Public Trust Faces Alleged Mismanagement, Court Appoints Interim Committee Before Granting Leave; Supreme Court Says No Interim Orders Before Section 92 Leave
Court Appoints Committee to Manage Public Trust Before Granting Section 92 Leave; Supreme Court Says Suit Is Not Yet Instituted, Sets Rule Against Interim Relief
Facts
The dispute arose concerning People’s Education Trust, a public trust. Proceedings were initiated under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, along with an application seeking the Court’s leave to institute the suit.
While the leave application was still pending, the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mandya, passed an order dated 2 May 2025 under Order XL Rule 1(a) CPC, constituting an ad hoc committee comprising the existing trustees to manage the Trust’s day-to-day affairs pending further directions.
The Karnataka High Court set aside this order on 25 June 2025, holding that without leave under Section 92, the suit had not legally come into existence and the Civil Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to pass interlocutory orders.
This raised an important question on which different High Courts had taken conflicting positions. The Allahabad, Bombay, Kerala and Madras High Courts had recognised protective jurisdiction at the pre-leave stage, while the Orissa and Karnataka High Courts had taken the contrary view.
Issues
The Supreme Court framed the substantial question of law as:
Whether a Civil Court, when presented with a plaint under Section 92 CPC together with an application for leave to institute the suit, can pass protective or preservatory interim orders while the leave application itself remains pending?
Appellants’ Arguments
The appellants argued that a Civil Court cannot become a “mute spectator” merely because the Section 92 leave application has not yet been decided.
They contended that the Court retained power to appoint a receiver under Section 94 read with Order XL Rule 1 CPC, and alternatively through its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC.
They emphasised that unlike provisions governing temporary injunctions, Order XL Rule 1 does not expressly use the words “in any suit” and authorises appointment of a receiver over “any property” before or after decree.
The appellants further argued that a receiver merely acts as the “hand of the Court” to preserve and manage property until the parties’ rights are determined. Appointment of a receiver was therefore characterised as protective rather than adjudicatory.
Reliance was placed upon Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal to argue that Section 151 preserves inherent powers necessary to secure the ends of justice where the CPC does not expressly provide a remedy.
Respondents’ Arguments
The respondents argued that leave under Section 92 is a condition precedent to institution of the suit itself.
A leave application does not become a substantive proceeding merely because procedural rules require it to be separately registered.
Until leave is granted, according to them, there is no properly instituted suit and therefore no underlying proceeding in which an application for appointment of receiver can be entertained.
They further argued that the Trial Court had not identified any exceptional circumstances justifying the receiver/committee arrangement and had passed a cryptic order.
Analysis of the Law
1. Section 92 Leave Is a Mandatory Precondition
The Supreme Court examined the language of Section 92 closely.
Unlike an ordinary civil suit, which is ordinarily instituted by presentation of a plaint, Section 92 specifically requires persons interested in a public charitable or religious trust to have “obtained the leave of the Court.”
The Court held that the 1976 amendment deliberately shifted threshold scrutiny from the executive to the judiciary.
Accordingly, obtaining leave is a mandatory condition precedent to institution of a Section 92 suit concerning a public charity.
2. Section 92 Is Both a “Protective Shield” and a “Remedial Sword”
The Supreme Court described Section 92 in striking terms as simultaneously a:
“protective shield” and a “remedial sword.”
It enables persons genuinely interested in a public charitable or religious trust to approach the Court in cases of breach or mismanagement.
At the same time, the leave requirement protects public trusts and their trustees against vexatious or malicious litigation that could divert charitable resources towards unnecessary court proceedings.
Thus, Section 92 balances protection of trust property against protection of the trust itself from harassment.
3. Leave Application Is Only a Threshold Proceeding
The Supreme Court rejected the proposition that the application seeking leave itself constitutes the substantive proceeding.
It held that consideration of leave is merely a “threshold proceeding.”
The substantive Section 92 proceeding is the suit, and interlocutory orders can be passed only after leave has been granted.
Until then, there is no pending proceeding in which an interlocutory application can be entertained.
4. Order XL Receiver Cannot Be Appointed Before Leave
The Supreme Court held that Section 94 supplemental proceedings necessarily presuppose an existing underlying proceeding.
An application under Order XL Rule 1 cannot itself circumvent the “gateway proceeding” of obtaining Section 92 leave.
Until leave is granted:
there is no lis before the Court.
Consequently, an application for appointment of receiver under Order XL Rule 1(a) is not maintainable at that stage.
5. Section 141 Cannot Cure the Defect
The appellants’ reliance upon Section 141 CPC was also rejected.
The Supreme Court held that Section 141 extends CPC procedure to miscellaneous proceedings only insofar as applicable. It cannot be used to override substantive statutory safeguards.
The requirement of Section 92 leave and the consequences of appointment of a receiver affect substantive rights and cannot be treated merely as procedural formalities.
The expression “before or after decree” in Order XL itself presupposes the existence of a validly instituted suit.
6. Section 151 Cannot Override Section 92
The Court also rejected reliance on inherent powers.
Section 151 cannot be used where doing so would conflict with an express statutory scheme.
Since Section 92 is a special provision containing a specific safeguard, the Court’s general inherent jurisdiction cannot override it.
The Supreme Court applied the principle:
generalia specialibus non derogant — the general does not derogate from the special.
Thus, inherent jurisdiction exists to supplement existing jurisdiction; it cannot be invoked to create jurisdiction where none yet exists.
7. Calling the Receiver “Protective” Does Not Create Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that appointment of a receiver should be permitted because it is merely protective or preservatory.
The nature of the relief cannot supply jurisdiction where jurisdiction itself is absent.
More importantly, appointment of a receiver over a public trust can be highly intrusive because it may dislodge the existing management before the Court has even determined whether leave to sue should be granted.
If leave were subsequently refused, substantial prejudice could already have been caused to the trust’s management.
The Important Exception: Urgent Cases
The Supreme Court nevertheless recognised the practical difficulty that genuine emergencies may arise where immediate protection of public trust property is necessary.
Its solution is significant.
The Court held that in cases of compelling urgency, the Civil Court need not necessarily issue notice to the proposed defendants before deciding the Section 92 leave application.
Thus, where immediate intervention is genuinely required, the Court may:
first grant Section 92 leave ex parte for cogent reasons recorded in writing, and thereafter exercise its jurisdiction to grant appropriate interim protection.
Notice before grant of leave is ordinarily desirable, but absence of prior notice does not itself make the suit non-maintainable. The defendants remain entitled to seek revocation of the leave.
This is the practical distinction drawn by the judgment: the Court cannot grant interim relief while leave remains pending, but genuine urgency can justify deciding and granting leave without prior notice, after recording compelling reasons.
Precedent Analysis
R.M. Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar
The Supreme Court relied on this authority to reiterate that leave under Section 92 is mandatory and a suit instituted without the requisite leave is not maintainable.
Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra
The Court reiterated that a Section 92 action requires three cumulative conditions: a public charitable/religious trust; breach of trust or necessity for Court directions concerning administration; and relief falling within Section 92(1).
Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal
Although this case recognises inherent powers under Section 151, the Supreme Court distinguished the principle because inherent jurisdiction cannot operate contrary to an express statutory safeguard such as Section 92.
Muhammad Ali Khan v. Ahmad Ali Khan
The appellants relied heavily upon this Allahabad Full Bench judgment concerning protective jurisdiction and receivers.
The Supreme Court held it did not assist them because it concerned a private trust, whereas Section 92 governs public charitable or religious trusts.
Court’s Reasoning
The Supreme Court’s reasoning turns on the sequence mandated by Section 92:
Leave → Institution of Suit → Interlocutory Jurisdiction → Interim Relief.
That sequence cannot ordinarily be reversed.
Merely filing the plaint together with the leave application does not create a pending Section 92 suit capable of supporting a receiver, injunction or other protective order.
The Court therefore resolved the conflicting High Court positions by holding that a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to pass protective or preservatory interim orders while the Section 92 leave application remains undecided.
At the same time, the statutory framework does not require the Court to remain helpless in a genuine emergency: it can dispense with prior notice, grant leave for compelling reasons recorded in writing, and then consider interim protection.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court held:
A Civil Court cannot pass protective or preservatory interim orders in a Section 92 CPC matter before granting leave to institute the suit.
Leave is the mandatory jurisdictional gateway.
Neither Order XL Rule 1, Section 94, Section 141, nor the Court’s inherent powers under Section 151 CPC can bypass that statutory requirement.
However, in cases of genuine urgency, the Court may dispense with notice and grant Section 92 leave ex parte for compelling reasons recorded in writing, after which appropriate interim orders may be considered.
The appeals were accordingly dismissed, affirming the Karnataka High Court’s approach.
Case Details
Case: S. Panchalingu & Ors. v. People’s Education Trust (R) & Others
Court: Supreme Court of India
Citation: 2026 INSC 1010
Proceedings: Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 25577–25579 of 2025
Bench: Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Manmohan
Judgment by: Justice Manmohan
Date: 18 September 2026
Result: Appeals dismissed; Civil Court cannot grant interim protective relief before Section 92 leave, though prior notice may be dispensed with in compellingly urgent cases.
