1. Court’s decision
The Delhi High Court has dismissed a petition under Article 227 challenging a trial court order dated 15 October 2025 that refused to allow an amendment to a plaint in a suit pending for three decades. The Court held that the application was hopelessly belated, squarely barred by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and a transparent attempt to protract the trial at the stage of rebuttal arguments.
Noting that the petitioner had already moved — and lost — an earlier amendment application, the Court held that the present request amounted to re-litigation under a different label. The petitioner was also criticised for blaming “inadvertence of previous counsel,” which the Court termed a “deprecated practice.”
Finding the petition frivolous and abusive, the Court dismissed it with ₹25,000 costs, in addition to costs imposed earlier by the trial court, directing deposit with the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee.
2. Facts
The underlying suit for permanent and mandatory injunction was filed approximately 30 years ago to restrain demolition of portions of the suit property by municipal and development authorities. Evidence concluded years earlier, and both sides had already advanced final arguments.
At the stage of rebuttal arguments, the petitioner moved an application seeking to amend seven paragraphs of the plaint and the prayer clause, essentially to insert references to “defendant no. 2.”
The trial court rejected the amendment, holding:
• the suit was at the “fag end,”
• the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 was attracted,
• the petitioner had always been aware of the role of defendant no. 2,
• an earlier amendment application had already been dismissed on 24 July 2025, achieving finality, and
• allowing the amendment would reopen pleadings, necessitate fresh defence, and derail trial in a three-decade-old case.
The petitioner challenged this order before the High Court.
3. Issues
The High Court examined the following:
- Whether the amendment application complied with the due diligence requirement under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC.
- Whether the petitioner had justified why the proposed amendments could not have been made earlier.
- Whether a second amendment application, following a previously dismissed one, was maintainable.
- Whether allowing the amendment would prejudice the defence and delay final adjudication.
- Whether the trial court’s order suffered from any jurisdictional error warranting interference under Article 227.
4. Petitioner’s arguments
The petitioner argued that:
• unless the amendment was allowed, the suit would not be “completely adjudicated upon,”
• the additional facts were merely clarificatory and necessary for effective adjudication, and
• the “residuary prayer clause” of the plaint already contemplated the relief now sought to be detailed.
The petitioner further attempted to justify delay by stating that prior counsel had “inadvertently omitted” to include these pleadings earlier.
No other substantial submission was advanced.
5. Respondents’ arguments
The respondents relied on the trial court’s reasoning, pointing out that:
• the petitioner had been aware of all facts since the beginning,
• the suit was at the final stage and nearly concluded,
• an earlier amendment application had already been rejected and not appealed,
• the proposed changes were intended only to delay the decree,
• allowing amendment would require fresh pleadings and reopening of trial, which would be prejudicial and contrary to the interest of justice.
They submitted that the trial court’s order was justified and required no interference.
6. Analysis of the law
A. Proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC strictly bars late-stage amendments
The Court emphasised that once the suit has reached the stage of final arguments, the proviso applies, requiring the applicant to show:
- that the facts sought to be pleaded were not within knowledge earlier, and
- could not have been discovered despite due diligence.
Here, the petitioner:
• always knew of defendant no. 2’s role,
• never pleaded these facts in the earlier amendment application,
• and furnished no due diligence explanation.
Thus, the statutory bar applied squarely.
B. Earlier amendment order had attained finality
The Court held that an earlier application for amendment had already been rejected by the trial court in July 2025. The petitioner did not challenge that order.
Hence, the second attempt was a collateral attack and an abuse of process.
C. Allowing amendment would irreparably delay a 30-year-old suit
If granted, the amendment would:
• permit defendant no. 2 to file fresh pleadings,
• reopen evidence,
• revive trial,
• prolong the litigation indefinitely.
The Court held this would be the “worst travesty of justice” in the context of a suit already pending for three decades.
D. “Blaming previous counsel” is not a ground
The Court expressed strong disapproval of litigants maligning their former counsel to justify delay.
It held that such a practice must be discouraged, especially when counsel is not before the Court to defend against such allegations.
E. No jurisdictional error warranting Article 227 intervention
The High Court under Article 227 does not sit as an appellate court. The trial court’s order was well-reasoned, based on settled principles, and free from perversity.
7. Precedent analysis
The judgment does not cite case names, but it affirms the settled jurisprudence on:
Order VI Rule 17 (Amendment of Pleadings)
• Late-stage amendments require strict scrutiny.
• Due diligence is mandatory.
• Amendments after trial commencement must be exceptional.
Article 227 jurisdiction
• Interference is warranted only when the order is perverse, illegal, or without jurisdiction.
• Mere disagreement on merits does not justify intervention.
Litigation delay principles
• Courts must prevent misuse of procedural devices to prolong suits.
• A 30-year pendency heightens the need for finality.
8. Court’s reasoning
The Court concluded:
• the petitioner was always aware of defendant no. 2’s presence and role;
• the amendment was clearly barred under Order VI Rule 17;
• the petitioner had filed an earlier amendment application and selectively omitted these facts;
• the belated request was an attempt to obstruct final adjudication;
• the trial court’s reasoning was correct on all counts;
• no interference was warranted under Article 227.
The Court characterised the petition as frivolous, motivated by a desire to “somehow protract proceedings,” and liable for costs.
9. Conclusion
The petition was dismissed.
The Court:
• upheld the trial court’s refusal to allow amendment;
• imposed ₹25,000 costs, to be deposited with the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee within two weeks;
• declined to entertain pending applications.
The judgment restores momentum to long-stalled litigation and sends a strong signal against procedural misuse.
10. Implications
This ruling reinforces that:
• Late-stage amendments in long-pending suits face a very high bar.
• Due diligence must be proven with specificity, not asserted casually.
• Attempts to reopen pleadings at final argument stage will be rejected absent compelling necessity.
• Blaming previous counsel is unacceptable and not a legally valid explanation.
• Article 227 cannot be invoked to revisit factual, discretionary, or procedural decisions lacking jurisdictional error.
The judgment further discourages dilatory litigation tactics and promotes finality in cases delayed over decades.
Case Law References
(Drawn from principles invoked in the judgment; no cases expressly cited.)
• Order VI Rule 17 jurisprudence — strict application of due-diligence proviso.
• Article 227 standards — supervisory, not appellate, jurisdiction.
• Doctrine against procedural abuse — courts must curb delay tactics in long-pending suits.
FAQs
1. When can a court refuse amendment of pleadings under Order VI Rule 17?
When the suit is at an advanced stage and the applicant cannot show due diligence or explain why the amendment was not sought earlier.
2. Can an amendment be allowed after final arguments have begun?
Only in exceptional circumstances. Courts strictly apply the proviso at this stage, especially in old suits.
3. Is blaming previous counsel a valid reason for delay in seeking amendment?
No. Courts treat such explanations as vague and unacceptable.
