Court’s Decision
The Patna High Court, presided over by Justice Harish Kumar, allowed the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, quashing two charge memoranda issued against a university professor by the Chief Vigilance Officer (CVO) of Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agricultural University, Pusa, Bihar.
The Court held that the CVO had no jurisdiction to issue charge-sheets on behalf of the disciplinary authority, observing that:
“Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, it must be done in that way or not at all. Other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden.”
The Court ruled that the Board of Management, being the disciplinary authority under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, could delegate only limited authority to the Vice-Chancellor to draw up a charge memo, but final approval must rest with the Board before issuance. The Court therefore set aside both charge-sheets and remitted the matter back for fresh consideration in accordance with law.
Facts
The petitioner, a university professor, was initially appointed as an Associate Professor in a research institute affiliated with the University. Later, an advertisement dated 4 December 2017 invited applications for the post of Programme Coordinator (Senior Scientist and Head) under the Krishi Vigyan Kendra, RPCAU.
After due scrutiny and interviews, the petitioner was recommended by the selection committee, appointed on 18 June 2019, and later confirmed in service on 28 August 2021.
However, on 6 June 2024, a show cause notice was issued by the Chief Vigilance Officer alleging that the petitioner did not possess the required experience as his prior appointments were project-based contractual roles, not qualifying as regular service.
The petitioner replied to the show-cause notice on 18 July 2024, refuting all allegations. Despite this, the CVO issued a memorandum dated 2 April 2025, initiating major penalty proceedings under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
Subsequently, a supplementary charge-sheet dated 9 July 2025 was also issued, alleging that the petitioner had exceeded the maximum age limit of 45 years for the post and was not entitled to relaxation, as he was not a regular employee of the University at the time of application.
Issues
- Whether the departmental proceedings were vitiated due to inordinate delay in initiating the disciplinary process.
- Whether the CVO had competence or authority to issue charge-sheets under the CCS (CCA) Rules.
- Whether the charge memoranda were valid without approval of the disciplinary authority.
- Whether such sub-delegation of powers amounted to violation of Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner contended that the charges were baseless and delayed, arguing that the alleged irregularities dated back to 2017, while the charge memos were issued only in 2025, eight years later. Such delay, it was argued, caused prejudice and violated the principles of fairness.
The petitioner further argued that no forgery or fabrication of documents was ever alleged; his credentials were scrutinized and verified by the University’s selection committee before appointment.
He maintained that only the Vice-Chancellor or the Board of Management, as the disciplinary authority, could issue charge-sheets under Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, and not the Chief Vigilance Officer. Therefore, the charge memoranda were without jurisdiction and void ab initio.
Reliance was placed on several Supreme Court precedents:
- A.K. Roy v. State of Punjab (AIR 1986 SC 2160) – holding that a delegated authority cannot sub-delegate unless expressly permitted.
- Sahni Silk Mills (1994) 5 SCC 346 – emphasizing that delegated statutory powers must be exercised by the designated authority.
- Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath (2014) 1 SCC 351 – holding that charge-sheets issued without approval from the disciplinary authority are non est.
- State of M.P. v. Bani Singh (AIR 1990 SC 1308) and P.V. Mahadevan v. TN Housing Board (2005) 6 SCC 636) – holding that delayed disciplinary action prejudices the employee and violates natural justice.
Respondent’s Arguments
The University, represented by Senior Advocate P.K. Shahi, contended that the proceedings were validly initiated following a public complaint submitted to the President of India, who is the Visitor of the University under Section 9(1) of the Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agricultural University Act, 2016.
Following a directive from the President’s Secretariat, the Department of Agricultural Research and Education (DARE) conducted an inquiry and found that the petitioner was ineligible at the time of appointment. The Board of Management, in its meeting held on 6 December 2023, authorized the Vice-Chancellor to take all actions under the CCS (CCA) Rules, including issuance of charge-sheets and appointment of Enquiry Officers.
It was argued that the charge-sheets were issued “for and on behalf of the disciplinary authority” and had been approved by the Board. The University asserted that there was no mala fide and that the petitioner’s defence could be adequately examined during the disciplinary inquiry.
Analysis of the Law
The Court examined the scope of Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, which mandates that the disciplinary authority must either draw up or cause to be drawn up the articles of charge, including imputations, list of witnesses, and documents.
The Court reiterated that while administrative assistance may be sought in preparing the charges, the final approval and issuance must emanate from the disciplinary authority itself, as per constitutional and statutory safeguards under Article 311(1) of the Constitution.
The maxim delegatus non potest delegare was reaffirmed, meaning that a delegated authority cannot further delegate unless expressly permitted by the legislature. The Court found that no such enabling provision existed in the RPCAU Act or the CCS (CCA) Rules authorizing the Chief Vigilance Officer to issue charge-sheets.
Precedent Analysis
- A.K. Roy v. State of Punjab (AIR 1986 SC 2160)
– The Supreme Court held that sub-delegation of statutory power is impermissible unless expressly authorized. Applied here to hold that the Vice-Chancellor could not sub-delegate power to the CVO. - Sahni Silk Mills (1994) 5 SCC 346
– Emphasized that statutory powers must be exercised by the designated authority; sub-delegation is impermissible without clear legislative sanction. - Steel Authority of India v. Labour Court (1980) 3 SCC 734)
– Held that only the designated disciplinary authority can issue charge-sheets; others lack jurisdiction. - Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath (2014) 1 SCC 351)
– Held that charge-sheets not approved by the disciplinary authority are void; the expression “cause to be drawn up” does not confer power of issuance on subordinates. - State of Tamil Nadu v. Promod Kumar (2018) 17 SCC 677)
– Reaffirmed that disciplinary action and charge-sheet must originate from the disciplinary authority itself, ensuring compliance with Article 311(2).
Court’s Reasoning
Justice Harish Kumar held that the disciplinary authority (Board of Management) could delegate limited procedural powers to the Vice-Chancellor but not further delegate them to the Chief Vigilance Officer.
The Court observed:
“Even if the Vice-Chancellor was authorized to approve appointment of Inquiry Officers and issue charge-sheets, the memorandum issued under the signature of the Chief Vigilance Officer for and on behalf of the disciplinary authority is unsustainable in law without explicit approval by the Board of Management.”
The Court clarified that the term “cause to be drawn up” under Rule 14(3) does not empower subordinates to issue the charge memo. The charges must be approved by the disciplinary authority prior to issuance, else they are void.
The Court also held that the alleged delay in proceedings was not unreasonable, as the complaint emerged in 2023, followed by inquiries and issuance of charge-sheets in 2025. However, since the issuance authority was incompetent, the entire proceedings were vitiated.
Conclusion
The Court quashed both charge memoranda—Memo No. 19 dated 2 April 2025 and Memo No. 33 dated 9 July 2025—for lack of jurisdiction.
“Any memo of charge by the Chief Vigilance Officer without explicit approval by the Board of Management cannot be held to be valid.”
The matter was remitted to the disciplinary authority to take appropriate action in accordance with law, keeping in mind the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and the binding precedent of B.V. Gopinath (supra). The writ petition was accordingly allowed.
Implications
This judgment reinforces the limits of administrative delegation in disciplinary matters within autonomous institutions. It underscores that disciplinary power is quasi-judicial in nature and cannot be sub-delegated without express statutory authorization.
The ruling safeguards public servants and university employees from procedural irregularities and reaffirms the principle that disciplinary actions must conform strictly to statutory and constitutional mandates under Article 311.
FAQs
1. Can a Chief Vigilance Officer issue charge-sheets in disciplinary proceedings?
No. The power to issue charge-sheets vests only in the disciplinary authority or an officer expressly authorized by statute. A CVO cannot act “for and on behalf of” the disciplinary authority without express approval.
2. What happens if a charge-sheet is issued without proper approval?
Such a charge-sheet is invalid and liable to be quashed as per the Supreme Court ruling in B.V. Gopinath v. Union of India (2014).
3. Does delay in initiating disciplinary action automatically vitiate proceedings?
Not always. Delay alone is not fatal unless it causes demonstrable prejudice to the employee’s defence or reflects mala fides.
