Company Claims ₹9,000 Monthly Payment Secured Permanent Possession of Delhi Property; Delhi High Court Orders Eviction, Says Perpetual Tenancy Requires Registered Document
Tenant Denies Lease Deed but Admits Paying ₹9,000 Monthly Rent; Delhi High Court Says Admission Is Enough for Possession Decree
Facts
The dispute concerned a 1,000-square-foot first-floor property at 4405/2, Kothi No. 5, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi. The plaintiff, Manju Khanna, sought possession, damages/mesne profits and interest against tenant M/s Ronuk Industries Ltd.
According to the landlady, the company was inducted as a tenant under a Lease Agreement dated 29 July 1986 at ₹9,000 per month. She later served a notice dated 7 August 2003 terminating the tenancy and sought possession and damages at ₹1,000 per day.
The tenant presented a substantially different version.
It admitted that it had initially entered the premises as a tenant but claimed that the arrangement was actually with the landlady’s husband, Uma Shankar Khanna, who represented himself as the owner.
According to the company, because it required the property for its long-standing commercial business, the parties subsequently agreed that its possession would become permanent/perpetual.
Tenant’s ₹9,000 “Permanent Possession” Case
The company claimed that comparable properties in the locality could have been rented for approximately ₹1,000–₹1,500 per month, but it agreed to pay the unusually high amount of ₹9,000 because it was promised permanent possession.
It asserted that ₹9,000 per month would be paid for 20 years and included a component of refundable security or consideration for permanent possession.
In the proceedings, the company even characterised these payments as “EMI” for possession in perpetuity.
Procedural History
During trial, Manju Khanna moved an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC seeking a decree for possession on admissions.
The Civil Judge allowed it on 7 November 2016.
The Court found that despite the manner in which the defence had been framed, the company had admitted that:
- it entered the property as a tenant; and
- it had been paying ₹9,000 per month as rent.
The Civil Judge therefore granted possession while leaving the issue of damages/mesne profits for determination after evidence.
The Additional District Judge dismissed the company’s first appeal and affirmed the possession decree.
Ronuk Industries then approached the Delhi High Court in a Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC. The judgment was pronounced on 23 September 2026.
Appellant’s Arguments
Ronuk Industries argued that there was no clear and unequivocal admission capable of supporting a decree under Order XII Rule 6.
It denied execution of the lease relied upon by the landlady and contended that the nature of its possession required a full trial.
The company also argued that:
- evidence had already commenced and should have been completed;
- the alleged permanent-possession arrangement required examination at trial;
- the landlady had allegedly concealed documents relating to that arrangement;
- termination notice dated 7 August 2003 had never been served; and
- a ₹19.50 lakh bank draft prepared by the landlady in its favour demonstrated that money had been received as premium/security for permanent possession.
Respondent’s Position
The landlady relied primarily upon the company’s own written statement.
Even while disputing the written lease, the company had expressly pleaded that it was:
“initially inducted as a tenant”
and that rent was regularly paid.
It had also admitted payment of ₹9,000 per month through the plaintiff, although it claimed the money was ultimately intended for her husband.
Thus, the essential landlord-tenant relationship was admitted irrespective of the dispute concerning the written lease.
Analysis of the Law
1. Tenant’s Own Pleadings Established Tenancy
The High Court found the company’s admissions decisive.
Even if execution of the 1986 Lease Agreement was disputed, the company’s own written statement expressly admitted that it had initially entered the premises in the capacity of a tenant.
It also admitted payment of ₹9,000 per month.
Therefore, the case did not depend entirely upon proving the disputed written lease.
This provided a sufficient foundation for a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
2. Permanent Tenancy Could Not Be Created Orally
The company’s principal defence was that an agreement with the landlady’s husband subsequently transformed its occupation into permanent possession.
The High Court rejected this.
Any right to possess immovable property permanently or for a term requiring registration could only be created through a registered document.
No such registered instrument existed.
Accordingly, the alleged oral arrangement was legally incapable of creating the perpetual possession claimed by the tenant and was barred by the requirements of Section 17 of the Registration Act.
3. Paying High Rent Does Not Create Permanent Property Rights
Ronuk Industries emphasised that ₹9,000 per month was extremely high when comparable properties allegedly commanded only around ₹1,500.
The Court did not accept that this transformed rent into consideration for permanent ownership or possession.
Even assuming the commercial explanation was factually correct, a perpetual interest in immovable property could not arise merely because the tenant had paid a higher amount for many years.
The legal requirement of a registered instrument remained unsatisfied.
4. ₹19.50 Lakh Draft Did Not Prove Permanent Tenancy
The company relied heavily upon the landlady having prepared a ₹19.50 lakh demand draft in its favour.
According to Ronuk Industries, this represented refund of the premium/security received for permanent possession.
The High Court drew the opposite inference.
It held that the draft merely showed that the landlady, who had remained out of possession for decades, was keen to recover her property and was willing to return money received over the years to secure possession.
It did not establish that the company had been granted permanent rights.
5. Tenant Could Not Defeat Landlady’s Ownership
The company had also disputed Manju Khanna’s title and alleged that her husband may have purchased the property benami in her name.
The courts below rejected this defence on the principle of tenant estoppel under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act.
The High Court similarly noted that the plaintiff had acquired ownership through a Sale Deed.
Even assuming the company had been dealing primarily with her husband, this could not take away her ownership or her right to seek possession from a person who admittedly entered the premises as a tenant.
6. No Termination Notice? Filing the Suit Itself Was Sufficient
Ronuk Industries specifically denied receiving the legal notice dated 7 August 2003 terminating its tenancy.
The High Court held that even if this denial were accepted, it would not save the tenancy.
Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in M/s Nopany Investments (P) Ltd. v. Santokh Singh (HUF), the Court reiterated that even in the absence of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, institution of the eviction suit itself constitutes notice to quit.
The tenancy was therefore validly terminated.
7. Full Trial Was Still Necessary for Mesne Profits—But Not Possession
The company argued that because evidence had already commenced and applications for discovery remained pending, the Civil Judge should not have granted possession under Order XII Rule 6.
The High Court rejected this argument.
It distinguished between two components of the suit:
Possession: could be decided immediately because the material admissions were sufficient.
Damages/mesne profits: required evidence and had therefore correctly been kept pending.
Consequently, the need for evidence on mesne profits did not require the Court to defer an otherwise justified decree for possession on admissions.
Precedent Analysis
M/s Nopany Investments (P) Ltd. v. Santokh Singh (HUF)
The Supreme Court held that institution of an eviction suit under general law can itself constitute notice to quit, even where a separate Section 106 Transfer of Property Act notice is absent.
Sky Land International Pvt. Ltd. v. Kavita P. Lalwani
Relied upon by the Civil Judge while applying the principles governing estoppel against a tenant challenging the landlord’s title.
The judgment otherwise primarily turns on the company’s own pleadings and the statutory requirements governing creation of long-term rights in immovable property.
Court’s Reasoning
The High Court found three circumstances decisive.
First, the company itself admitted that it had originally entered the premises as a tenant and had been paying ₹9,000 monthly.
Second, its only substantive answer to the possession claim—that the tenancy had later become permanent—was legally unsustainable because no registered instrument created such a right.
Third, even its denial of the termination notice did not assist it because filing the eviction suit itself constituted sufficient notice to quit.
The two courts below had therefore correctly granted the landlady possession under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court held that no substantial question of law arose under Section 100 CPC.
The Regular Second Appeal was accordingly dismissed, leaving intact the decree directing Ronuk Industries to hand over possession to Manju Khanna.
Case: M/s Ronuk Industries Ltd. v. Manju Khanna
Court: Delhi High Court
Case No.: RSA 48/2019
Judge: Justice Neena Bansal Krishna
Reserved: 13 July 2026
Pronounced: 23 September 2026
Result: Second appeal dismissed; possession decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC upheld. The tenant’s alleged oral arrangement for permanent possession was unenforceable without a registered instrument.
