Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court, in a significant judgment interpreting Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), held that mere presence in an unlawful assembly cannot, by itself, establish the existence of a common object or shared intent to commit an offence.
The Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai and Sandeep Mehta set aside the concurrent conviction of several accused persons under Sections 147, 148, 302/149, and 307/149 IPC, observing that the prosecution had failed to prove the participation, overt act, or specific role of each accused in furtherance of a common object.
Reiterating long-standing principles of criminal jurisprudence, the Court declared:
“An accused cannot be convicted merely on the basis of his presence in a mob unless it is established that he shared the common object of the assembly or was aware of its unlawful nature.”
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, acquitted the surviving appellants, and directed that those still in custody be released immediately, unless required in any other case.
Facts
The case arose from a violent incident in a village in Bihar, wherein a mob of nearly 100 persons allegedly armed with weapons surrounded a group of villagers and assaulted them, resulting in two deaths and multiple injuries.
The prosecution claimed that the assailants formed an unlawful assembly with a common object to kill members of the rival group. Based on eyewitness testimony and circumstantial evidence, the trial court convicted 34 accused persons under various sections of the IPC, including 302 read with 149.
On appeal, the Patna High Court confirmed the conviction, holding that the appellants’ presence in the mob and the collective violence were sufficient to attract Section 149 liability. The accused thereafter approached the Supreme Court, contending that there was no clear evidence of their individual acts or any proof that they shared a common object to commit murder.
Issues
- Whether the prosecution had proved that the accused were part of an unlawful assembly with a common object to commit murder under Section 149 IPC.
- Whether mere presence at the place of occurrence is enough to infer participation and guilt.
- Whether the High Court erred in upholding conviction without establishing individual roles and intentions of each accused.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The appellants contended that the trial and appellate courts erred in applying Section 149 IPC mechanically, without examining whether each accused actively participated or shared the common object of the mob.
They argued that the evidence merely established their presence in the vicinity, which is insufficient to attract vicarious liability for murder.
Reliance was placed on Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1964 AIR SC 1643), wherein the Supreme Court held that mere presence in a crowd does not automatically prove shared intention unless accompanied by evidence of participation or prior concert.
The appellants also cited State of Kerala v. Shaji (2001) 8 SCC 740 and Kuldip Yadav v. State of Bihar (2011) 5 SCC 324, arguing that identification of specific acts or overt participation is mandatory for conviction under Section 149 IPC.
They further asserted that the prosecution witnesses were highly partisan, belonging to the rival faction, and no independent witnesses were examined. The alleged recovery of weapons was doubtful and unsupported by forensic evidence.
Respondent’s Arguments
The State, defending the conviction, argued that the magnitude of the assault, use of deadly weapons, and coordinated attack clearly established the existence of a common object among the assailants.
It submitted that direct evidence identifying each individual in a mob of 100 persons is often impractical; hence, the collective participation and presence during the commission of the offence sufficed to establish guilt under Section 149 IPC.
The State relied on Bhagwan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2002) 4 SCC 85, emphasizing that when unlawful assembly members act in unison towards a common purpose, they incur joint liability even without proof of individual overt acts.
It was further argued that both the trial court and the High Court had appreciated the evidence in detail, and there was no perversity warranting interference by the Supreme Court.
Analysis of the Law
The Court began by examining the scope and ingredients of Section 149 IPC, which makes every member of an unlawful assembly liable for an offence committed in pursuit of the common object.
The Bench clarified that two essential elements must co-exist for invoking Section 149:
- The accused must be a member of an unlawful assembly as defined under Section 141 IPC.
- The act committed must be in prosecution of the common object or such that members knew it was likely to be committed.
However, the Court emphasized that vicarious liability cannot be fastened mechanically on every person present unless there is convincing evidence of participation or awareness.
“To invoke Section 149 IPC, there must be clear and cogent evidence that the accused shared the common object of the assembly or knew that the offence was a probable consequence.”
Precedent Analysis
- Masalti v. State of U.P. (1964 AIR SC 1643) – The Constitution Bench held that mere presence in a large assembly does not justify conviction unless participation or common object is established through credible evidence.
- Kuldip Yadav v. State of Bihar (2011) 5 SCC 324) – The Court reiterated that proof of common object is essential and cannot be inferred solely from presence at the scene.
- State of Kerala v. Shaji (2001) 8 SCC 740) – Held that even where eyewitnesses identify a few persons, others cannot be convicted unless their role or association with the common object is proved.
- Rajendra Shantaram Todankar v. State of Maharashtra (2003) 2 SCC 257) – Clarified that Section 149 creates constructive liability only when the accused had knowledge of the likelihood of the offence being committed.
- Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85) – Distinguished; the Court observed that it applies only where participation and proximity are clearly established.
Court’s Reasoning
After examining the evidence, the Supreme Court found that the prosecution witnesses made omnibus allegations, implicating all accused without specifying their roles.
There was no identification of weapons used, nor any medical or forensic corroboration linking the accused to the fatal injuries.
The Bench held that both the trial court and the High Court failed to segregate the roles of individual accused and instead convicted them en masse under Section 149.
“Criminal liability cannot be inferred from mere association or proximity. The prosecution must establish active participation or conscious sharing of the unlawful intent.”
The Court reiterated that collective responsibility under Section 149 must be grounded on evidence of a common object, which in this case was entirely absent.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the appellants were entitled to the benefit of doubt.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and acquitted the surviving appellants.
“The prosecution has not been able to establish any overt act, participation, or even presence with a shared intent. The conviction under Section 149 IPC cannot stand.”
The Court directed the immediate release of all surviving appellants who were in custody and ordered that the bail bonds of those already on bail be discharged.
The judgment underscores the need for individualized evidence in group offences and the duty of courts to prevent mechanical application of collective liability provisions.
Implications
This ruling reinforces the constitutional safeguards against arbitrary conviction and strengthens the principle of personal culpability in criminal law.
It sends a clear message that the State cannot prosecute en masse without specific proof linking each accused to the crime.
The decision is a valuable precedent restraining misuse of Section 149 IPC, ensuring that criminal liability is proportionate and evidence-based, rather than presumed by association.
FAQs
1. Can a person be convicted under Section 149 IPC merely for being part of a mob?
No. The Supreme Court clarified that mere presence in an unlawful assembly does not prove common object or guilt unless the prosecution establishes active participation or shared intent.
2. What must be proved for conviction under Section 149 IPC?
The prosecution must prove that the accused was a member of an unlawful assembly and shared or knew of the common object leading to the offence.
3. Why did the Supreme Court acquit the accused in this case?
Because the evidence failed to show any specific role, act, or intent linking the accused to the killings. The conviction was based solely on presence, which is insufficient in law.
