Man Blames Hospital for Wife’s COVID Death and Seeks FIR After Magistrate and Sessions Court Refuse; Delhi High Court Dismisses Second Challenge
Failed Revision Cannot Be Repackaged as Inherent-Powers Petition Unless Grave Miscarriage of Justice Is Shown: Delhi High Court
Facts
The petitioner, Anil Ahluwalia, approached the Delhi High Court under Section 528 BNSS, challenging the Sessions Court’s order dated 19 April 2025 which had affirmed the Magistrate’s refusal to direct registration of an FIR under Section 175(3) BNSS, corresponding to the erstwhile Section 156(3) CrPC.
The complaint arose from the death of the petitioner’s wife during the COVID-19 pandemic in April 2021.
She tested positive for COVID-19 on 23 April 2021. On 25 April, she developed breathing difficulties. After Max Super Speciality Hospital allegedly refused admission because no bed was available, the petitioner took her to the respondent hospital.
According to the complainant, a hospital representative initially demanded ₹1 lakh in cash to arrange a bed, and his wife was eventually admitted after an advance payment of ₹50,000.
He further alleged that Remdesivir injections costing ₹25,000 each were prescribed, additional money was demanded and his wife’s oxygen supply was stopped on two occasions on 27 April 2021.
According to him, after the oxygen was allegedly stopped again at around 6:00 p.m., his wife was not properly attended to and died at approximately 7:27 p.m.
Hospital’s Version
The police Action Taken Report also recorded the respondents’ version.
According to the hospital, the patient’s oxygen saturation remained unstable and her death occurred despite treatment during a period when numerous COVID patients were losing their lives despite doctors’ efforts.
What the Magistrate Held
The Magistrate refused to direct registration of an FIR.
The reasoning was that the complainant already knew:
- the identity of the proposed accused;
- the relevant factual circumstances; and
- the evidence on which he intended to rely.
Consequently, police investigation was not presently necessary.
Importantly, however, the Magistrate did not dismiss the criminal complaint itself. The complaint was retained and listed for the complainant to lead pre-summoning evidence under Section 200 CrPC.
The Magistrate also observed that police assistance could subsequently be sought under Section 202 CrPC if necessary.
Revision Before Sessions Court
Anil Ahluwalia challenged that order before the Sessions Court.
The Sessions Court considered the allegations, relevant precedents concerning medical negligence and the Delhi Medical Council report, but upheld the Magistrate’s decision and dismissed the revision.
He then approached the High Court under its inherent powers.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner argued that the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS was distinct from revisional jurisdiction under Section 438 BNSS.
His counsel characterised the allegations as involving homicide as well as forgery of a prescription, contending that registration of an FIR and police investigation were therefore necessary.
He relied principally upon:
Krishnan v. Krishnaveni, and
Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra.
The argument was that merely because a litigant had already availed the remedy of criminal revision, the High Court was not completely deprived of its inherent powers.
Central Legal Issue
The real issue before the Delhi High Court was not whether the allegations ultimately established medical negligence or homicide.
The Court framed the question as the interplay between Section 438(3) BNSS and Section 528 BNSS.
Section 438(3) prevents a party who has already invoked revisional jurisdiction before one forum from filing another revision.
Section 528 preserves the High Court’s inherent powers.
The question therefore was:
Can a person who unsuccessfully challenged an order in revision before the Sessions Court approach the High Court under Section 528 BNSS to obtain substantially the same relief?
Analysis of the Law
1. Section 528 Cannot Become a Backdoor Second Revision
The Court held that the provisions substantially correspond to the earlier Sections 397(3) and 482 CrPC, and therefore the precedents interpreting those provisions continue to apply under the BNSS.
The High Court emphasised that inherent powers are undoubtedly broad, but they are not untrammelled.
What the legislature expressly prohibits through the bar on a second revision cannot ordinarily be achieved indirectly by styling the second challenge as a petition invoking inherent powers.
Otherwise, the prohibition under Section 438(3) would become meaningless.
2. Exception: Gross Injustice or Grave Miscarriage of Justice
The Court did not hold that inherent jurisdiction completely disappears after an unsuccessful revision.
An important exception remains.
Where the High Court finds:
- gross failure of justice;
- grave miscarriage of justice;
- abuse of judicial process;
- jurisdictional illegality; or
- a comparable exceptional circumstance,
it may still invoke its inherent jurisdiction despite the statutory bar.
But this power must be exercised sparingly and cautiously, rather than becoming a routine appellate or revisional mechanism.
Precedent Analysis
Krishnan v. Krishnaveni
This precedent actually established the limited nature of the exception.
The Supreme Court held that ordinarily a person barred from filing a second revision cannot circumvent Section 397(3) by invoking Section 482.
However, where examination of the record reveals grave miscarriage of justice, abuse of process, failure to follow statutory procedure or comparable illegality, the High Court retains power to intervene to secure the ends of justice.
Thus, Krishnan did not support unrestricted recourse to inherent powers after revision.
Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra
The Court distinguished this authority.
Dhariwal Tobacco dealt with whether a Section 482 petition could be rejected merely because an alternative remedy of revision was available.
That was materially different from the present case, where the petitioner had already availed the revisional remedy unsuccessfully and was attempting to re-agitate the same issue before the High Court.
Exclusive Capital Ltd. v. State, Government of NCT Delhi
Justice Girish Kathpalia also relied upon his recent 2026 decision in Exclusive Capital.
That judgment formulated the principle that an express prohibition against a second revision cannot ordinarily receive “backdoor entry” through inherent powers.
Interference may nevertheless occur in rare cases where the impugned order is clearly without jurisdiction, constitutes abuse of process or causes gross injustice.
Why There Was No “Gross Injustice” Here
This became decisive.
The Court asked whether refusing to direct registration of an FIR had left Anil Ahluwalia without any effective legal remedy.
The answer was no.
His criminal complaint had not been dismissed.
It remained pending before the Magistrate for pre-summoning evidence.
Therefore, he could:
lead evidence before the Magistrate;
attempt to establish the allegations against the proposed accused; and
if police assistance subsequently became necessary, the Magistrate retained power to seek such assistance at the appropriate stage.
Accordingly, refusal to immediately direct an FIR did not terminate his complaint or prevent him from pursuing criminal proceedings.
Important Distinction: FIR Refused, Complaint Not Dismissed
This is the practical significance of the judgment.
The High Court did not hold that the allegations concerning the hospital were false.
Nor did it finally adjudicate whether the doctors or hospital were guilty of medical negligence, homicide or forgery.
Instead, the Court held that the petitioner had an existing procedural remedy before the Magistrate, making this an inappropriate case for extraordinary intervention through inherent powers after an unsuccessful revision.
The Magistrate had merely refused to compel police investigation at that stage.
Court’s Reasoning
The High Court’s reasoning can be reduced to three propositions:
First, Section 438(3) BNSS expressly prevents repetitive revisional challenges.
Second, Section 528 BNSS cannot routinely be invoked to circumvent that statutory prohibition merely by changing the label of the proceeding.
Third, exceptional inherent jurisdiction remains available where there is gross injustice or grave miscarriage of justice—but Anil Ahluwalia could not satisfy that threshold because his private complaint remained pending before the competent Magistrate.
There was therefore no justification for the High Court to interfere with the concurrent, reasoned decisions of the Magistrate and Sessions Court.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court held that the matter was neither a case of gross injustice nor an exceptional case warranting invocation of inherent powers.
Since the petitioner’s complaint was already pending before the Magistrate for recording pre-summoning evidence, he had not been rendered remediless.
The petition under Section 528 BNSS was consequently dismissed as not maintainable.
Case: Anil Ahluwalia v. State NCT of Delhi & Ors.
Court: Delhi High Court
Case No.: CRL.M.C. 119/2026
Judge: Justice Girish Kathpalia
Reserved: 16 September 2026
Pronounced: 23 September 2026
Result: Petition dismissed as not maintainable. After unsuccessfully pursuing revision, Section 528 BNSS could not be used as a second challenge absent gross injustice; the complainant remained free to lead pre-summoning evidence before the Magistrate.
