Woman Voluntarily Travels and Stays With Man for Days but Later Alleges Rape; Supreme Court Acquits Accused, Says Immorality Cannot Replace Evidence
Woman Accompanies Man Through Crowded Streets Without Raising Alarm, Later Alleges Rape; Supreme Court Acquits Accused Over Contradictory Testimony
Facts
The case arose from an incident in June 2009. The prosecutrix, then studying in Class VIII, alleged that she left her house on the evening of 19 June 2009 to purchase grocery items when appellant Paramjit Singh Bedi, whom she already knew, approached her and asked her to meet his daughter, who was her friend. She accompanied him in a car to LIG Flats, Ludhiana. According to her, she was kept there for two days and was subjected to sexual intercourse against her will. She alleged that the appellant subsequently took her to Malerkotla, kept her in an abandoned factory and again had sexual intercourse with her against her will while threatening to kill her. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
On 25 June 2009, she returned to Ludhiana with the appellant and they were intercepted by her father and the police. FIR No. 142/2009 was registered under Sections 363, 366A and 376 IPC. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
The Sessions Court acquitted the appellant of the Section 366 IPC charge, holding that the prosecution had failed to prove kidnapping or abduction, but convicted him under Section 376 IPC and sentenced him to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a ₹5,000 fine. The Punjab and Haryana High Court affirmed the conviction. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
The matter ultimately reached the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 203 of 2015, Paramjit Singh Bedi v. State of Punjab. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
Issues
The principal questions before the Supreme Court were whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that sexual intercourse was without the prosecutrix’s consent, and whether the same testimony that had been substantially disbelieved while acquitting the appellant of abduction could nevertheless be relied upon to convict him of rape.
The Court also examined the prosecutrix’s age because, under Section 375 IPC as it stood before the 2013 amendment, sexual intercourse with a woman below 16 years attracted the statutory provision irrespective of consent. The alleged incidents occurred in June 2009, so the pre-2013 law applied. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
Appellant’s Arguments
The appellant contended that he had been falsely implicated because of existing civil and financial disputes involving the prosecutrix’s father and a relative concerning money and tenanted premises. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
More importantly, the defence argued that the Sessions Court itself had found the prosecutrix to be a major and had acquitted him under Section 366 IPC. She had accompanied him for several days, travelled through crowded public places and intersections, ridden pillion on his scooter from Ludhiana to Malerkotla and travelled back without raising an alarm or attempting to escape. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
The defence therefore argued that the circumstances indicated consent. It also relied upon the medical evidence showing no internal or external injuries on the prosecutrix. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
Respondent’s Arguments
The State of Punjab maintained that the prosecutrix had clearly stated that sexual intercourse occurred without her consent and that her evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
The State further relied upon the school certificate to contend that she was approximately 15 years old, in which case consent would have been legally immaterial under the applicable law. It also invoked the presumption under Section 114A of the Evidence Act. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
Analysis of the Law
The Supreme Court first examined the age evidence. The radiologist who conducted the ossification test assessed the prosecutrix’s age at 17–19 years, with possible variation, and stated in cross-examination that she could have been more than 18 but less than 19. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
The Sessions Court had already found that the prosecution failed to establish that she was below 18 and accepted her age as 19. Consequently, it acquitted the appellant of kidnapping. That finding had not been challenged by either the State or the informant and had therefore attained finality. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
The medical examination was also significant. The doctor found no external injury on the prosecutrix’s body and no injury to her private parts. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
However, the Supreme Court did not treat absence of injury, standing alone, as determinative. Its conclusion emerged from the cumulative evidentiary circumstances and contradictions in the prosecutrix’s testimony.
Precedent Analysis
The Court reiterated the established proposition that a rape conviction can rest upon the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. But such testimony must be of a quality that inspires the confidence of the Court.
The significant principle applied here was that where the prosecution substantially depended upon the same factual narrative for interconnected charges, the Court could not disbelieve the prosecutrix on the material circumstances relevant to Section 366 IPC and then selectively accept the same version to establish Section 376 IPC without adequate evidentiary justification. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
Court’s Reasoning
The Supreme Court described the prosecutrix’s evidence as a “bundle of contradictions.”
She travelled with the appellant through busy markets and brightly lit intersections but did not raise an alarm. During the scooter journey from Ludhiana to Malerkotla, she neither attempted to get off the scooter nor sought assistance despite opportunities to do so. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
There was also a material contradiction regarding the return journey. In examination-in-chief, she stated that they returned from Malerkotla to Ludhiana by car, whereas during cross-examination she stated that they returned by train and travelled ticketless among other passengers. Even then, according to her testimony, she did not disclose the alleged assault to fellow passengers or raise an alarm. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
The Court concluded that the evidence showed that she had willingly accompanied the appellant to the LIG Flats, remained there for two days and thereafter travelled with him to Malerkotla. Her evidence was riddled with contradictions and was not considered sufficiently credible to establish forcible intercourse beyond reasonable doubt. The Court also held that the mere presence of spermatozoa in the vaginal swab did not establish rape in the surrounding circumstances. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
The Supreme Court specifically disapproved the Sessions Judge’s description of certain women as “daring women,” calling that expression “totally uncalled for.” Nevertheless, on the evidence particular to this case, it found the allegation of forcible intercourse unreliable. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
Most significantly, the Court observed that even if the appellant’s conduct could be regarded as immoral or unethical, that could not substitute for proof of the offence of rape:
“Immorality of an act sans credible evidence cannot justify a conviction.”
The charge had to be established through credible evidence rather than conjecture or the presiding judge’s value judgment. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
Conclusion
The Supreme Court held that the conviction under Section 376 IPC could not be sustained. It set aside both the 1 June 2012 judgment of the Sessions Judge, Ludhiana and the 12 September 2013 judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
Paramjit Singh Bedi was consequently acquitted of the Section 376 IPC charge, and his criminal appeal was allowed. PARAMJIT SINGH BEDI
Case Details
Case: Paramjit Singh Bedi v. State of Punjab
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 203 of 2015
Citation: 2026 INSC 1054
Judges: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Date: 25 September 2026
Result: Appeal allowed; conviction and 10-year sentence under Section 376 IPC set aside; appellant acquitted.
