Court’s Decision
The Delhi High Court dismissed a petition challenging a trial court’s order permitting the plaintiff to lead additional evidence after initially closing its evidence. The Court held that allowing additional evidence in the present case did not amount to giving the plaintiff an opportunity to “plug loopholes” since the defendant had not yet commenced its evidence. Emphasizing that justice demands disputes be decided on merits rather than technical defaults, the Court refused to interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution and upheld the trial court’s discretion.
Facts
The petitioner, defendant before the trial court, assailed an order dated 28.07.2025 whereby the trial court permitted the plaintiff to lead additional evidence even after having closed its earlier evidence. The plaintiff explained that while preparing for cross-examination of the defendant’s witnesses, it realized that certain witnesses had inadvertently not been examined. An application was filed before commencement of the defendant’s evidence seeking permission to produce those witnesses.
The trial court, after considering the application, allowed it on the ground that the testimony of such witnesses was relevant to the issues in controversy and would aid in arriving at the truth. It also observed that no prejudice would be caused to the defendant since its evidence had not yet begun. Aggrieved, the defendant approached the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.
Issues
- Whether permitting additional evidence after the plaintiff had closed its case amounts to allowing it to fill lacunae in its evidence.
- Whether the trial court’s order was perverse or suffered from legal infirmity warranting interference under Article 227.
- Whether the principle of deciding disputes on merits justified permitting additional evidence in such circumstances.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner contended that the impugned order improperly gave the plaintiff an opportunity to fill loopholes in its case. According to the petitioner, the plaintiff had voluntarily closed its evidence without examining all witnesses and provided no reasonable explanation for this omission. Permitting additional evidence at a later stage, it was argued, undermined procedural discipline and fairness. The petitioner submitted that the trial court’s decision lacked justification and should be set aside as contrary to law.
Respondent’s Arguments
The respondents did not appear before the High Court. However, before the trial court, the plaintiff had argued that the omission of certain witnesses was only realized when preparing for cross-examination of the defendant’s witnesses. Since the defendant’s evidence had not yet commenced, permitting additional evidence would cause no prejudice. Moreover, the testimony of the proposed witnesses was directly relevant to resolving the dispute on merits, making their examination necessary. The trial court accepted this reasoning and allowed the application.
Analysis of the Law
The High Court analyzed the scope of its supervisory powers under Article 227. Interference is warranted only where there is perversity, patent illegality, or manifest injustice in the subordinate court’s order. In matters relating to evidence, trial courts are vested with wide discretion, particularly when the additional material is relevant to the controversy and does not prejudice the opposite party.
The Court clarified that the concept of “filling lacunae” arises only at the stage of final arguments, after both parties have led their evidence. At that stage, a party may attempt to remedy weaknesses in its case by producing new evidence. In contrast, in this case, the plaintiff sought permission before the defendant had begun its evidence, thereby eliminating any element of unfair advantage.
The Court further emphasized the cardinal principle that disputes should be adjudicated on merits rather than dismissed on technical defaults. Procedural rules are intended to advance justice, not defeat it. Where omission is bona fide and can be compensated by costs, courts should lean towards allowing relevant evidence rather than excluding it.
Precedent Analysis
Though the order does not cite case law explicitly, the reasoning reflects well-established principles from prior Supreme Court and High Court rulings:
- K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy (2011) 11 SCC 275 – Held that courts have inherent powers to allow additional evidence if it is necessary for justice and does not prejudice the other side.
- Salem Advocate Bar Assn. v. Union of India (2005) 6 SCC 344 – Stressed that procedural laws are handmaids of justice and should not thwart substantial justice.
- Shyam Sunder v. Satya Narain (1980) 2 SCC 295 – Recognized that justice must be based on merits rather than technicalities.
These precedents collectively reinforce the High Court’s view that the trial court’s order was legally sound and in keeping with the principle of deciding disputes on merits.
Court’s Reasoning
The High Court reasoned that:
- The plaintiff’s request for additional evidence was made before the defendant commenced its own evidence.
- The trial court had specifically recorded that the proposed witnesses’ testimony was relevant to the dispute.
- No prejudice would be caused to the defendant since it would still have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses.
- Allowing the additional evidence was consistent with the principle of ensuring adjudication on merits rather than penalizing procedural lapses.
Finding no infirmity or perversity in the trial court’s reasoning, the High Court concluded that supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be invoked to interfere.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition challenging the trial court’s order. It upheld the trial court’s discretion in permitting additional evidence, holding that such permission was justified, non-prejudicial, and consistent with the principle of deciding disputes on merits. The accompanying applications were also dismissed.
Implications
This judgment reaffirms that courts must prioritize substantial justice over procedural rigidity. It highlights that:
- Additional evidence can be permitted if it aids in arriving at the truth and does not prejudice the opposite party.
- The doctrine of “filling lacunae” does not apply before both parties have concluded their evidence.
- Supervisory powers under Article 227 will not be exercised to interfere with reasoned trial court orders.
The decision serves as a reminder to litigants that courts will favour adjudication on merits rather than penalize bona fide omissions.
FAQs
Q1: Can a party introduce additional evidence after closing its case?
Yes, if the evidence is relevant and necessary for justice, and no prejudice is caused to the other party. Courts have discretion to allow it.
Q2: Does allowing additional evidence amount to filling loopholes?
Not always. “Filling lacunae” arises only when a party seeks to cover weaknesses after both sides have closed their evidence. If sought earlier, it is not treated as plugging loopholes.
Q3: When will High Courts interfere with such orders under Article 227?
Only if the trial court’s order is perverse, illegal, or manifestly unjust. Otherwise, supervisory jurisdiction is not invoked.
