bootlegger” in one part and as a “dangerous person” elsewhere, showing a templated approach rather than genuine application of mind. Reliance on stale antecedents dating back to 2020 was criticised as extraneous and irrelevant.
Respondent’s Arguments
The State defended the detention order, arguing that the petitioner had a consistent criminal history. The authorities were satisfied that he was a dangerous person likely to commit prejudicial acts.
It was submitted that in-camera witness statements revealed that people in the locality were too afraid to complain against him, reflecting his influence and capacity to disturb public order. The State contended that preventive detention was justified to prevent recurrence of criminal activity.
Analysis of the Law
The Court analysed the distinction between law and order and public order, relying on Supreme Court precedent. It held that preventive detention under the MPDA Act can only be invoked when acts disturb the even tempo of society, not merely when individual rights are violated.
The Court noted that preventive detention requires a live and proximate link between past conduct and likelihood of recurrence. Delays in issuing detention orders without supervening acts render the subjective satisfaction stale.
The Court further reiterated that when a person is already on bail, detention requires cogent material showing real and imminent likelihood of prejudicial activity—not vague apprehensions. Reliance on stale antecedents, or inconsistent classification of the detenue, undermines subjective satisfaction.
Precedent Analysis
The Court relied upon and discussed several landmark precedents:
- Kanu Biswas v. State of W.B. (1972) 3 SCC 831 – Preventive detention must be based on disturbance of public order, not mere breaches of law and order.
- Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi v. State of Manipur (2010) 9 SCC 618 – Unexplained delay between incident and detention order vitiates detention as it snaps the live link.
- Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu (2011) 5 SCC 244 – Preventive detention cannot be based on vague apprehensions; real and imminent likelihood of prejudicial activity must be shown.
- Khudiram Das v. State of W.B. (1975) 2 SCC 81 – Subjective satisfaction based on extraneous or irrelevant material is invalid.
These precedents were applied to hold that the detention order was unsustainable.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court held that:
- The alleged incident was a targeted assault amounting to a law-and-order problem, not public order disturbance.
- The 12-week unexplained delay snapped the live link, making the detention stale.
- Since the petitioner was already on bail, absence of post-bail misconduct or breach of conditions negated the justification for detention.
- Reliance on stale antecedents and inconsistent categorisation showed a casual, templated approach by the detaining authority.
Each infirmity was individually sufficient to vitiate the detention order; cumulatively, they made the order unsustainable.
Conclusion
The High Court allowed the writ petition, quashed the detention order, its approval, and confirmation. It directed that the detenue be released forthwith, unless required in any other case.
Implications
This ruling reinforces constitutional safeguards against arbitrary preventive detention. It draws a sharp distinction between law-and-order infractions and public order disturbances, clarifies that preventive detention cannot rest on stale material, and reiterates that detention while on bail requires real and imminent likelihood of prejudicial conduct.
For future cases, it sets clear standards: detention orders must be proximate, specific, and supported by material affecting society at large—not vague fears or dated antecedents.
FAQs
Q1. Can preventive detention be ordered for ordinary criminal offences?
No. The Court held that preventive detention is justified only when acts disturb public order, not for isolated law-and-order infractions.
Q2. Does delay between incident and detention order matter?
Yes. Unexplained delay snaps the live link required for preventive detention, making the order invalid.
Q3. Can a person on bail still be preventively detained?
Only if there is cogent material showing a real and imminent likelihood of prejudicial activity. Mere apprehensions are insufficient.
