Schoolgirl Allegedly Kidnapped and Gang-Raped; Delhi High Court Adds SC/ST Act Charge Against Accused Who Knew Her Caste Identity
Minor Gang-Rape Survivor Omits Caste Allegation Initially; Delhi High Court Says Delay Cannot Alone Defeat SC/ST Act Charge, Adds Section 3(1)(w) Against Accused
Facts
The petitioner was a schoolgoing minor who alleged that on 31 March 2016, while waiting outside her school to collect her Class X result, accused Tarun @ Jhabbar arrived and subsequently forcibly took her on a motorcycle and then into an i20 car driven by co-accused Sumit Dedha @ Shannu.
According to the FIR, she was forcibly made to consume beer on the way. She was thereafter taken to a room where Tarun allegedly raped her and threatened to circulate a video of the incident if she disclosed it to her family.
In her statement under Section 164 CrPC, she reiterated the rape allegation and further stated that Sumit had made a video of the incident and had also attempted to rape her but could not do so because the owner of the house arrived.
The first charge-sheet invoked provisions including Sections 363, 328, 376(2)(g), 506, 120B and 34 IPC and Sections 6, 12 and 17 POCSO Act. Following a complaint by the survivor’s father to the SC/ST Commission, a supplementary charge-sheet also invoked provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
The Trial Court framed charges under Sections 363, 366 and 506 IPC read with Section 120B, and Section 6 POCSO read with Section 5(g), alternatively Section 376D IPC. It declined to frame charges under Section 328 IPC, Section 14(3) POCSO Act and Sections 3(1)(e), (r) and (w) of the SC/ST Act.
The survivor challenged this limited discharge before the Delhi High Court.
Issues
The principal issues were whether the Trial Court ought to have framed additional charges under:
- Section 3(1)(w) SC/ST Act for the alleged sexual offence committed with knowledge that the survivor belonged to a Scheduled Caste;
- Sections 3(1)(e) and 3(1)(r) SC/ST Act;
- Section 328 IPC for allegedly forcing her to consume beer mixed with a stupefying substance; and
- Section 14(3) POCSO Act for allegedly recording the sexual assault.
The Court also considered whether the survivor’s failure to mention the caste-related allegations in her original complaint/FIR and Section 164 statement, followed by their emergence months later, was sufficient to reject the SC/ST Act case at the charge stage.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner argued that the Trial Court had adopted an unduly restrictive approach by insisting that the original FIR or Section 164 statement must specifically state that the kidnapping and rape occurred because she belonged to a Scheduled Caste.
She contended that an FIR is not an encyclopaedia of every fact or circumstance and relied upon Ashabai Machindra Adhagale v. State of Maharashtra.
She further relied upon Section 8(c) of the SC/ST Act, which raises a statutory presumption concerning knowledge of the victim’s caste or tribal identity where the accused had personal knowledge of the victim or her family.
Material collected during investigation allegedly showed that Tarun knew the petitioner, lived in the same locality and had earlier made caste-related remarks to her.
She also sought charges under Section 328 IPC and Section 14(3) POCSO Act.
Respondents’ Arguments
Respondent no.3 argued that no caste-related allegation appeared in the complaint, FIR or Section 164 statement and that the SC/ST Act allegations surfaced only about six months later, after the survivor’s father approached the SC/ST Commission.
He characterised this as an afterthought.
More specifically, respondent no.3 argued that the survivor herself admitted that she had never met him before the incident. Therefore, there was no basis to infer that he knew her caste identity.
He also supported the Trial Court’s refusal to frame charges under Section 328 IPC and Section 14(3) POCSO Act for want of foundational evidence.
Analysis of the Law
1. Initial Omission of Caste Allegation Was Not Automatically Fatal
The High Court disagreed with the Trial Court insofar as it treated the absence of caste-related allegations in the initial complaint and Section 164 statement, coupled with a six-month delay, as sufficient to discard the SC/ST Act provisions.
The Court placed particular emphasis on the fact that the survivor was a schoolgoing minor facing allegations of gang rape.
According to the Court, the trauma associated with such a bodily and heinous offence could affect a minor survivor’s ability to immediately “process, recollect and articulate every facet of the occurrence.”
The Court therefore held that later amendments or improvements cannot simply be discarded as delayed or afterthoughts, unless contradictions exist which justify doing so.
This was not a blanket rule that every subsequent allegation must be accepted. Rather, the Court held that delay or initial omission alone was insufficient in the circumstances of this case.
2. Section 3(1)(w) Does Not Require Proof That Sexual Act Was Committed Solely Because of Caste
This is the central legal proposition of the judgment.
The High Court held that the ingredients of different offences under Section 3 of the SC/ST Act are not uniform.
For an offence under Section 3(1)(w), the statutory requirement is materially different from provisions requiring a caste-based purpose or intention.
The Court held that:
Mere knowledge that the woman belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is sufficient for Section 3(1)(w), subject to the other statutory ingredients.
The prosecution is not additionally required to establish that the sexual act was committed solely or exclusively because of the victim’s caste or tribal identity.
This makes the judgment particularly significant.
3. Prima Facie Knowledge Established Against Respondent No.2
The Court found sufficient material at the charge stage to infer that Tarun knew the survivor’s caste.
Both were acquainted with each other and lived in the same locality at Ambedkar Basti. Tarun himself had described the survivor as his girlfriend.
The Court held that this was relevant for drawing the statutory presumption under Section 8(c) SC/ST Act regarding knowledge of caste identity.
Additionally, the survivor’s interrogation report attributed a caste-related taunt to Tarun.
Taken together, these circumstances prima facie demonstrated that Tarun knew that she belonged to a Scheduled Caste. The Trial Court therefore ought to have framed a charge against him under Section 3(1)(w).
4. Same Charge Could Not Be Framed Against Respondent No.3
The position of Sumit was different.
The survivor herself had stated that she did not know him before the incident and met him for the first time on the date of occurrence.
There was no independent material showing that he knew her caste identity. He also did not reside in the same locality.
Accordingly, the High Court upheld the Trial Court’s refusal to frame a Section 3(1)(w) charge against respondent no.3.
5. Sections 3(1)(e) and 3(1)(r) Not Attracted
The Court refused to add a charge under Section 3(1)(e) because the material did not indicate that the alleged acts were committed with the object of publicly humiliating the survivor in the manner contemplated by that provision.
As regards Section 3(1)(r), there was no prima facie material showing the requisite intention to insult or intimidate the survivor on account of her Scheduled Caste status.
The Court referred to Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand and Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala while discussing the ingredients of this offence.
Section 328 IPC – Forced Beer/Stupefying Substance
The survivor alleged that she had been forcibly made to consume beer mixed with some stupefying substance.
The High Court nevertheless upheld the refusal to frame a charge under Section 328 IPC.
The allegation was unsupported by substantive material:
- no empty bottle was recovered;
- no alleged stupefying substance was recovered; and
- the MLC contained no medical opinion indicating administration of any stupefying or intoxicating substance.
Accordingly, the Court found no reason to interfere with the Trial Court’s decision on Section 328 IPC.
Section 14(3) POCSO Act – Alleged Recording of Rape
The survivor had stated that respondent no.3 recorded a video of the incident.
But beyond this allegation, the investigation yielded no supporting material demonstrating that such a video actually existed.
Crucially:
- the mobile phone allegedly used for recording was not recovered; and
- there was no electronic evidence establishing the existence of the alleged recording.
The High Court therefore upheld the discharge under Section 14(3) POCSO Act.
Precedent Analysis
Ashabai Machindra Adhagale v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 3 SCC 789
Relied upon by the petitioner to contend that the FIR is not expected to be an exhaustive encyclopaedia containing every fact or circumstance relevant to the prosecution.
Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710
Considered while examining Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act and the requirement of the necessary caste-related intention behind insult or intimidation.
Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249
Also relied upon regarding the essential ingredients of an offence involving caste-based insult or intimidation under the SC/ST Act.
Court’s Reasoning
The High Court made a careful distinction between the different additional charges sought by the survivor.
For Section 3(1)(w) SC/ST Act, there was prima facie material against Tarun demonstrating knowledge of the survivor’s caste identity. The Trial Court had incorrectly imposed an additional requirement that the sexual offence must have been committed only because of her caste.
For respondent no.3, however, there was insufficient material showing such knowledge.
Similarly, the Court found the evidentiary foundation inadequate for Section 328 IPC and Section 14(3) POCSO Act.
The High Court therefore did not set aside the entire charge order. It modified it only to the extent justified by the material on record.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court partly allowed the survivor’s revision petition.
It directed the Trial Court to frame an additional charge under Section 3(1)(w) of the SC/ST Act against respondent no.2, Tarun @ Jhabbar.
The Court declined to interfere with the remainder of the charge order, meaning:
- no Section 3(1)(w) SC/ST Act charge against respondent no.3;
- no charges under Sections 3(1)(e) and 3(1)(r) SC/ST Act;
- no Section 328 IPC charge; and
- no Section 14(3) POCSO Act charge.
The Court clarified that its observations would not prejudice the parties during trial.
Case Details
Case: Prosecutrix R v. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors.
Court: Delhi High Court
Case No.: CRL.REV.P. 410/2017 & CRL.M.A. 9230/2017
CNR: DLHC012480952017
Judge: Justice Saurabh Banerjee
Reserved: 21 August 2026
Pronounced: 17 September 2026
Result: Revision partly allowed; additional charge under Section 3(1)(w) SC/ST Act directed against respondent no.2; remaining discharge/order on charge left undisturbed.
