Court’s Decision
The Delhi High Court dismissed a writ petition challenging the selection of a candidate to the post of Reader at Jamia Millia Islamia University. The petitioner had alleged that the selected candidate did not possess the requisite five years of teaching experience under Clause 1.3.2 of the UGC Regulations, 2000, and had relied on a disputed experience certificate. The Court, however, interpreted the clause to mean that eligibility could be met either by five years of teaching, five years of research, or a cumulative combination of teaching and research. Applying this interpretation, the Court held the selected candidate was eligible and found no infirmity in the decision-making process of the Selection Committee. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed without costs.
Facts
The dispute arose from a 2005 advertisement for the post of Reader in the Department of Sociology. The petitioner, a Lecturer since 2003, claimed to be fully eligible. The contest was with another candidate, also a Lecturer since 2003, who was eventually selected.
The petitioner argued that the selected candidate lacked five years of teaching experience, as her two-year teaching certificate from the Indian Institute of Youth Welfare (IIYW), Nagpur, was fabricated. RTI replies initially denied her association with the institute, though later letters from IIYW confirmed her adhoc faculty status. An inquiry committee of the University in 2007 expressed doubts about the authenticity of the IIYW certificate.
The petitioner also stressed that the Selection Committee and University acted illegally in ignoring the inquiry report and sought quashing of the selection. The respondents countered that the candidate had sufficient cumulative teaching and research experience, and that courts should not interfere in academic selection processes
.
Issues
- How should Clause 1.3.2 of the UGC Regulations, 2000 be interpreted, particularly the use of the term “and/or”?
- Whether the IIYW teaching certificate could be relied upon to establish eligibility.
- Whether cumulative teaching and research experience could render the candidate eligible.
- What weight should be given to the University’s internal inquiry report that questioned the certificate’s authenticity.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner argued that Clause 1.3.2 strictly required five years of teaching experience, excluding the period spent for a Ph.D. The respondent candidate fell short because her IIYW certificate was unreliable and fabricated. Reliance was placed on RTI replies showing that IIYW initially denied employing the candidate.
It was further argued that fraud vitiates all, and since the IIYW certificate was doubtful, the candidate’s application should have been rejected outright. Counsel stressed that the inquiry report of 2007, which had discredited the certificate, was improperly brushed aside by the University’s Legal Counsel without authority. The petitioner contended that this report was a finding of fact and should have barred the respondent’s selection.
Respondent’s Arguments
The selected candidate contended that IIYW was a genuine institution, and she had taught there between 1998–2000. Even if that period were disregarded, she had over four years of teaching experience combined with two years of research experience (1995–1997). Clause 1.3.2, properly interpreted, permitted cumulative reckoning of teaching and research to reach five years.
The University defended the selection, arguing that the Selection Committee had duly considered the candidate’s overall record, including extensive teaching at Lady Irwin College, Institute of Home Economics, and Jamia Millia Islamia. It argued that judicial review cannot extend to re-evaluating the credentials assessed by expert academic bodies. The UGC, though inconsistent in its affidavits, ultimately recognized that both teaching and research could be cumulatively counted.
Analysis of the Law
The Court’s central task was interpreting Clause 1.3.2 of the UGC Regulations. It emphasized the golden rule of statutory interpretation: words used must be given plain meaning. The expression “and/or” in the clause could not be treated as surplusage. Thus, the Court held that candidates could qualify by showing (a) five years of teaching, (b) five years of research, or (c) a cumulative total of both.
Applying this interpretation, even if IIYW teaching experience was ignored, the respondent still had 4.4 years of teaching and two years of research, totaling over six years, making her eligible.
The Court also clarified that the inquiry report of 2007, while critical of the IIYW certificate, did not negate eligibility under the cumulative model. Furthermore, the Executive Council of the University had formally confirmed the candidate’s appointment through a resolution, which was never challenged in the writ petition.
Precedent Analysis
- M.V. Thimmaiah v. UPSC (2008) 2 SCC 119 – Held that Courts cannot act as appellate bodies over selection committees; judicial review is limited to process and mala fides.
- UPSC v. M. Sathiya Priya (2018) 15 SCC 796 – Reinforced that recommendations of expert committees cannot be challenged except for mala fides or statutory violation.
- Basavaiah v. Dr. HL Ramesh (2010) 8 SCC 372 – Reiterated limited judicial role in academic matters; Courts should defer to experts.
- Ran Vijay Singh v. State of UP (2018) 2 SCC 357 and Maharashtra State Board v. Paritosh Sheth (1984) 4 SCC 27 – Cautioned against Courts substituting their views in academic assessments.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that judicial review cannot extend to substituting the academic judgment of experts. The Selection Committee, Executive Council, and UGC had all examined the respondent’s credentials. Even assuming doubts over IIYW experience, the respondent’s cumulative record sufficed.
The Court also stressed that the petitioner had not challenged the Executive Council’s resolution formally approving the appointment. Without such challenge, the petition could not succeed. Academic appointments, the Court reiterated, fall primarily within the discretion of expert committees, and absent mala fides or violation of statutory rules, Courts will not interfere.
Conclusion
The writ petition was dismissed. The Court upheld the respondent’s selection as Reader, interpreting Clause 1.3.2 of the UGC Regulations to allow cumulative teaching and research experience. It found no illegality in the decision-making process and declined to interfere.
Implications
The ruling clarifies that the UGC Regulations are flexible: candidates may combine teaching and research to satisfy experience requirements for Reader posts. It strengthens judicial deference to academic experts in selection matters, warning litigants that Courts will not second-guess academic bodies absent fraud or mala fides. The decision also highlights the importance of formally challenging institutional resolutions if one seeks judicial relief.
FAQs
Q1. Can teaching and research experience be combined under UGC Regulations for Reader posts?
Yes. The Court held that the term “and/or” permits cumulative experience of teaching and research to satisfy the five-year requirement.
Q2. Can Courts interfere with Selection Committee decisions in universities?
Courts have a limited role. They may review process irregularities or mala fides but will not act as appellate bodies over academic assessments.
Q3. What if an experience certificate is disputed?
Even if one experience claim is doubtful, cumulative experience from valid teaching and research can still establish eligibility, as in this case.
