Delhi High Court Upholds Discharge of Husband and In-Laws in Matrimonial Case; Finds Cruelty, Stridhan and Sexual-Offence Allegations Insufficient to Raise Grave Suspicion
Delhi High Court Upholds Discharge of Husband and In-Laws; Finds Matrimonial Cruelty and Dowry Allegations Insufficient to Raise Grave Suspicion
Facts
The petitioner-wife approached the Delhi High Court under Section 528 BNSS, corresponding to Section 482 CrPC, challenging two orders that had resulted in the discharge of her husband and his family members in FIR No. 364/2019, P.S. Dwarka South, registered under Sections 498A, 406, 377, 509 and 34 IPC.
The petitioner married respondent No. 2 on 28 April 2017 at Arya Samaj Mandir, followed by a social marriage ceremony on 19 June 2017. She was employed as an Air Hostess with Air India, while her husband was a pilot.
According to her, matrimonial discord arose soon after marriage. She alleged that the respondents were dissatisfied because her father had declined a demand for a Honda City car. Her father allegedly spent approximately Rs. 35 lakhs on the marriage and jewellery and subsequently transferred Rs. 3,20,000 towards the couple’s proposed New Zealand honeymoon.
She further alleged that her jewellery was taken by respondent No. 5 on 20 June 2017 for safe custody and was subsequently not returned despite repeated demands. She also alleged physical and verbal abuse, derogatory remarks, pressure to resign from employment and non-consensual sexual acts by her husband.
The petitioner eventually began residing at her parental home from 29 March 2018. After reconciliation efforts failed, she approached the CAW Cell, resulting in registration of the FIR.
Following investigation, the husband was chargesheeted under Sections 377, 323, 498A, 406, 509 and 34 IPC, while the remaining accused were chargesheeted under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC.
On 18 May 2024, the Mahila Court discharged all accused. The petitioner’s revision was subsequently dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge on 13 December 2024, leading to the present petition.
Issues
- Whether the material collected during investigation raised a prima facie case or grave suspicion sufficient to frame charges against the husband and his family members.
- Whether allegations concerning demand for a car, physical assault, verbal abuse and matrimonial harassment justified framing charges under Sections 498A, 323 and 509 IPC.
- Whether the alleged entrustment and non-return of jewellery and stridhan disclosed the ingredients of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 IPC.
- Whether the husband’s discharge under Section 377 IPC was sustainable despite the complainant’s allegations of non-consensual sexual acts.
- Whether the Trial Court had improperly assessed the probative value of evidence at the stage of framing charge.
- Whether the High Court could interfere under Section 528 BNSS with concurrent discharge findings of the Trial Court and Revisional Court.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner argued that both courts below had improperly evaluated the prosecution evidence as though conducting a trial rather than merely considering whether sufficient material existed to frame charges.
Regarding Section 406 IPC, she relied upon the specific allegation that respondent No. 5 had taken her jewellery for safe custody on 20 June 2017 and subsequently failed to return it despite demands on several specified dates. She also relied upon jewellery bills, the jeweller being cited as a prosecution witness and messages exchanged with her husband.
She argued that specific allegations existed against respondents Nos. 2 to 5 regarding demand for a car, physical assault, verbal abuse and harassment, supported by statements of her parents and relatives recorded during investigation.
She relied upon Aluri Venkata Ramana v. Aluri Thirupathi Rao & Ors. to argue that Section 498A recognises both wilful conduct causing physical or mental injury and harassment connected with unlawful demands.
The petitioner further contended that the charge stage requires only a prima facie case or grave suspicion, not proof sufficient for conviction.
Respondent’s Arguments
State
Interestingly, the State supported the petitioner’s challenge to the discharge.
The APP argued that the Trial Court had failed to consider the complaint, Section 161 statements, documentary material and stridhan list in their entirety.
The State submitted that specific allegations existed regarding entrustment of jewellery to respondent No. 5 and repeated demands for its return.
Regarding Section 377 IPC, the State argued that the complainant’s allegations could not have been discarded merely because there was no medical or other corroborative evidence. Questions of credibility and corroboration should ordinarily be examined during trial rather than at the stage of charge.
Husband and In-Laws
Respondents Nos. 2 to 5 argued that the petition was essentially an impermissible attempt to secure re-appreciation of evidence after two courts had independently found insufficient material to frame charges.
They alleged that the FIR was a counterblast to the husband’s divorce proceedings and that the petitioner had initiated multiple matrimonial proceedings thereafter.
They characterised the allegations concerning dowry, cruelty, criminal breach of trust and sexual offences as vague, omnibus and unsupported by contemporaneous evidence.
Regarding stridhan, they argued that the husband had admitted possession of certain articles and had expressed willingness to return them, but the petitioner declined to receive them.
Analysis of the Law
Test at the Stage of Framing Charge
The High Court reiterated that at the charge stage, the Court is required to determine whether the investigation material raises a prima facie case or grave suspicion against the accused.
The Court should not meticulously evaluate evidence or decide whether conviction will ultimately follow.
However, this principle does not mean that every allegation automatically warrants a trial. Where the prosecution material fails to disclose the basic ingredients of the alleged offence, an accused cannot be compelled to undergo trial merely on vague or omnibus allegations.
Cruelty, Assault and Section 509 IPC
The High Court found that both courts below had considered the allegations concerning dowry demand, physical assault and matrimonial discord together with the investigation material.
Both had independently concluded that the material did not create grave suspicion warranting charges.
The High Court found no perversity or jurisdictional error in those concurrent findings concerning Sections 498A, 323 and 509 IPC.
Section 406 IPC – Stridhan
Regarding criminal breach of trust, the Trial Court had found no sufficiently clear and specific allegations establishing the necessary entrustment of stridhan.
The respondents had also admitted possession of certain articles and expressed willingness to return them, while the petitioner had declined to receive those admitted articles.
The Trial Court additionally noted a discrepancy: the allegation of entrustment was against Madhu Chopra, whereas the chargesheet for Section 406 IPC had been filed against Aditya Chopra. These findings were affirmed by the Revisional Court.
Section 377 IPC
The High Court also upheld the concurrent findings regarding Section 377 IPC.
Apart from the complainant’s allegations, the investigation had produced no contemporaneous medical or other supporting material.
The MLC conducted approximately two years after the alleged incident recorded no external injury, and no swab was taken because of the passage of time.
The Revisional Court had independently reconsidered this aspect and found no reason to disturb the discharge. The High Court declined to substitute its own assessment for those concurrent findings.
Scope of Section 528 BNSS
The Court emphasised that its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS is not an appellate jurisdiction permitting routine re-appreciation of evidence.
Where the Trial Court and Revisional Court have concurrently evaluated the material, interference is justified only where there is patent illegality, perversity or miscarriage of justice.
The petitioner had failed to demonstrate any such defect.
Precedent Analysis
Aluri Venkata Ramana v. Aluri Thirupathi Rao & Ors.
The petitioner relied upon Aluri Venkata Ramana v. Aluri Thirupathi Rao & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 5473 for the proposition that Section 498A IPC contemplates two independent categories of cruelty.
Clause (a) concerns wilful conduct causing physical or mental injury, while clause (b) deals with harassment associated with unlawful demands. Therefore, absence of a specific dowry demand does not necessarily exclude Section 498A where physical or mental cruelty is otherwise established.
The High Court did not dispute that proposition. It held, however, that the settled legal test still had to be applied to the specific evidentiary material in the case, and both courts below had found that material insufficient to raise grave suspicion.
State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao
The petitioner relied upon State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 INSC 894, along with other authorities, to contend that the Court at the charge stage must assess only whether a prima facie case or grave suspicion exists and should not evaluate the evidence as though deciding guilt.
State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa
Reliance was also placed on State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659, concerning the threshold applicable while considering framing of charge.
State of M.P. v. Mohan Lal Soni
The petitioner cited State of M.P. v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338, again in support of the proposition that the Court should not conduct a detailed evidentiary assessment at the charge stage.
Sajjan Kumar v. CBI
Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 was also cited regarding the principles governing discharge and framing of charge.
The High Court accepted that these authorities correctly stated the governing test. However, it held that application of the test depends upon the facts and material of each individual case. The two courts below had correctly applied the test and independently concluded that no grave suspicion arose.
Court’s Reasoning
The High Court’s central reasoning was that this was not a case where the lower courts had imposed an erroneously high standard of proof at the charge stage.
Both the Trial Court and the Revisional Court had examined whether the allegations and investigation material, taken at face value, disclosed the essential ingredients of the offences and created grave suspicion against the accused.
For Sections 498A, 323 and 509 IPC, the material was found insufficient.
For Section 406 IPC, there were deficiencies concerning specific entrustment, willingness to return admitted articles and even the identity of the person against whom the relevant charge had been filed.
For Section 377 IPC, the allegation was unsupported by contemporaneous medical or other corroborative material collected during investigation.
Most importantly, there were already two concurrent judicial findings in favour of discharge.
The High Court held that Section 528 BNSS could not be converted into another appellate forum merely because the complainant sought a different appreciation of the investigation material.
Without patent illegality, perversity, jurisdictional error or miscarriage of justice, there was no justification to interfere.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court dismissed the complainant-wife’s petition and upheld the discharge of her husband and his family members.
It held that the Trial Court and Revisional Court had correctly applied the principles governing framing of charge and that their concurrent findings disclosed no illegality, perversity, material irregularity or jurisdictional error.
The Court therefore refused to restore the criminal prosecution under Sections 498A, 406, 377, 323, 509 and 34 IPC against the respondents.
All pending applications were also disposed of.
Case Details
Case: XXXXXXXXXXX v. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors.
Court: Delhi High Court
Case Number: CRL.M.C. 1781/2025
Judge: Justice Madhu Jain
Date: 07 August 2026
Result: Petition dismissed; Trial Court’s discharge of respondent Nos. 2 to 5, as affirmed by the Revisional Court, upheld.
