Court’s decision
The Delhi High Court dismissed a petition challenging a trial court’s procedural order which proposed to hear legal issues before recording evidence in a civil suit. Holding that the impugned order did not affect substantive rights of the parties, the Court ruled that no case for supervisory interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was made out. The Court clarified that at an interlocutory stage, where findings are yet to be rendered, the High Court ought not to intervene merely because the trial court has chosen to first examine legal questions.
Facts
The dispute arose out of a civil suit pending before a Delhi trial court concerning competing claims over immovable property. The petitioner approached the High Court challenging an order passed by the trial court in September 2024. By the impugned order, the trial court had taken admission–denial affidavits on record and observed that the issues involved appeared to be “purely legal” in nature. It accordingly listed the matter for arguments on those legal questions, instead of immediately proceeding with the recording of evidence.
Aggrieved, the petitioner invoked Article 227, contending that once issues had already been framed earlier and the matter was listed for plaintiff’s evidence, the trial court was bound to proceed with trial and could not defer evidence by treating the dispute as one involving only legal questions.
Issues
The principal issue before the High Court was whether a trial court’s decision to first hear legal issues—before allowing parties to lead evidence—amounts to a jurisdictional error or procedural perversity warranting interference under Article 227. A related issue was whether such a procedural order causes prejudice to the rights of the parties so as to justify supervisory correction.
Petitioner’s arguments
The petitioner argued that issues in the civil suit had already been framed in May 2022 and the matter was thereafter listed for plaintiff’s evidence. It was contended that the trial court, having reached that stage, could not reverse course by deciding to hear legal arguments first. According to the petitioner, the impugned order effectively stalled the trial and prejudiced his case by denying him an opportunity to lead evidence. It was submitted that the trial court’s approach undermined procedural fairness and warranted intervention to ensure that the suit proceeded in accordance with settled civil procedure.
Respondent’s arguments
The respondent countered that the impugned order was purely procedural and did not decide any rights of the parties. It was argued that civil courts possess inherent powers to manage proceedings and are competent to hear legal issues at any stage, particularly where such issues may go to the root of the matter. The respondent emphasized that the trial court had not finally adjudicated anything and had merely called upon parties to address legal questions, including the applicability of concepts such as GPA transactions and benami claims. Consequently, it was submitted that the petition under Article 227 was not maintainable.
Analysis of the law
The High Court examined the scope of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It reiterated that this power is meant to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and to correct grave derelictions of duty or patent perversity. Article 227 does not confer an appellate jurisdiction, nor does it permit routine interference with discretionary or procedural orders.
In civil proceedings, trial courts are vested with wide latitude in case management. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 enables courts to decide issues of law as preliminary issues where appropriate. Even where issues have been framed, courts are not denuded of the power to regulate the sequence of hearing if doing so aids efficient adjudication.
Precedent analysis
While the order under consideration was brief, it aligned with a consistent line of authority holding that procedural directions do not ordinarily invite Article 227 interference. Courts have repeatedly emphasized that interlocutory orders, particularly those that neither finally decide rights nor cause irreparable prejudice, should not be interfered with at the supervisory stage.
The High Court’s reasoning also resonates with broader constitutional jurisprudence that discourages piecemeal challenges during trial and seeks to prevent the supervisory jurisdiction from being converted into a tool for delaying proceedings.
Court’s reasoning
Upon perusal of the impugned order, the High Court noted that the trial court had merely observed that the issues “appear to be purely legal” and that it “has to be considered if parties can be treated at issue on any point or not.” The High Court emphasized that these observations were tentative and that the trial court had yet to render any findings.
Crucially, the Court found that the impugned order did not determine rights or liabilities of the parties. It neither closed the evidence nor finally decided the suit. Since the trial court was still in seisin of the matter and was yet to adjudicate the legal issues, the High Court held that no prejudice was caused at this stage. The petitioner, therefore, had no cause to invoke Article 227 prematurely.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court concluded that the petition was devoid of merit. It held that the trial court’s decision to first hear legal issues was a procedural step within its jurisdiction and did not warrant supervisory interference. Since the impugned order did not adversely affect the rights of the parties and the suit remained pending for adjudication, the Court dismissed the petition along with all pending applications.
Implications
This decision reinforces the principle that High Courts will not interfere with day-to-day procedural orders of trial courts under Article 227. It underscores judicial discipline in supervisory review and discourages litigants from challenging every interlocutory direction that does not go in their favour. For civil litigants, the ruling clarifies that trial courts retain discretion to sequence hearings, including deciding legal issues first, and such discretion will ordinarily be respected unless grave injustice is shown.
Case law references
- Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 (general principle)
Held: High Courts should not interfere with interlocutory or procedural orders unless there is patent lack of jurisdiction or manifest injustice.
Applied: Used to dismiss the challenge to a procedural trial court order.
FAQs
Q1. Can the High Court interfere with a trial court’s procedural order under Article 227?
Only in exceptional cases. Routine procedural or interlocutory orders that do not affect substantive rights are generally not interfered with.
Q2. Can a civil court decide legal issues before recording evidence?
Yes. Trial courts have discretion to hear and decide legal issues first, especially if they may dispose of or substantially narrow the dispute.
Q3. Does such an order prejudice the parties’ rights?
Not ordinarily. Unless rights are finally decided or evidence is irreversibly shut out, no prejudice is presumed.
