Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court of India set aside the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Karnataka High Court, holding that the plaintiff failed to establish her title based on an oral gift (Hiba) and that the suit was barred by limitation. The Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and S.V.N. Bhatti observed that “courts are bound to exercise the greatest care, perhaps even suspicion, when a verbal gift is set up after the donor’s death” and reiterated that delivery of possession is an indispensable condition for a valid Hiba under Mohammedan Law.
The Court ruled that the plaintiff’s long silence and inaction for over two decades, despite public revenue records showing mutations and registered sale deeds in favour of the defendants, amounted to constructive notice. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, dismissed the plaintiff’s suit for declaration and injunction, and restored the defendants’ ownership rights over the entire property.
Facts
The dispute revolved around agricultural land measuring 24 acres and 28 guntas in Sy. No. 107 at Kusnoor village, Gulbarga district. The original owner, Khadijabee, obtained title through a partition decree in 1987. The plaintiff claimed that on 5 December 1988, Khadijabee orally gifted 10 acres of this land to her daughter (the plaintiff) under a Hiba (oral gift), followed by a memorandum of gift (Ex. P-8) executed on 5 January 1989.
After Khadijabee’s death on 29 November 1990, her husband Abdul Basit allegedly mutated the entire property in his own name and, on 25 February 1995, sold the entire extent to the defendants through five sale deeds. The defendants’ names were entered in the Record of Rights (ROR), and they continued in possession, paying agricultural taxes and obtaining crop loans.
The plaintiff filed a suit in 2013, seeking a declaration that she was the owner of the property and that the sale deeds were void. She alleged that the defendants were Khadijabee’s agricultural servants and had fabricated the sale deeds to claim ownership.
The Trial Court partially decreed the suit, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to 3/4th share (18 acres 21 guntas) as Khadijabee’s heir, while the oral gift was disbelieved. The High Court, however, modified the decree and held that the plaintiff was the absolute owner of 10 acres by oral gift and 3/4th share in the remaining land.
The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court’s modification of the decree and its acceptance of the oral gift.
Issues
- Whether the Supreme Court could reappreciate evidence under Article 136 of the Constitution.
- Whether the High Court could reverse the Trial Court’s findings on oral gift without a cross-appeal.
- Whether the plaintiff proved her relationship as the daughter of Khadijabee and Abdul Basit.
- Whether the alleged oral gift (Hiba) was validly proved under Mohammedan Law.
- Whether the suit was barred by limitation under Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The appellants (defendants) contended that both courts below had misread the evidence and drawn perverse conclusions. They argued that the plaintiff failed to prove her lineage as Khadijabee’s daughter, as no documentary evidence—such as birth certificate, school records, or ration card—was produced.
They submitted that the oral gift was fabricated and never acted upon. The gift memorandum (Ex. P-8) bore only a thumb impression of Khadijabee, even though she usually signed in Urdu, and it was never reflected in revenue records.
It was further argued that after Khadijabee’s death in 1990, Abdul Basit became the sole heir, validly mutated the land in his name, and sold it in 1995. The plaintiffs, they said, were negligent for over 18 years before filing the 2013 suit, which was clearly barred by limitation.
They also contended that the High Court had no jurisdiction to modify the decree in favour of the plaintiff without a cross-appeal, as held in Banarsi v. Ram Phal (2003) 9 SCC 606.
Respondent’s Arguments
The respondent (plaintiff) argued that both the Trial Court and the High Court had concurrently accepted her status as daughter of Khadijabee under Section 50 of the Evidence Act, based on credible oral testimony.
It was submitted that the oral gift was validly made and accepted, as possession of 10 acres had been handed over to her by Khadijabee, witnessed by family members. The memorandum of gift merely recorded a past transaction and did not require registration.
The plaintiff further argued that the suit was filed within limitation because the cause of action arose only in 2013, when the defendants allegedly tried to dispossess her.
Analysis of the Law
The Court began by reaffirming that under Article 136 of the Constitution, reappreciation of evidence is generally not undertaken but may be done to correct perverse findings or manifest errors. Relying on Mahesh Dattaray Thirthakar v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 11 SCC 141, the Bench reiterated that where lower courts act on unreliable or irrelevant evidence, the Supreme Court may re-examine the record to prevent miscarriage of justice.
Applying Banarsi v. Ram Phal (2003) 9 SCC 606, the Court held that the High Court erred in enlarging the plaintiff’s relief without a cross-appeal. The High Court had transformed a limited decree of 3/4th share into an absolute ownership declaration over 24 acres and 28 guntas—an illegality beyond its jurisdiction.
The Court next analyzed the evidentiary standards under Sections 50 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 50 permits opinion evidence on relationships only when the witness has special means of knowledge; however, such opinion is merely an intermediate step, not conclusive proof. Citing Dolgobinda Paricha v. Nimai Charan Misra (AIR 1959 SC 914) and Chandu Lal Agarwala v. Khalilar Rahman (ILR 1942 2 Cal 299), the Court explained that conduct-based opinion must be supported by credible evidence and personal knowledge, which was missing in this case.
Further, under Section 73, courts may compare disputed signatures, but such comparison should be a last resort, supported by expert opinion (Fakhruddin v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 55). The Trial Court’s direct comparison of signatures between disputed documents, despite both sides contesting authenticity, was found legally unsustainable.
Precedent Analysis
- Mahesh Dattaray Thirthakar v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 11 SCC 141 — Allowed limited reappreciation of evidence under Article 136 to prevent injustice.
- Banarsi v. Ram Phal (2003) 9 SCC 606 — Held that an appellate court cannot modify a decree in favour of a non-appealing party; applied to set aside the High Court’s excess modification.
- Dolgobinda Paricha v. Nimai Charan Misra (1959) — Clarified that opinion evidence on relationship must be credible, conduct-based, and not mere assertion.
- Rasheeda Khatoon v. Ashiq Ali (2014) 10 SCC 459, Hafeeza Bibi v. Sk. Farid (2011) 5 SCC 654, and Abdul Rahim v. Sk. Abdul Zabar (2009) 6 SCC 160 — Laid down the three essentials of a valid Hiba: declaration by donor, acceptance by donee, and delivery of possession.
- Mussamut Kamarunnissa Bibi v. Mussamut Husaini Bibi (1880 UKPC 36) — Warned courts to exercise extreme caution when accepting oral gifts asserted after a donor’s death.
- Prem Singh v. Birbal (2006 AIR SC 3608) — Established presumption of validity of registered sale deeds; burden lies on challenger to rebut.
- Noorul Hoda v. Bibi Raifunnisa (1996) 7 SCC 767 — Explained the doctrine of constructive notice for dormant claimants who fail to act diligently.
Court’s Reasoning
The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s reversal of the Trial Court’s findings on the oral gift without a cross-appeal was impermissible. The plaintiff’s claim of being the sole heir and donee was unsupported by credible documentary or continuous evidence.
The Bench observed that for a valid Hiba, delivery of possession must be proved through contemporaneous evidence, such as mutation, rent receipts, or control over the property. The plaintiff’s failure to mutate her name or assert her rights for over two decades contradicted her claim of possession.
The Court noted:
“Hiba is operative with immediate effect and deprives the transferor of control over the property. Evidence of possession is an important consideration. The long silence of the donee and continued possession by the defendants discredits the claim of oral gift.”
Further, the Court held that the suit filed in 2013 was hopelessly time-barred, as the plaintiff had constructive notice of the 1991 and 1995 mutations and registered sale deeds. Her negligence over 23 years could not be excused.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments of the Trial Court and High Court, and dismissed the plaintiff’s suit in entirety. It held that the oral gift was never proved, the relationship was unsubstantiated, and the suit was barred by limitation. The Court reaffirmed:
“In matters of oral gifts, particularly when asserted after the donor’s death, courts must act with utmost caution and demand clear, continuous proof of possession.”
No order as to costs was made.
Implications
This ruling reinforces the strict evidentiary standards for proving oral gifts (Hiba) under Mohammedan Law. It underscores that mere oral testimony or familial claims cannot substitute for contemporaneous acts demonstrating possession.
The judgment also emphasizes that courts cannot enlarge reliefs without proper appeals and that claimants who sleep over their rights for decades cannot later invoke equity. It will serve as a cautionary precedent in property disputes involving Hiba, inheritance, and limitation.
FAQs
1. What are the essentials of a valid Hiba (oral gift) under Mohammedan Law?
A valid Hiba requires (i) declaration by the donor, (ii) acceptance by the donee, and (iii) delivery of possession. Without proof of possession, the gift is incomplete.
2. Can courts accept an oral gift claimed after the donor’s death?
Only with clear, credible, and contemporaneous evidence of possession or mutation. Otherwise, courts must exercise “greatest care and suspicion.”
3. When does the limitation period start for challenging sale deeds?
Under Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act, the three-year period starts from when the right to sue first accrues, not when the plaintiff chooses to act.
