Court’s Decision
The Bombay High Court (Justice Jitendra Jain) decreed a suit for specific performance and conveyance of a property in favour of the developer under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, holding that the defendant-society’s express admissions in multiple proceedings conclusively established the plaintiff’s entitlement.
The Court held that once a party admits material facts and compliance by the opposite party, the Court can pronounce judgment without trial, since such admissions are the “best proof of facts admitted.”
“Admissions are the best proof of facts admitted. When the defendant’s own pleadings and statements in prior proceedings acknowledge the plaintiff’s rights, the Court must give effect to such admissions.”
Accordingly, the Court directed the defendant-society to execute a deed of conveyance and hand over possession of the suit property admeasuring 5,412 sq. meters (CTS No. 1196-E, Village Kanjur, Mumbai) to the plaintiff-developer.
Facts
The plaintiff, a land developer, had entered into a Development Agreement dated 16 April 2003 with the defendant co-operative housing society for development of a larger land parcel comprising CTS Nos. 1196-A to 1196-E. The total consideration was ₹3.34 crore, out of which ₹50 lakh pertained to the suit property.
The agreement stipulated that the developer would construct and hand over 500 residential flats to the society, while the society would convey two reserved plots — one for a district centre and another for a private school (CTS 1196-E, i.e., the suit property) — to the developer upon receipt of consideration.
The plaintiff paid the full consideration of ₹50 lakh in two instalments (29 January 2007 and 20 February 2007) and completed the construction of the flats. Despite repeated requests, the defendant-society failed to execute the conveyance deed, citing pendency of unrelated civil suits concerning other parts of the land.
The society even issued a letter dated 13 April 2017, requesting the plaintiff to safeguard the property by deploying security staff — a letter which implicitly acknowledged the plaintiff’s ownership rights. The plaintiff then filed the present suit seeking specific performance, declaration of the validity of the 2003 agreement, and possession of the suit property.
Issues
- Whether the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for specific performance under Order XII Rule 6 CPC based on the defendant’s admissions.
- Whether the defendant-society’s plea that the suit was barred by limitation was tenable under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
- Whether the plaintiff had established full compliance with the Development Agreement.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The plaintiff’s counsel argued that the admissions made by the defendant-society in its pleadings and in multiple prior civil suits were clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal.
It was pointed out that in Civil Suit No. 4939 of 2003, the society had admitted that it agreed to sell the property to the plaintiff and that conveyance deeds had already been executed for part of the larger property (CTS 1196-B). Similarly, in Civil Suit No. 3470 of 2004, the society acknowledged having assigned its rights in the suit property to the plaintiff after receipt of full consideration.
The plaintiff emphasized that there was no denial of payment of ₹50 lakh, no allegation of breach of contract, and no dispute regarding the handover of the 500 constructed flats. The 2017 letter from the society, asking the plaintiff to deploy watchmen on the land, further proved that the society recognized the plaintiff’s ownership.
The plaintiff relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam (1974) 1 SCC 242, holding that admissions are the best proof of facts admitted, and sought decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC without the need for trial.
Respondent’s Arguments
The defendant-society opposed the application, arguing that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a three-year period for suits seeking specific performance. It claimed that since the agreement was executed in 2003, the suit filed in 2021 was time-barred.
However, the society did not specify any date of refusal or demonstrate how the limitation period applied. It also failed to dispute the plaintiff’s compliance with the 2003 Development Agreement or the receipt of consideration.
The society sought to rely on pending civil litigation involving a third party (Shamji Dayabhai Shah Educational Trust), contending that execution of the conveyance was impossible due to injunction orders. But the Court noted that those proceedings only restricted dispossession, not ownership.
Analysis of the Law
The Court began by discussing Order XII Rule 6 CPC, which empowers courts to pronounce judgment on admissions at any stage of the suit without waiting for trial.
Justice Jitendra Jain emphasized that the object of this provision is to curtail unnecessary litigation where material facts are admitted, ensuring quick justice. The Court relied on Nagindas Ramdas (supra) to reaffirm that admissions constitute substantive evidence and are binding unless withdrawn with the Court’s permission.
The Court further examined Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides that limitation begins either from (a) the date fixed for performance, or (b) when the plaintiff has notice of refusal. Since no date for performance was fixed in the 2003 agreement and there was no express refusal by the society, Article 54 was held inapplicable.
For this conclusion, the Court referred to Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla (Dead) by LRs v. Bibijan (2009) 5 SCC 462 and Venunath v. Limbabai (2014 SCC OnLine Bom 1734), which clarified that limitation does not begin until refusal is communicated.
Precedent Analysis
- Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam (1974) 1 SCC 242 — Admissions are substantive evidence and the best proof of facts admitted; they justify a decree without trial.
- Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla (Dead) by LRs v. Bibijan (2009) 5 SCC 462 — Where no date for performance is fixed, limitation runs only from the date of refusal.
- Venunath v. Limbabai (2014 SCC OnLine Bom 1734) — When no refusal to perform is made, limitation cannot be invoked under Article 54.
These cases were cited to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s claim was timely and supported by unequivocal admissions.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court observed that the defendant’s own pleadings and prior statements across multiple litigations left no room for dispute regarding the plaintiff’s rights.
“There is an express admission by the defendant-society in several proceedings acknowledging that the plaintiff has fulfilled the 2003 agreement and that conveyance is due. Such admissions are sufficient for the Court to exercise powers under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.”
The Judge further noted that the defendant’s limitation plea was unsupported by any factual foundation, as it neither identified a date of refusal nor a contractual breach by the plaintiff.
The Court also highlighted that the plaintiff had fulfilled all obligations under the 2003 agreement — including payment, construction, and delivery of flats — and that no breach or default was alleged by the society.
Finding the admissions unequivocal and the limitation plea baseless, the Court invoked its discretion under Order XII Rule 6 CPC to decree the suit without trial.
Conclusion
The Bombay High Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, granting prayers (a), (b), and (c) of the plaint — declaring the 2003 Development Agreement valid, directing the defendants to execute the deed of conveyance, and handing over possession of the property (CTS 1196-E) to the plaintiff.
“Admissions are sufficient to justify a decree under Order XII Rule 6. The plaintiff’s claim stands proved through the defendants’ own words.”
The Court held that Article 54 of the Limitation Act did not apply, and the suit was not time-barred. The decree was ordered to be drawn accordingly, thereby concluding the litigation.
Implications
This decision underscores that clear and unequivocal admissions in pleadings or prior proceedings can form the basis for a summary decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, eliminating the need for trial.
It also clarifies that limitation for specific performance under Article 54 begins only upon refusal to perform, not merely from the date of agreement.
The judgment sends a strong message to litigants that strategic denials or silence cannot undo prior admissions, and that courts will enforce contractual obligations based on documentary evidence and admissions.
