Court’s decision
The Madras High Court vacated an ex parte interim injunction earlier granted in favour of a Chennai-based salon brand against a Udaipur-based salon accused of infringing its registered trademark “Bounce”. Justice N. Senthilkumar held that the term ‘Bounce’ is a generic and descriptive expression commonly used in the beauty and hairstyling industry, and therefore cannot be monopolised by one entity.
The Court observed that “the trademark ‘Bounce’ being a common trade expression cannot, by itself, confer an exclusive right unless it has acquired distinctive character or secondary meaning.” It further found that the two businesses operated in distinct geographical regions, with differing logos and target audiences, thus negating any immediate likelihood of confusion. Consequently, the Court vacated the injunction, allowing the defendant to continue operating under the name “Bounce Salon and Makeover Studio.”
Facts
The plaintiff, a prominent beauty and haircare enterprise with branches in major cities such as Chennai, Bengaluru, and Hyderabad, claimed ownership of several registered trademarks including “Kanya,” “Oryza,” and “Bounce.” The mark “Bounce” was first conceived in 2004 as part of the plaintiff’s expansion into unisex salons catering to affluent clients, and trademark registration was obtained under No. 1278997.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, operating three salons in Udaipur under the name “Bounce Salon and Makeover Studio,” had infringed its registered mark and diluted its goodwill. It argued that the identical use of “Bounce” in the defendant’s trade name was likely to deceive customers and amount to passing off.
An ex parte injunction was granted by the Madras High Court on 12 March 2025 restraining the defendant from using the word “Bounce” in any form. The defendant subsequently filed applications seeking to vacate the injunction, while the plaintiff filed multiple applications for contempt, claiming continued violation of the order.
Issues
- Whether the use of the term “Bounce” by the defendant constituted infringement of the plaintiff’s registered trademark and amounted to passing off.
- Whether the word “Bounce” was distinctive or generic in the context of the salon and beauty industry.
- Whether the geographical separation of business operations (Chennai and Udaipur) eliminated the possibility of confusion.
- Whether the ex parte injunction should continue pending trial.
Petitioner’s arguments
The plaintiff contended that it had been using the “Bounce” mark continuously for over 15 years, achieving extensive recognition and goodwill. The mark, along with its variants such as “Bounce Style Lounge” and “Bounce Academy,” was allegedly associated exclusively with its brand. It argued that the defendant’s use of an identical mark and similar get-up amounted to deliberate infringement and was intended to ride upon the plaintiff’s reputation.
The plaintiff further asserted that its registration under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 granted it nationwide protection irrespective of physical location, contending that “in the age of digital commerce, geographical boundaries cannot restrict the reach of a trademark.” It relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Midas Hygiene Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia (2004) 3 SCC 90, where it was held that in trademark infringement cases, injunctions should ordinarily follow upon proof of dishonest adoption.
Respondent’s arguments
The defendant argued that its business was confined exclusively to Udaipur, Rajasthan, and catered to a local clientele. It pointed out that the plaintiff’s operations were limited to metropolitan cities in South India and that no evidence had been produced to show any business activity, customer base, or reputation in Udaipur.
The defendant contended that ‘Bounce’ is a descriptive word commonly used in the hair and beauty industry to describe hair quality—specifically, fullness and vitality—and therefore cannot be monopolised. It also argued that its logo and trade name “Bounce Salon and Makeover Studio” were visually distinct, incorporating a graphic of scissors, stars, and a circular seal, making confusion highly unlikely.
Further, the defendant alleged delay and acquiescence, noting that the plaintiff had issued cease and desist notices as early as March 2023 but did not pursue legal action for nearly two years. It relied on the Delhi High Court’s decision in Arun Chopra v. Kaka-Ka Dhaba Pvt. Ltd. to argue that territorial and factual distinctions between businesses must be evaluated before granting injunctions.
Analysis of the law
The Court examined Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which stipulates that registration of a mark comprising several parts grants exclusive rights only to the mark taken as a whole, and not to its individual non-distinctive components. The Court emphasized that ‘Bounce’, being a word commonly used in hairstyling parlance, is non-distinctive and descriptive of a desirable hair quality. Hence, the plaintiff’s registration could not prevent others from bona fide descriptive use of the same word in their business names.
The Court also analyzed the classic three-pronged test for injunctions—prima facie case, irreparable loss, and balance of convenience. It held that the plaintiff had not established a strong prima facie case, as its mark was descriptive, the businesses operated in geographically separate regions, and there was no material to show confusion or loss of goodwill.
Precedent analysis
- Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia (2004) 3 SCC 90 – The Court acknowledged that injunctions ordinarily follow in cases of clear infringement but distinguished the present case since the mark was not distinctive and the adoption was not dishonest.
- Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (AIR 2001 SC 1952) – Cited for the test of deceptive similarity, including factors such as nature of goods, class of purchasers, and likelihood of confusion. The Court found these factors absent due to distinct trade areas and clientele.
- Maria Margadia Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria (2012) – Referred for caution against mechanical grant of injunctions, emphasizing that injunctions must not be granted without thorough examination, as they often decide the fate of civil suits.
- Arun Chopra v. Kaka-Ka Dhaba Pvt. Ltd. (Delhi HC) – Relied upon by the defendant to establish that localized reputation and geographical separation reduce the risk of confusion, which the Court accepted.
Court’s reasoning
Justice Senthilkumar noted that a comparison of the two marks revealed significant visual and structural differences. While the plaintiff’s mark consisted solely of the word “Bounce,” the defendant’s mark was “Bounce Salon and Makeover Studio” featuring a distinct logo. Applying Section 17(1) and (2) of the Trade Marks Act, the Court held that the defendant’s use of the mark as a whole was permissible.
The Court observed that the plaintiff’s claim of pan-India reputation was unsupported by evidence of commercial activity or brand presence in Udaipur. It emphasized that the likelihood of confusion must be assessed from the perspective of an average consumer, and a person seeking salon services in Chennai would not associate them with a salon operating exclusively in Rajasthan.
Concluding that “the term ‘Bounce’ cannot be treated as a proprietary brand element when used descriptively within its industry context,” the Court vacated the injunction, holding that continuing it would cause irreparable harm to the defendant’s local business.
Conclusion
The Madras High Court vacated the interim injunction granted on 12 March 2025, allowing the Udaipur salon to continue operations under the name “Bounce Salon and Makeover Studio.” It dismissed the plaintiff’s multiple contempt applications, finding no wilful disobedience.
The Court reiterated that trademark rights cannot be claimed over common industry terms unless proven to have acquired distinctiveness through extensive and exclusive use. The issue of infringement, it held, was a matter for trial, and maintaining an interim restraint in the meantime would cause disproportionate hardship to the defendant.
Implications
This judgment underscores that descriptive or generic marks—especially in service industries like salons, restaurants, or fashion—cannot be monopolized without proof of distinctiveness. It also reaffirms that geographical separation and lack of overlapping clientele weaken claims of confusion.
The decision sets an important precedent for small businesses operating under descriptive trade names, protecting them from overreach by larger corporations seeking nationwide exclusivity based merely on registration.
